
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THE COLLECTED WORKS

OF

DUGALD STEWART.

THE COLLECTED WORKS

OF

DUGALD STEWART, ESQ., F.R.SS.

HONORARY MEMBER OF THE IMPERIAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AT ST. PETERSBURG;
MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ACADEMIES OF BERLIN AND OF NAPLES; OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETIES OF PHILADELPHIA AND OF BOSTON;
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IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.

59891

SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME.

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

TRANSLATIONS

OF THE

PASSAGES IN FOREIGN LANGUAGES

CONTAINED IN

THE COLLECTED WORKS

OF

DUGALD STEWART.

WITH GENERAL INDEX.

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EDINBURGH: T. CONSTABLE,
PRINTER TO THE QUEEN AND TO THE UNIVERSITY.

PREFACE.

The following Translations have been prepared in conformity with instructions contained in the Trust Settlement of Miss Stewart, with reference to the publication of the present Edition of Mr. Stewart's Works. In providing for the issue of this volume as a Supplement to the Collected Works, Miss Stewart only gave effect to the wish of their Author. Mr. Stewart has rendered into English many of the passages in foreign languages contained in his writings; and in the Preface to the *Active and Moral Powers*, his latest work, he thus expresses himself with reference to those quotations: "I regret that the state of my health did not enable me to accompany all of them with an English version. But should a second edition of this work ever be called for, I flatter myself that some friendly hand will supply the omission."[1]

In the Translations now offered to the public, nothing has been aimed at beyond a clear and faithful rendering of the originals.

To the Translations there is added a General Index, which is designed to facilitate reference to the *Collected Works*.

[1] *Active and Moral Powers* vol. i., Preface; *Coll. Works*, vol. vi. p. 116.

Edinburgh, *January* 1860.

TRANSLATIONS.

VOL. I.

Page 3, note, col. 2, line 11.—The art of healing is not posterior to the science, but, after the discovery of the art, the science was investigated.—*Celsus.*

P. 7, n. 1, l. 9.—Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, Poetry, Music, and their several divisions, constitute the third general class that has its source in imagination, and the parts of which are comprehended under the name of Fine Arts. They may be all referred to Poetry, if we take the term in its natural acceptation, which is simply *invention* or *creation.*—*D'Alembert.*

P. 7, n. 2, l. 6.—If we have not placed, with Bacon, Reason after Imagination, it is because we have followed, in the encyclopædical arrangement, the metaphysical order of the operations of the mind, in preference to their historical development since the revival of letters. —*D'Alembert.*

P. 8, n. 1, l. 5.—To imagine is simply to contemplate the form or image of a corporeal thing.—*Descartes.*

P. 9, n., c. 1, l. 4.—Bacon, however, has on some points been justly censured. . . . It has been remarked that his classification of the sciences rests on a distinction far from rigorous, since Memory, Reason, and Imagination necessarily concur in every art, as well as in every science. It may, however, be urged in reply, that one or other of these three faculties may yet play the principal part, the others acting in subordination to it. Taking the distinction of Bacon in this sense, the accuracy of his classification remains unquestionable, and its great utility becomes apparent.—*Degerando.*

P. 12, n. 1, c. 1, l. 11.—We have too deep a conviction of the arbitrariness that must always prevail in a division of such a nature, to believe that our system is the only one or the best; we shall be satisfied, if our efforts be not wholly disapproved by the intellectual. . . . If the enlightened public accord its approbation to these changes, our readiness to take advantage of hints will be rewarded; if the verdict be against us, we shall only thereby be the more firmly persuaded of the impossibility of forming an encyclopædical tree that shall be to every one's taste.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 18, n., c. 1, l. 1.—Under Physical Science I comprehend Logic, which is the knowledge of the operations of our mind, and of the generation of our ideas; Metaphysics, which is occupied with the nature and origin of beings; and finally Physics, properly so called, which observes the mutual action of bodies, and the causes and concatenation of sensible phenomena; *to these might be added History.* —*Turgot.*

P. 22, l. 25.—Laws of laws from which we can determine what is right or wrong in the appointments of each individual law.—*Bacon.*

P. 24, n., c. 2, l. 3.—Begetting and rearing children, they transmit from one to another life, as runners the torch.—*Plato.*

And, like to racers, pass life's torch along.—*Lucretius.*

P. 28, n. 1, c. 2, l. 20.—Vives, in the literary course, contends as successfully as energetically, and if I am not mistaken in my estimate of the character and ability of the man, he will never rest until he has distanced all his competitors.—*Erasmus.*

P. 29, n. 2, l. 2.—I sincerely believe that it is impossible the Church can be reformed, unless the canons, decretals, scholastic theology, philosophy, logic, as they now exist, be thoroughly uprooted, and others of a different character instituted.—*Luther.*

P. 29, n. 4, c. 2, l. 8.—You will not persuade me that philosophy is that babbling about matter, motion, infinity, place, vacuum, time, which are almost the only topics we have any information upon in Aristotle; and which can in no way whatever improve either the intellect, affections, or social manners of men, tending only to sow and breed strife.—*Luther* (in Bayle).

P. 29, n. 4, c. 2, l. 19.—There is nothing I more ardently desire, than, if leisure be permitted me, to unveil to the many that stage-player (Aristotle), who has so thoroughly deluded the Church in his

Greek mask, and display his ignominy before the world. I have on hand some brief notes on the first book of the Physics, in which I am resolved to act anew the fable of Aristæus on this Proteus of mine (Aristotle). It is the chief part of my cross, to be compelled to see the finest minds among my brethren, fitted by nature for profitable studies, spending their lives upon such rubbish, and reaping no return.—*Luther.*

P. 30, n. 2, l. 1.—And to Melanchthon, indeed, is chiefly due the continued retention of the Aristotelic philosophy in the schools of the Protestants. He composed the compends of most of the courses of the Aristotelic philosophy, that for long were in use in the academies.—*Heineccius.*

P. 33, n. 2, l. 1.—Our method, as we have often said, is the offspring of a certain good fortune rather than of talent, of time rather than of intelligence.—*Bacon* (N. O. lib. i. cap. cxxii.)

P. 35, n., l. 1.—Nor should we omit to mention the prophecy of Daniel of the last days of the world,—*Many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased* (Dan. xii. 4),—which clearly intimates and betokens the design of the fates, that is, of Providence, to bring about, at the same epoch, the completion of the circuit of the globe (now accomplished, or at least in process of fulfilment, by means of so many distant voyages), and the increase of the sciences.—*Bacon.*

P. 36, n. 1, l. 21.—The sight of the microscope would have startled Democritus, and he would have thought that he was now within reach of the atom which he alleged was wholly invisible.—*Bacon.*

P. 36, n. 1, c. 2, l. 33.—The invention of printing has doubtless contributed to the progress of the human race; but the invention was itself a consequence of the habit of reading that had become general in a great many countries.—*Condorcet.*

P. 37, l. 32.—These, and other matters of this kind, lie hid in the pandects of a future age, not to be known until God, the disposer of the ages, shall have laid open this book to men.—*Kepler.*

P. 39, n., c. 1, l. 23.—Who counsel the exile of reason from the moral precepts that are taught in the Holy Scriptures, and inconsiderately adopt the absurd and anomalous opinion of Luther (admirably and with great elegance refuted by Melchior Canus, *Loc. Theol.* lib. ix., x.), and teach doctrines which, if they should find followers, would lead to a confusion of all moral precepts, and render revelation itself absolutely useless and inefficacious.—*Lampredi.*

P. 40, n. 1, l. 1.—And nevertheless the doctors, *angelic*, *cherubic*, *seraphic*, polluted not only the whole of philosophy and theology with as many errors as they could, but carried even into moral philosophy those execrable doctrines of *probabilism*, *the method of directing the intention*, *mental reservation*, *philosophical sin*, in which even yet the Jesuits take a wonderful delight.—*Heineccius.*

P. 42, l. 6.—One of the greatest evils resulting to the State from the despotic authority of the ministers of last century, is the practice they introduced, through a misapprehension of their private interests, of always supporting the superior at the expense of the inferior. This maxim is Machiavel's, whom the majority of his readers do not understand, and whom the rest believe to have been clever, because he was uniformly wicked. He is far from being an able writer, and is very often erroneous; but on no point more so, in my opinion, than on the present.—*Cardinal de Retz.*

P. 44, l. 5.—But if we come to the men, it is sufficiently well known what sort of vicars of Christ we shall find; Julius, for example, and Leo, and Clement, and Paul, were pillars of the Christian faith, and supreme interpreters of religion, who knew nothing more of Christ than what they had learned in the school of Lucian. But why enumerate three or four Pontiffs, as if it were at all a matter of doubt what kind of religion the Pontiffs, with the whole College of Cardinals, have long ago professed? The first head of the secret theology that prevails among them is, that there is no God; the other, that whatever is written of Christ is mere lies and imposture. —*Calvin.*

P. 45, n. 1, l. 4.—He said that if he had held truth in his hands like a bird, he would have smothered it; so useless and dangerous to the human race did he consider the most beautiful gift of heaven.—*Baron de Grimm.*

P. 45, n. 1, l. 20.—Both carried too far their decisive, though apparently gentle, revolt against the gods and laws of Parnassus; but the freedom of the views of La Motte seems to be more closely connected with the personal interest he had in maintaining them, and the freedom of Fontenelle with the general interest, occasionally, perhaps, imperfectly understood, which he took in the progress of reason in all classes.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 45, n. 1, c. 2, l. 8.—The subtlety of La Motte is more explicitly developed; that of Fontenelle leaves more to the sagacity of the

reader. La Motte, without loading his subject, neglects nothing that is pertinent, is skilful in bringing everything to bear on his point, and seems afraid of losing any advantage by too delicate reticence; Fontenelle, without once being obscure, except to those who do not deserve that an author should be clear, affords at once the pleasure of supplying what he omits to express, and the expectation that there is still more to be reached by those who prove themselves worthy of it. —*D'Alembert.*

P. 48, l. 33.—Augustine, indeed, after reading the *Hortensius* of Cicero, a book in praise of philosophy, writes, that he was wont to admire it so much, that he asked for nothing more in it except the name of Jesus Christ. He ingenuously acknowledges even that it was the perusal of this book which inflamed him with a desire after the contemplation of Christian, that is, of true philosophy.—*Schottus.*

P. 49, n. 2, l. 14.—An admirable work, learned, varied, clear, but full to overflowing of envy and hatred of Aristotle.—*Brucker.*

P. 49, n. 2, c. 2, l. 1.—In which discussion, we allow, the learning of Patricius shines pre-eminent; the refinement of his mind is worthy of the highest admiration, and, what deserves the first place, he manifests an uncommon acquaintance with ancient philosophy. By his assistance, as we have gratefully acknowledged in the proper place, we have been able on many occasions to shed light on the history of Peripateticism.—*Brucker.*

P. 49, n. 3, l. 1.—*Antibarbarus; or, of the True Principles and Mode of Philosophising against Pseudo-Philosophers;* Parma, 1553. The pseudo-philosophers were all the schoolmen, past and present; and Nizolius stands up with the greatest boldness in opposition to their monstrous doctrines and barbarous language. The prolonged and unremitting admiration of Aristotle only proved, he said, the multitude of fools and the duration of their folly.—*Fontenelle.*

P. 50, n. 2, l. 7.—He was the first to discover that there was a law of war, and that it could be taught, and to expound the rules of war and peace, and perhaps suggested to Grotius the idea of composing his work. He is a man worthy before others of commemoration; for he increased the glory of his native Italy, whence he drew the system of Roman law, and was the means of placing the land that had been the restorer and nurse of all good arts, in the position of first mistress of Natural Jurisprudence.—*Lampredi.*

P. 51, n., c. 2, l. 6.—Uprightness is the guardian of king and people; not the rude state-craft of the Machiavelians.—*Campanella.*

P. 52, n. 1, l. 1.—A magistrate above all encomium; the type according to which all have been judged who, without his courage and learning, have since his time presumed to sit on the same tribunal.—*Henault.*

P. 52, n. 2, l. 4.—A man of penetrating and ardent genius, and gifted with marvellous eloquence; at that time a theologian of great reputation among the Protestants.—*Thuanus.*

P. 53, n. 2, c. 2, l. 12.—As in this work (*De Republica*) he obtained the credit of being not only tinctured, but imbued with the most varied learning, so, in the estimation of some judicious persons, he showed himself in it not wholly free from *the ostentation inherent in the race.—Thuanus.*

P. 56, n. 1, c. 2, l. 5.—So critical and hazardous a thing is it to discourse of those matters, unless you ever take for your cynosure God, the Catholic faith, and the judgment of the Church.—*Martin del Rio.*

P. 58, n., c. 1, l. 11.—If we are inclined to refuse to John Bodin the character of an accurate and judicious writer, we must, without dispute, allow to him great genius, vast learning, marvellous memory and acquaintance with books.—*Bayle.*

P. 58, n. 1, l. 10.—The art of printing alone may easily vie with all the discoveries of the ancients. They, accordingly, who allege that all things were comprehended by the ancients, are not less in error than those who deny them the long-continued possession of many arts. Nature holds innumerable stores of sciences, which time can never exhaust.—*Bodin.*

P. 58, n. 1, c. 2, l. 10.—That age which is called *golden* would, if compared with ours, appear *iron.—Bodin.*

P. 58, n. 2, l. 7.—Than whom (Budæus), says Ludovicus Vives, Gaul at no time, nor Italy itself in this age, produced a man of more subtle genius, more penetrating judgment, more painstaking industry, or greater erudition.

P. 59, n. 1, l. 3.—The younger we are, the more sharpsighted, for as we are thus later in the order of time, we enter into the labours of our predecessors.—*Roger Bacon.*

P. 59, n. 1, l. 9.—The period will arrive when time, and the inquiry of a distant age, will bring to light the things that are now

concealed. The day will come in which our posterity will marvel at our ignorance of the truths that appear (to them) so obvious.—*Seneca.*

P. 59, n 2, l. 8.—Barbarism being at length repelled, Peter Ramus, a man of more polite learning, had the boldness to attack Aristotle, on every point with greater ardour and freedom, and severely censure the whole Peripatetic philosophy. His *Dialectica* acquired in a brief period a very high reputation among great numbers, especially students of eloquence, who detested the scholastics,—their diction and style being far from agreeable to admirers of Cicero.—*Sanderson.*

P. 60, n. 1, l. 3.—A man (Ramus), not to speak too severely, *somewhat acute and talkative.* I can hardly, indeed, restrain my indignation from treating him as he merits, and hurling back with greater force on his own head the reproaches he throws out against the ancients.—*Barrow.*

P. 60, n. 1, l. 25.—In the logic of Aristotle we get but a single example of a precept, and most frequently not even one; but no workman ever acquired perfection in his art by a solitary example. To this end there is need of a number of these not all alike. And, in sooth, of what nature are the illustrations of Aristotle when they are not positively erroneous? All *b* is *a*; all *c* is *b*; therefore all *c* is *a*. The illustrations to youths fresh from the grammarians and the orators, and unacquainted with the terms of the mute mathematicians, is strange and difficult; and, throughout the whole of the Analytics, he has made use of this diction, which is neither Attic, Ionic, Doric, Æolic, nor the vulgar, but geometrical, and hateful to youths, unknown to the people, strange to common sense, and as foreign as may be from the practice of rhetoric and liberal science.—*Ramus.*

P. 62, n. 2, c. 2, l. 14.—

[Then the Tarpeian cliff
And capitol he shows], now bright with gold,
Then dusk with horrid shades.—*Virgil* (Kennedy).

P. 65, n. 1, l. 1.—The use of this feigned history hath been to give some shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of things doth deny it, the world being in proportion inferior to the soul, by reason whereof there is, agreeable to the spirit of man, a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more absolute variety, than can be found in the nature of things. Therefore, because the acts or events of true history have not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind of man, poesy feigneth acts and

events greater and more heroical; because the history propoundeth the successes and issues of actions, not so agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice; therefore poesy feigns them more just in retribution, and more according to revealed providence; because true history representeth actions and events more ordinary and less interchanged; therefore poesy endureth them with more rareness, and more unexpected and alternative variations; so as it appeareth that poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality, and to delectation.—*Bacon* (Advancement of Learning).

P. 65, n. 2, l. 2.—Doctrine of the compact, or the common bond of mind and body.—*Bacon.*

P. 65, n. 2, l. 14.—With reference to another point which pertains to this subject, inquiry has been extremely sparing, and not at all proportioned either to the subtlety or the utility of the matter: *how far, to wit, the imagination itself, or the thought strongly fixed, and exalted, as it were, to a species of faith, is able to change and modify the body of the imaginant.—Bacon.*

P. 65, n. 2, l. 30.—Incident unto this is the inquiry how to raise and fortify the imagination; for if the imagination fortified have power, then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it. And herein came in crookedly and dangerously a palliation of a great part of ceremonial magic.—*Bacon* (Advancement of Learning).

P. 67, n. 1, l. 8.—In order to understand these, we do not require to investigate *the nature of the mind;* it is sufficient that we prepare a historic sketch of the mind or its perceptions in the way Verulamius teaches.—*Spinoza.*

P. 67, c. 2, l. 5.—All the modes of thinking of which we are conscious, may be referred to two general classes, the one of which is *perception*, or the operation of the understanding, and the other *volition*, or the operation of the will. *Thus to perceive by the senses, to imagine and to conceive objects purely intelligible, are only different modes of perceiving;* but to desire, to be averse from, to affirm, to deny, to doubt, are different modes of willing.—*Descartes.*

P. 72, l. 14.—See above, p. 22, l. 25.

P. 76, n. 1, l. 1.—In France, the celebrity of the writings of Chancellor Bacon dates almost from the Encyclopædia.—*Montucla.*

P. 76, n. 1, c. 2, l. 3.—An astonishing precision in matters of no moment.—*Le Clerc.*

P 89, l. 17.—The schoolmen, I admit, abound in trifles; *but there is gold amid that rubbish.—Leibnitz.*

P. 100, n. 2, c. 2, l. 21.—Engaging in a contest with the course of nature, they are eager to bestow on that which of all things is the most fleeting and perishable, and most exposed to every change of fortune, a perpetuity which they themselves neither do nor can possess. —*Buchanan.*

P. 101, n., c. 1, l. 1.—Feeling his end approaching, he (Montaigne) caused mass to be said in his room. On the elevation of the host, he raised himself on his bed to adore it, but was so weak that he expired in the act, 15th Sept. 1592, aged sixty.—*Nouv. Dict. Hist.* (*Lyons.*)

P. 105, n., c. 1, l. 15.—You are aware how far that matter (*the argument for the Christian religion*) has been advanced by the *philosophic subtlety* of Raymond of Sebonde, the varied dialogues of Ludovicus Vives, the vast erudition also, and lofty eloquence of your countryman, Philip Mornæus.—*Hugo Grotius.*

P. 105, n., c. 2, l. 5.—This book (Raymond of Sebonde's *Natural Theology*) presents certain bold peculiarities that gratified the philosophers of the age in which it appeared, and that would not be unacceptable in ours.—*Nouv. Dict. Hist.*

P. 105, n., c. 2, l. 16.—(He gave him) a dress according to French style, and stripped him of his wild bearing and uncouth mien, so that he has henceforward manners enough to permit of his being presented in good society.—*Montaigne.*

P. 107, n. 1, l. 1.—Amiable man, how gentlemanly he is! He is an old friend of mine, but, for that very reason, he is now new to me. —*Madame de Sevigné.*

P. 107, n. 2, l. 11.—I write my book for a few people and a few years; if it had been designed to occupy a durable place, it would have been necessary to clothe it in a language of greater maturity. From the constant variation that has attended ours up to this hour, who can expect that its present form will be that in use fifty years hence? It is daily flowing through our hands, and, in my own time, it has changed to the extent of a half. We say that it has now reached perfection; so says each age of its own. *It is for good and useful works to attach it permanently to them, and its fortune will rise and fall with the reputation of our country.—Montaigne.*

P. 112, n. 2, c. 2, l. 1.—In every branch it is but the chiefs of the sect whose works reach a certain *éclat;* Bacon was not of this number,—the form of his philosophy was opposed to sects; he was too much of a sage to astonish.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 116, n. 1, l. 20.—It has caused surprise that Descartes, in his *Metaphysical Meditations*, has said nothing of the immortality of the soul. But he tells us himself in one of his letters, that having in that work clearly established the distinction of mind and matter, it necessarily followed that the soul, from its nature, could not perish with the body.—*Thomas.*

P. 116, n. 1, c. 2, l. 10.—I do not concur in the opinion, that immortality is merely probable by the light of nature; for I believe it to be matter of certainty, that the mind can be destroyed only by a miracle.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 119, n. 1, l. 1.—While we thus reject all of which we can entertain the smallest doubt, and even imagine that it is false, we easily indeed suppose that there is neither God, nor sky, nor bodies, and that we ourselves even have neither hands nor feet, nor finally a body; but we cannot in the same way suppose that we are not while we doubt of the truth of these things; for there is a repugnance in conceiving that what thinks does not exist at the very time when it thinks. Accordingly, the knowledge, *I think, therefore I am*, is the first and most certain that occurs to one philosophising orderly.—*Descartes* (Eng. Trans.)

P. 119, n. 2, l. 5.—When I make myself the object of reflection, I not only find that I am an incomplete [imperfect] and dependent being, and one who unceasingly aspires after something better and greater than he is; but, at the same time, I am assured likewise that he upon whom I am dependent possesses in himself all the good after which I aspire [and the ideas of which I find in my mind], and that not merely indefinitely and potentially, but infinitely and actually, and that he is thus God. And the whole force of the argument of which I have here availed myself to establish the existence of God, consists in this, that I perceive I could not possibly be of such a nature as I am, and yet have in my mind the idea of God, if God did not in reality exist. This same God, I say, whose idea is in my mind, that is, a being who possesses all those lofty perfections, of which the mind may have some slight conception, without, however, being able fully to comprehend them, and who is wholly superior to all defect [and has nothing that marks imperfection]: whence it is sufficiently manifest that he cannot be a deceiver, since it is a dictate of the natural light that all fraud and deception spring from some defect.—*Descartes* (Eng. Trans.)

P. 120, n. 1, c. 2, l. 13.—Notwithstanding all the sagacity he had exercised in proving the existence of God, he was accused of denying it *by clergymen who perhaps did not believe it.—D'Alembert.*

P. 121, n. 1, l. 1.—I am not the assemblage of members called the human body; I am not a thin and penetrating air diffused through all these members, of wind, or flame, or vapour, or breath. . . . But what then am I? *A thinking thing*, it has been said; but what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands [conceives], affirms, desires, wills, refuses, &c.—*Descartes* (Eng. Trans.)

P. 122, n. 1, l. 1.—Therefore I know that nothing of all that I can embrace in imagination belongs to the knowledge which I have of myself, and that there is need to recall with the utmost care the mind from this mode of thinking, that it may be able to know its own nature with perfect distinctness.—*Descartes* (Eng. Trans.)

P. 122, n. 1, l. 10.—To imagine is nothing more than to contemplate the figure or image of a corporeal thing.—*Descartes* (Eng. Trans.)

P. 123, n. 1, l. 1.—Descartes bore arms at first in Holland, under the celebrated Maurice of Nassau; then in Germany, under Maximilian of Bavaria, at the commencement of the Thirty Years' War. He afterwards passed into the service of the Emperor Ferdinand II., that he might obtain a closer view of the troubles in Hungary. It is believed, also, that, at the siege of Rochelle, he fought as a volunteer, in an engagement with the English fleet.—*Thomas.*

P. 124, n. 1, l. 2.—The mathematics, which Descartes held sufficiently cheap, form, nevertheless, at this hour, the most solid and least contested ground of his fame.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 124, n. 1, l. 10.—As a philosopher, he was perhaps equally great, but not so happy. Geometry, which from the nature of its object must always be progressing without retrograding, could not fail, in the hands of so great a genius, of making very sensible progress, and such as all would recognise. Philosophy was in a very different condition, everything had to be begun; and what must we not pay for the first steps in any branch of science! The merit of making them at all, entitles a man to be excused if they are but small.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 126, n. 2, l. 8.—It is thus manifest that to say we perceive colours in objects, is in reality equivalent to saying we perceive something in objects, and are yet ignorant of what it is, except as

that which determines in us a certain highly vivid and clear sensation, which we call the sensation of colours. . . . But when we think we perceive colours in objects, although we are in reality ignorant of what we then denominate colour, and are unable to conceive any resemblance between the colour we suppose to be in objects, and that of which we are conscious in sensation, yet because we do not observe this, or because there are in objects several properties, as size, figure, number, &c., which, as we clearly know, exist, or may exist in them as they are perceived by our senses, or conceived by our understanding, we easily glide into the error of holding that what is called colour in objects is something entirely resembling the colour we perceive, and thereafter of supposing that we have a clear perception of what is in no way perceived by us.—*Descartes* (Eng. Trans.)

P. 127, n. 2, l. 1.—I have often wondered that so great men as Descartes and Malebranche, with their followers, should have put it forward as a rare discovery of their philosophy, *that heat is in ourselves, and not in fire;* whereas the generality of men remark, that *the heat is in the fire as well as in us.* . . . But in this famous debate, what is the question? Only about the imperfection of language, which conveys a confused idea by the word *heat.* This term expresses equally two things, which indeed have some relation or analogy, and are yet very different,—viz. 1. The sensation of heat of which we are conscious; 2. The disposition in the fire to produce in us this sensation.—*Buffon.*

P. 138, n. 1, l. 11.—I cannot persuade myself that nature has implanted in men any affection that is always vicious, and has no good and laudable use.—*Descartes.*

P. 144, n. 1, l. 1.—In the next place, all our knowledge seems plainly to come originally from the senses; and although you do not allow, that whatever is in the intellect must first have been in sense, the principle seems nevertheless true, since [intellection] is brought about only by incursion, or, as they say, κατὰ περίπτωσιν; it is, however, perfected by analogy, composition, division, augmentation, diminution, and other similar processes, which it is unnecessary here to specify.—*Gassendi.*

P. 145, n. 1, l. 4.—The affection of Gassendi for Thomas Hobbes was very strong. Receiving Hobbes' little work *De Corpore*, a few months before his death, he kissed it, adding, *this book is indeed of small bulk, but in my opinion it abounds throughout with marrow.*—*Sorbière.*

P. 146, l. 3.—There is a talk of a refutation of a certain book (*Système de la Nature*). I should like to have it. I believe it is to be by you. . . . All refutations of the *Système* should be good, especially such as you write. But, my dear Voltaire, give yourself no concern about any metaphysical reasonings on unintelligible matters. Can we impart or admit ideas that we do not receive through our senses?—*Madame du Deffand.*

P. 146, n. 2, l. 1.—Gassendi was the author of the new philosophy of the human mind; for it is time to render to him, in this respect, a justice which he has hardly ever obtained from his own countrymen. It is, in truth, very singular that, in speaking of the new philosophy of the human mind, we should always say the *philosophy of Locke.* D'Alembert and Condillac authorised the expression by both ascribing exclusively to Locke the glory of this discovery, &c.—*Degerando.*

. 146, n. 2, c. 2, l. 17.—Locke alone develôped the theory of the human understanding, in a book in which there are only truths; and, what renders the work perfect, all these truths are clear.—*Voltaire.*

P. 148, l. 33.—(Gassendi) the best philosopher among the learned, and the most learned among philosophers.—*Gibbon.*

P. 150, n. 2, c. 2, l. 3.—All the perceptions, as well of sense as of mind, are in relation to the nature of man, not of the universe; and the human intellect, like an uneven mirror in respect to the rays of objects, blends its own nature with things as they are, distorts and discolours them.—*Bacon.*

P. 151, n. 1, l. 8.—From the irrational mingling of matters human and divine, there arises not only a fantastical philosophy, but a heretical religion. Wherefore it is of exceeding importance that, in soberness of mind, we should only render to faith the things that are faith's.—*Bacon.*

P. 152, l. 13.—Even the wisest men are guided rather by the imagination of others, that is, by opinion and custom, than by the rules of reason. Thus, in districts where sorcerers are burnt, this class of persons is universal, because in these places people believe that they really are such, and this conviction is strengthened by talking about them. Cease to punish them, and treat them as fools, and it will be seen that in course of time there will be no sorcerers; because those who are so only by imagination, who certainly constitute the majority, will become like other men.

It is therefore with propriety that many Parliaments do not punish

sorcerers: they are found in much fewer numbers in the districts under their jurisdiction; and the envy, hatred, and malice of the ill-designed, can no longer make use of this pretext to crush the innocent. —*Malebranche.*

P. 153, l. 2.—It is good to rub and file one's brain against that of others.—*Montaigne.*

P. 153, n. 2, c. 2, l. 7.—Minds are thus of two sorts. Some easily observe the differences of things, and these are good minds. Others imagine and suppose resemblance among objects, and these are superficial minds.—*Malebranche.*

P. 153, n. 2, c. 2, l. 19.—The greatest and seemingly the radical distinction of minds with respect to philosophy and the sciences, is this, that some show greater vigour and aptitude in noting the differences of things; others, in remarking their resemblances. For steady and acute minds are able to fix their thoughts, and dwell upon and adhere to a point amid all the refinement of differences. Sublime and discursive minds, on the other hand, observe and compare even most delicate and general resemblances. Both readily fall into extremes, by catching either at distinctions too refined, or resemblances too shadowy.—*Bacon.*

P. 154, l. 18.—If, for example, a speaker express himself with ease,—if he preserve an agreeable rhythm in his periods,—if he have the air of a gentleman and a man of spirit,—if he be a person of quality,—if he be followed by a large train,—if he speak with authority and gravity,—if others listen to him with respect and in silence, —if he have some reputation and intercourse with minds of the first order,—in fine, if he be fortunate enough to please or to be esteemed; all that he advances will be approved, and there will be nothing about him, even to his collar and ruffles, which does not prove something to men's satisfaction.—*Malebranche.*

P. 154, n. 1, l. 9.—An illustrious *savant*, who founded the chairs of geometry and astronomy in the University of Oxford (Sir Henry Savile), commences a work which he took it into his head to compose on the first eight propositions of Euclid in these words:—*It is my design, gentlemen, if strength and health permit, to expound the definitions, postulates, axioms, and the first eight propositions of the first book of the Elements, leaving what remains to my successors.* He concludes with these words:—*I have fulfilled my promise, gentlemen, by the grace of God, I have kept my word; I have* expounded,

according to my ability, *the definitions, postulates, axioms, and the first eight propositions of the elements of Euclid. Here, exhausted by age, I lay aside circles and science. Others more vigorous in body, and of a more lively genius, will perhaps succeed me in this office.* The space of an hour would be quite sufficient for any man of ordinary capacity to master by himself, or with the aid of the slightest mathematician that ever was, the definitions, postulates, axioms, and the first eight propositions of Euclid: and here we have an author speaking of the undertaking as something very great and difficult. He is afraid lest his strength fail him: if, he says, *strength and health permit.* He leaves it to his successors to prosecute those researches: *leaving what remains to my successors.* He thanks God that he has been enabled, through special grace, to accomplish what he had promised: *by the grace of God, I have fulfilled my promise, I have kept my word, I have expounded them according to my ability.* What? the quadrature of the circle? the duplication of the cube? This great man has expounded, according to his ability, the definitions, postulates, axioms, and the first eight propositions of the first book of the Elements of Euclid. Perhaps among those who will succeed him, there will be found some with more health and strength to continue the noble work: *others will perhaps succeed me in this work more vigorous in body, and of a more lively genius.* But for him it is time that he should take his rest: *here, exhausted by age, I lay aside circles and science.—Malebranche.*

P. 155, n., c. 2, l. 26.—Last century, some years of study were sufficient to make one acquainted with all that Archimedes and Hipparchus had been able to discover; and now, two years' instruction under a professor carries the student beyond what Leibnitz and Newton knew.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 156, n., l. 1.—All our various perceptions are attached to the various changes that take place in the fibres of the principal part of the brain, in which the soul more particularly resides.—*Malebranche.*

P. 157, n. 1, l. 1.—But that we may follow up our explication, it must be remarked, that the spirits do not always find the way through which they must pass sufficiently open and free, and that this is the reason why we experience difficulty in moving, for example, the fingers with the celerity necessary for playing on musical instruments, or the muscles that are used in pronouncing the words of a foreign language. By and bye, however, *the animal spirits, by*

their constant passage, render these ways open and smooth, so that in course of time they meet with no resistance. For it is in the facility with which the animal spirits pass into the members of our body, that habits consist.—*Malebranche.*

P. 157, n. 2, l. 1.—That we may no more doubt of the falsehood of this wretched philosophy, it is necessary to prove that there is but one true God, because there is but one true Cause; that the nature or force of each thing is only the will of God; that all natural causes are not real, but simply occasional causes.—*Malebranche.*

P. 159, n. 2, l. 5.—"*Does he who sees all in God, not see there that he himself is a fool?*" He was at least a fool with plenty of wit.—*La Harpe.*

P. 160, l. 20.—Faith teaches me that God created the heavens and the earth. It teaches that the Scripture is a divine book; and this book, or its appearance, tells me clearly and certainly, that there exist thousands and thousands of creatures. Wherefore thus are all my appearances changed to realities. Bodies exist,—that is a matter of rigorous demonstration, faith being supposed.—*Malebranche.*

P. 162, n. 1, l. 4.—Antony Arnauld, that he might thereby more successfully overthrow the argument of Malebranche, defended a peculiar opinion, asserting that ideas, or their perceptions, are one and the same, and differ only by their relations; that there is an idea, to wit, in as far as [the mental modification] has reference to the object which the mind considers, but a perception, in as far as it is viewed in relation to the mind perceiving; that this twofold relation, however, pertains to one modification of mind.—*Brucker.*

P. 169, l. 19.—Above all, never compel your subjects to change their religion. No human power can force the impenetrable entrenchment of the liberty of the heart. Force can never persuade men; it only makes hypocrites. When kings intermeddle with religion, in place of protecting it, they subject it to servitude. Grant to all civil toleration, not to the extent of approving all indifferently, but tolerating with patience all that God tolerates, and endeavouring to bring men back by gentle persuasion.—*Fénélon.*

P. 178, n. 1, l. 23.—This treatise having been at length published, the more impartial judges of those matters easily understood that there is no other genuine Philosophy of Morals than that which evolves and demonstrates the duties of a man and a citizen that are obligatory in the several circumstances of life, from manifest prin-

ciples, founded in the very nature of things; and, accordingly, that the science of natural law, how different soever might be the appearance it presented from the Ethic that a short time before had obtained in the schools, is not really another science, so far as concerns its aim and the matter to be discussed, but the same, only more correctly and solidly treated, so that it at length, in truth, reached the mark it had before unsuccessfully aimed at.—*Gerschom Carmichael.*

P. 178, n. 1, c. 2, l. 16.—Grotius and Puffendorf divide the schools. Trust me, read the Offices of Cicero.—*Voltaire.*

P. 181, n., l. 1.—Natural Law may be divided into the natural law of individuals, which has exclusively obtained the appellation of the Law of Nature, and the natural law of states, which may be called the Law of Nations, but is commonly designated the Right of Nations (*Jus Gentium*). The precepts of both are the same; but because states, when once instituted, assume the personal properties of individuals, the law which, when speaking of the duty of each individual, we call natural, as applied to entire states nations, or peoples, is called the *Jus Gentium.—Hobbes.*

P. 182, n., c. 2, l. 10.—*The Law of Nature scientifically considered in nine volumes by Christian Wolf.* . . . There is no one who will not be scared by such a medley of treatises, as if it were a perfectly Herculean task to learn honesty and justice.—*Lampredi.*

P. 189, n., c. 2, l. 1.—In this work, M. de Montesquieu occupies himself less with the laws which have been made than with those which ought to have been made.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 194, n. 1, l. 1.—An acquaintance with public details, now usually called Statistics, is one of those sciences that have become fashionable, and have obtained a general reputation for some years past; it has almost supplanted that of Public Law, which reigned in the commencement and up to the middle of the present century.—*Comte de Hertzberg.*

P. 196, l. 33.—In which, though a thousand diverse colours shine, yet the very transition eludes the eye that looks upon them; so much is that which is adjacent the same, yet the extremes are unlike. *Ovid.*

P. 208, l. 13.—He continued to stick to his trade.—*Cicero.*

P. 217, n. 1, l. 12.—That execrable atheist, Spinoza, is so shameless as to affirm that all things are absolutely necessary, and that nothing which is, was, or will be, could have been otherwise; so that

he has gone beyond all previous atheists, openly denying, as he does, any Deity, and recognising nothing beyond the powers of nature.

Vanini did not openly deny Deity, but he betrayed his cause in the treatise which he put forth, rejecting the arguments for the existence of God as futile and vain, by bringing forward all contrary reasons in the way of objections, and prosecuting these so as to make them appear insoluble; afterwards, however, he cast off the mask, and unmistakably professed atheism, and, in the famous city of Toulouse, was most righteously condemned and burnt.

The horrid Hobbes was the third promoter of atheism, who subverted all principles, moral and political, and substituted in their room natural might and human compacts, as the first principles of morality, society, and political government; and yet both Spinoza and Hobbes, although they lived and died in countries of the Reformation, were so far from being made examples for the terrifying of atheists, that they underwent not even the slightest punishment.—*Stair.*

P. 218, n. 1, l. 1.—Although to this sect (the Cartesian) the theologians and philosophers of Belgium were at first bitterly opposed, now, however (1727), scarce any other principles than the Cartesian are inculcated in the academies.—*Heineccius.*

P. 218, n. 2, l. 1.—In Locke there are some particulars not badly expounded; but, in the main, he has wandered far from the gate, and misapprehended both the nature of the mind and of truth.—*Leibnitz.*

Locke had subtlety and skill, and a sort of superficial metaphysic which he could set off to advantage.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 218, n. 2, c. 2, l. 8.—We owe this doctrine to Leibnitz; it was after him adopted by the illustrious Wolf.—*Heineccius.*

P. 218, n. 3, l. 3.—The work on the Human Understanding, of the very illustrious and justly celebrated Locke, at once excellent and worthy of its author, will always be included in the number of the most useful logics.—*Crousaz.*

P. 219, n. *, l. 12.—Verulamius, the restorer of true science, and whose merit cannot be too highly estimated, called prejudices *idols*, for the reason that the honour which is due to principles alone is transferred to prejudices wholly unworthy of our assent.

According to the fashion of his time, he designated each class of prejudices by peculiar, though withal ingenious, technical titles,—*Idols of the Tribe*, &c.—*Crousaz.*

P. 220, n. 1, l. 7.—He (M. Allamand) is a clergyman in the Pays de Vaud, and one of the men of the finest genius I know. He has sought to embrace all kinds of studies; but it is philosophy which he has most thoroughly mastered. On every question he has a theory, or, at least, trains of thought that are always original and ingenious. He is a subtle and luminous thinker, and expresses himself happily and with ease. The faults of his intellect are too great subtlety and refinement; those of his character, too much pride, ambition, and violence. This man, who could have enlightened a nation, or thrown it into disorder, lived and died in obscurity. . . . He is a village priest, and he dupes the rustics.—*Gibbon.*

P. 220, n. 2, l. 1.—I can assure you, that before my time, no one in France was acquainted with English poetry; the name of Locke had hardly been mentioned. I have suffered persecution for thirty years from a cloud of fanatics, for having said that Locke is the Hercules of metaphysics, who has marked out the limits of the human mind.—*Voltaire.*

P. 221, n., c. 1, l. 4.—See above, p. 146, c. 2, l. 17.

P. 222, n., c. 1, l. 1.—He (Chapelle) was very eloquent when intoxicated. He was usually the last to leave the table, and set himself to explain the philosophy of Epicurus to the servants.—*Biog. Univ.*

P. 222, n. 1, c. 2, l. 7.—I have sought in vain among the typographers for a little book, entitled *Doutes de M. Bernier sur la Philosophie*, published some years ago in France, which I saw, but which is not now to be found. I should like to read it again, because its author, the chief of the *Gassendists*, a little before his death, ingenuously acknowledged in this treatise, that there were points on which he was satisfied neither with Gassendi nor with Descartes.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 224, n. 2.—See above, p. 144, n. 1, l. 1.

P. 224, l. 15.—A philosopher of repute commences his logic with this proposition: *Omnis idea orsum ducit a sensibus—Every idea draws its origin from the senses.* He admits, however, that all our ideas were not in our senses such as they are in our mind; but he alleges that they were at least formed from those that passed through our senses, either by composition, as, when of the separate images of gold and a mountain, we make a mountain of gold; or by increase or diminution, as when, of the image of a man of ordinary size, we form

a giant or a pigmy; or by accommodation and analogy, as when, from the idea of a house we have seen, we form the image of one we have not seen. AND THUS, says he, WE CONCEIVE GOD, WHO CANNOT BE AN OBJECT OF SENSE, UNDER THE IMAGE OF A VENERABLE OLD MAN.

According to this opinion, although some of our ideas might not resemble any particular body which we had seen, or which had struck our senses, they would, nevertheless, be all of them corporeal, and would represent to us nothing which had not entered through sense, at least in its parts. And thus we could conceive nothing but by images, similar to those that are formed in the brain when we see or imagine to ourselves certain bodies.—*Port-Royal Logic.*

P. 234, l. 1.—There is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in sense.

There is nothing, doubtless, in the intellect which was not previously in sense, *except the intellect itself.—Leibnitz.*

P. 234, n. 1, l. 5.—Leibnitz has combated, with admirable force of dialectic, the system of Locke, which attributes all our ideas to our sensations. That famous axiom had been advanced, that there was nothing in the intellect which had not originally been in the senses; to this Leibnitz added the sublime restriction, *except the intellect itself.* From this principle is derived the whole of the new philosophy, which exercises so great an influence on the thinkers of Germany.—*Madame de Staël.*

P. 234, l. 25.—See above, p. 87, vol. i. of Stewart's *Works.*

P. 234, l. 37.—I employ the term *idea* in the common sense; whether ideas arise from the senses alone, as is the doctrine of Gassendi and our countryman Locke, and many others, or have a different origin, this is not the place to inquire.—*Raphson.*

P. 238, n., c. 1, l. 35.—The glory of Condillac consists in his having been the first disciple of Locke; but if Condillac had a master, he had the merit of making him of use to all others; he spread even a greater light on the discoveries of the English philosopher; he rendered them sensible, so to speak, and we have to thank him for having made them common and familiar. In a word, sound metaphysics in France dates only from the works of Condillac, and, with this title, he deserves to be included in the limited number of those who have advanced the science which they cultivated. . . .

The style of Condillac is clear and pure as his thoughts. His

mind is in general the most correct and luminous that in this age has contributed to the progress of good philosophy. . . .

The felt impression of objects is called *perception;* the action of the mind which considers them is named *reflection.* This word, it is true, expresses a physical movement, that of turning in on one's-self, or on some object; *but as all our ideas come from the senses,* we are frequently obliged to make use of physical terms to express the operations of the mind. . . .

The faculty of reflection, in other words, the power that the mind possesses of comparing, assembling, combining perceptions.—*La Harpe.*

P. 239, n., c. 1, l. 10.—In times past, neglecting to examine all that mechanism of the senses, all those direct relations of the body with objects, philosophers were occupied alone with what passed within man. The science of mind;—such was the noble study of Descartes, Pascal, Malebranche, Leibnitz. . . . It might be that they were occasionally lost in the clouds of the lofty regions whither they took their flight. Their labours were perhaps without direct application, but they at least pursued an elevated track; their teaching was in harmony with the thoughts that move us when we reflect profoundly on ourselves. That route necessarily issued in the noblest of the sciences—religion and morals. It implied, in those who followed it, soaring genius and expansive thought.

Men grew weary of following in this path; the labours of those great minds were treated as vain subtleties, or dishonoured by the title of scholastic reveries. Men threw themselves into the science of sensations, hoping that it would be more within the reach of human intelligence. They became more and more engrossed by the mechanical relations of man and objects, and the influence of his physical organization. Thus, metaphysics went ever downwards, until now, with some, it is almost confounded with physiology. . . . The eighteenth century would consider this mode of regarding man as one of its chief titles to glory.

Of this school Condillac is the chief. It is in his works that this metaphysic exercises all the seductions of method and lucidity; the clearer as it is the less profound. Few writers have been more successful. He reduced to the level of the vulgar the science of thought, by retrenching all of elevated it possessed. Every one was filled with surprise and vain glory on being able to philosophise so easily,

and cherished deep gratitude for the man to whom they owed that privilege. It was not perceived that he had merely lowered the science, in place of elevating his disciples to its height.—*Tableau de la Littérature Françoise.*

P. 247, n., c. 1, l. 5.—Experience tells me, that although my opinions cause surprise at first, because of their difference from the vulgar, yet, after they are understood, they are discovered to be so simple and conformed to common sense, that the wonder entirely ceases, and men for the same reason no longer esteem them: for such is the constitution of men, that they only hold in estimation objects which allow scope for wonder, and which they do not wholly possess or compass. Thus it is, that although health be the greatest of all the goods that concern the body, it is, however, that on which we least reflect, and which we least directly appreciate. Now the knowledge of truth is, as it were, the health of the mind; when we possess it we think no more of it.—*Descartes.*

P. 248, n. 1, l. 1.—The plebeian philosophers, who dissent from Plato and Socrates, and from that sect.—*Cicero.*

P. 253, n., c. 1, l. 5.—There are many people in the world with good intentions; the evil is, that they do not understand each other, and do not work in concert. If it were possible to discover a species of glue that would unite them, something would be gained. The evil often is, that good people have certain caprices, or particular opinions, which place them in opposition to each other. . . .

The sectarian spirit properly consists in a pretentious ambition of regulating others by our own maxims; whereas, we ought to be satisfied with seeing that men are proceeding onwards to the main end.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 256, n., c. 1, l. 18.—I do not understand how the mind can act on the body; I do not also see how, from the movement of the nerve, perception arises; it does not, however, appear to me thence to follow that all *influence* is to be rejected.

Substances are incognisable. Accordingly, we see that the nature of the mind escapes us; we know that it is something which has ideas, compares them, &c., but we are ignorant of the subject to which these properties belong.

We say the same of body; it is extended, impenetrable, &c.; but what is that which possesses these properties? There is no path open to us by which we can reach this knowledge.

Hence we conclude, that much is hid from us regarding the properties of mind and body.

It is matter of invincible demonstration, that mind does not act on body, nor the latter on the former, as body acts on body; but it does not appear to me that we can therefore infer the impossibility of all influence.

A body, by its own motion, does not act on another body, without an opposing motion; but whether an action totally diverse, and of which we have no idea, can be communicated to a different substance, and yet so that the cause shall correspond to the effect, I cannot venture to determine, in a matter so very obscure. It is certainly difficult to deny influence, when we carefully consider how in the minima [visible, audible] which the mind perceives, there subsists a relation with the movements in the body, and how its movements harmonise with the determinations of the mind: I refer to what physicians and anatomists teach on this point.

Accordingly, I come to no determination on the system of influence beyond saying, that its impossibility does not appear to me to be clearly demonstrated.—*Gravesande.*

P. 258, l. 14.—The work which God operates from the beginning to the end.—*Bacon.*

P. 258, n., c. 1, l. 6.—There was a time when the system of Pre-established Harmony was so much in vogue in Germany, that those who expressed any doubt respecting it were considered ignorant or narrow-minded.—*Euler.*

P. 259, c. 2, l. 9.—How much more beautiful is the desire rather to confess ignorance of what you do not know, than to utter nonsense, and be displeased with yourself.—*Cicero.*

P. 260, n., c. 1, l. 1.—The *Théodicée* alone would sufficiently represent Leibnitz. Unlimited reading, curious anecdotes regarding books and persons, much fairness and even favour towards all the authors cited, should it be in combating them; sublime and luminous views, reasoning always characterised at bottom by the spirit of the geometer, a style of which force is the ruling feature, and which yet admits the embellishments of a felicitous imagination.—*Fontenelle.*

P. 261, n. 1, l. 31.—Virtue is free and inviolable, which, as each honours and neglects, he will possess more and less; the responsibility is with him who chooses; God is blameless.—*Plato.*

P. 264, n. 2, l. 1.—All, therefore, in man is certain and deter-

mined beforehand, as in all other things; and the human mind is *a certain spiritual automaton.—Leibnitz.*

P. 264, n. 3, l. 6.—The opinions of Leibnitz tend above all to moral perfection, if it is true, as the German philosophers have essayed to prove, that free will reposes on the doctrine which withdraws the mind from the power of external objects, and that virtue is impossible without the complete independence of volition.—*Madame de Staël.*

P. 265, n. *, c. 2, l. 5.—See above, p. 239, n., c. 1, l. 10.

P. 265, n. 1, l. 6.—But the scale of creation does not terminate at the most elevated of the planetary worlds. There another universe begins, the extension of which is perhaps to that of the universe of the Fixed Stars, as the space of the solar system is to the capacity of a nut.

There, like resplendent STARS, shine the CELESTIAL HIERARCHIES.

There, on all sides, rays emanate from ANGELS, ARCHANGELS, SERAPHIM, CHERUBIM, THRONES, VIRTUES, PRINCIPALITIES, DOMINIONS, POWERS.

In the centre of these AUGUST SPHERES shines the SUN OF JUSTICE, THE ORIENT OF THE ABOVE, whence all the STARS borrow their light and splendour. . . .

The *Théodicée* of Leibnitz is one of my books of devotion: I have entitled my copy, *Manual of Christian Philosophy.—Charles Bonnet.*

P. 266, n. 1, l. 18.—In the time of Boyle, and other superior men who flourished in England under Charles II., one would not have dared to promulgate notions so visionary. I trust that good time will return under a government so excellent as the present. The main principle of Boyle lay in inculcating that all took place *mechanically* in physics. But it is a misfortune of men, that they in time contract a distaste for reason itself, and become wearied of the light. Chimeras begin to return, and please because they possess something of the marvellous. What has happened in the poetical, occurs also in the philosophical world. Men have grown tired of rational romances, such as *la Clélie Françoise* or *l'Aramène Allemande*, and have recurred for some time to the *Contes des Fées.—Leibnitz.*

P. 267, n. 1, l. 7.—My book, entitled *Essais de Théodicée*, on the goodness of God, the liberty of man, and the origin of evil, will very soon be finished. The greatest part of this work was written by shreds, when I lived with the late Queen of Prussia, where these

questions were frequently discussed on occasion of the *Dictionary* and other works of Bayle, which were there greatly read. After the death of that great Princess, I collected together and enlarged these pieces, at the request of friends who were acquainted with them, and I thus formed the work I have now mentioned. As I have meditated on the matter from my youth, I profess to have sifted it to the bottom. —*Leibnitz.*

P. 267, n. 1, c. 2, l. 9.—The most of my opinions have been finally fixed, after a deliberation of twenty years: for I began to meditate when very young, and I was not yet fifteen when I was in the habit of making whole day's journeys into a wood, in order to come to a decision between Aristotle and Democritus. Nevertheless, I have changed and changed again with each new light, and it is only about twelve years ago that I became satisfied, and reached demonstrations on those subjects that did not appear to admit of them; while yet, from the manner in which I deal with them, the demonstrations are as appreciable as those of numbers, though the subject does not fall within the sphere of imagination.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 268, n., c. 1, l. 13.—It is quite as you write, most reverend sir, regarding my *Théodicée*. You have hit the nail on the head; and I am surprised that no one has hitherto perceived that this was my meaning; for it is not the part of philosophers to be always serious in the discussion of a point, who, as you well remind us, put their powers to the proof in framing hypotheses. You, who are a theologian, perform your part in refuting error.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 269, n., c. 1, l. 6.—I hope there are many men in England who will not agree with the philosophy of Newton or Clarke, and who will not relish attractions properly so called, or a vacuum, or the *sensorium* of Deity, or that imperfection of the universe, which obliges God to amend it from time, or the necessity, to which the followers of Newton are subjected, of denying the grand principle of the need of a Sufficient Reason, by which I run them down.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 270, n. 2, l. 4.—This transcendent metaphysic will become somewhat more intelligible, if we attend to the fact, that in virtue of the principle of the sufficient reason, all in the universe is necessarily connected. The whole actions of simple beings are harmonious, or reciprocally subordinated. The exercise of the activity of a given monad is determined by the exercise of the activity of monads, to which it immediately corresponds. This correspondence extends from

every point of the universe to its extremities. As an illustration, take the circular and concentric rings which a stone causes when thrown into still water; they go on always enlarging and becoming fainter.

But the actual state of a monad is necessarily determined by its antecedent state: the latter by the preceding state; and thus we remount to the moment of creation.

Thus the past, present, and future, form in the same monad but a single chain. Our philosopher ingeniously remarked, that *the present is always pregnant with the future.*

He said further, that the Eternal Geometrician was perpetually solving this problem, viz., the state of a monad being given, to determine therefrom the state, past, present, and future, of the whole universe.—*Charles Bonnet.*

P. 275, n. 1, l. 1.—In truth, a like principle of hardness (the supposition, to wit, of bodies perfectly hard) cannot exist; it is a chimera that is repugnant to that general law which nature in all its operations constantly observes; I refer to that immutable and perpetual order established since the creation of the universe, which we may call the Law of Continuity, in virtue of which all that is accomplished is brought about by degrees infinitely small. Good sense would seem to dictate that no change can be effected *per saltum; nature does not operate by leaps;* nothing can pass from one extreme to another, without passing through all the intermediate degrees, &c.—*John Bernouilli.*

P. 276, n. 1, l. 1.—I hold that the mind, and even the body, is never without action, and that the mind is never without some perception; even when asleep, we have a dull and confused sensation (consciousness) of the place where we are, and of other things. But although experience should not confirm this, I believe it is still demonstrable. The case is somewhat similar to a vacuum in space, and the absolute repose of matter, with regard to the reality of which experience may be incompetent to decide; and yet these questions appear to me as well as to Mr. Locke, to be determined by demonstration.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 277, n. 1, l. 1.—Leibnitz admitted, as a fundamental principle of his sublime philosophy, that there are no leaps in nature, and that all is continuous or shaded in physics and in morals. This was his famous Law of Continuity, which he believed he discovered again in mathematics; and it was this law that inspired the singular predic-

tion of which I spoke (the prediction of the discovery of Polypi):—"All beings, he remarked, form but one chain, in which the different classes, like so many rings, are so closely connected with one another, that it is impossible for the senses and the imagination to fix precisely the point at which any one commences or terminates. All the species that border on, or occupy, so to speak, the regions of inflection and return, must be equivocal, and endowed with characters that may be equally referred to the neighbouring species. Thus, the existence of zoophytes or plant-animals, implies nothing monstrous; it is even conformable to the order of nature that such should exist. And so great is the force I concede to the principle of Continuity, that not only should I not be astonished to learn that beings had been discovered, which, in respect of several properties (for example, the power of nutrition or multiplication), might pass for vegetables with as great propriety as for animals, ... so little, I say, should I be surprised at this, that I am even convinced there must be such creatures, which Natural History will perhaps one day discover."—*Charles Bonnet.*

P. 278, n. *, l. 1.—In such a manner has the Supreme Workman concatenated the series of things from a plant to a man, that they cohere, as it were, without a break: thus zoophytes conjoin brutes with plants; the ape quadrupeds with man. Accordingly, in every species of man, we find the divine, the human, the savage.—*Scaliger.*

P. 278, n. †, l. 3.—Nature appears to proceed by degrees from one production to another; no leaps in her march; still less cataracts. It seems that the Law of Continuity is the universal law; and the philosopher who introduced it into physics, has opened up to us a vast field of vision. It was in virtue of this law that Leibnitz maintained that nature proceeds always by shadings and gradations, from one product to another; and that all the states through which a being successively passes, are wholly determined by one another, so that the subsequent state was involved in the antecedent, as the effect is in its cause.—*Bonnet.*

P. 278, n. ‡, l. 1.—Many have denied the existence of curves in nature. I will name only those that occur to me: *Lubin*, *Basson*, *Regius*, *Bonartis*, and I may also add *Hobbes* —*Leibnitz.*

P. 278, n. c, l. 2.—Thus it is that a meadow which, seen close at hand, is found covered with green patches really separate from one another, nevertheless affords to those looking at it from a distance,

the sensation of a continuous verdure; and a polished body, in whose continuity the microscope discovers a thousand breaks, appears to the naked eye to possess this quality in perfection.

In general, simple good sense, which counsels us to suspend our judgment in matters of which we are ignorant, and not confidently to decide on the non-existence of what escapes our senses, should have prevented men, calling themselves philosophers, from asserting so dogmatically the real continuity of that which has but an apparent continuity, and the non-existence of interstices, because they did not perceive them.—*Le Sage.*

P. 280, n. 1, l. 17.—Corneille is, so to speak, of our time, but his contemporaries are not. The *Cid*, the *Horaces*, *Cinna*, *Polieucte*, form the commencement of that brilliant chain which reunites our present literature to that of the reign of Richelieu and the minority of Louis XIV.; but around these luminous points there still reigns a deep night; their brightness causes them to appear near to our sight; the remainder thrown back into obscurity, seems very far from us. For us Corneille is modern, and Rotrou ancient.—*Suard.*

P. 283, n. 1, l. 3.—When at the age of thirteen, I threw off in one day three hundred hexameter verses, all without an elision, because I had accidentally alleged that it could easily be done.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 284, l. 24.—His sublime and towering genius naturally thirsted with greater vehemence than prudence for the beauty and lustre of a reputation so glorious. . . . Reason and riper years tempered his ardour, and he preserved, what of all things is the most difficult, moderation even in the pursuit of wisdom.—*Tacitus.*

P. 284, n.—I perceive that there are few of my character, to whom all difficult things seem easy, and all easy things difficult.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 288, n., c. 2, l. 3.—I have reduced the limits of our dispute to the grand axiom, *that nothing exists or occurs without there being a sufficient reason why it is as it is, and not otherwise.* If he continues to refuse me this axiom, what becomes of his honesty? If he concedes it, farewell to a vacuum, atoms, and the whole philosophy of Newton.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 293, n. 1, c. 2, l. 1.—Would there be space, if there were no body in it; and duration, if there were nothing in it? These questions arise, in my opinion, from our supposing that there is more reality in time and space than they truly possess. . . . Children, in saying that a vacuum is nothing, are right, because they adhere to the

simple notions of common sense; and philosophers, who seek to give reality to a vacuum, are lost in their speculations; a vacuum is the child of abstraction, and is an example of the abuse of a method so useful in many respects. If there were neither body nor succession, space and time would be possible, but they would not exist.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 293, n. 1, c. 2, l. 25.—The notions of time and of space is one of the points upon which Leibnitz has combated Clarke; but it appears to us that the Englishman has opposed nothing satisfactory to the reasonings of Leibnitz.—*Bailly.*

P. 294, n. 1, c. 2, l. 9.—

> Oft hath my doubtful mind essayed to scan
> If aught celestial hath a care for man;
> Or leaves him sport of every wind and wave—
> No will to govern, and no arm to save.
>
> *Claudian* (Howard).

P. 295, n. 1, l. 1.—Whatever is capable of rendering us better or more happy, nature has placed either in the class of what is clear, or in the one next to it.—*Seneca.*

P. 300, l. 7.—In words he (Epicurus) allowed the Gods, in reality he denied them.—*Cicero.*

P. 300, l. 8.—God without dominion, providence, and final causes, is nothing but Fate and Nature.—*Newton.*

P. 300, n. 2, l. 7.—By body, I understand a mode which, in a certain and determinate way, expresses the essence of God, in as far as it is considered as an extended thing.—*Spinoza.*

P. 300, l. 20.—Things could have been produced by God in no other way or order than they have been produced.—*Spinoza.*

P. 301, n., c. 1, l. 7.—I hold God to be the immanent, but not the transeunt, cause of all things.—*Spinoza.*

P. 301, n., c. 2, l. 15.—The foundation of the system which he built up is in the Ethics.—*Paulus.*

P. 302, n., c. 2, l. 32.—That whatever is done by the ruler is just.—*Anaxarchus* (in Plutarch).

P. 302, n., c. 2, l. 33.—I never heard Lycurgus, Solon, Miltiades, Themistocles, Epaminondas, mentioned in the school of Epicurus,—names in the mouths of all the other philosophers. . . . Nor yet, if I were desirous, could I forget Epicurus, whose likeness our friends exhibit not only in paintings, but even on cups and rings.—*Cicero.*

P. 305, n., c. 1, l. 3.—

[From the beginning, in all things that are,
Heaven, earth, the liquid plains, the moon's fair globe,
The sun—bright spheres,] a vital spirit dwells;
Mind stirs and quickens the material mass,
Fused through each part, and mingled with the whole.—
Virgil (by Kennedy).

P. 306, n. 1, l. 3.—If all things came to pass by fate, they come to pass by an antecedent cause; and if the cause of appetite be not in us, &c. . . . What is liberty? The power of living as you will.—*Cicero.*

P. 312, l. 18.—Extraordinary succession of events! How has this befallen me? Wherefore these circumstances and not others? Who has destined them for my head? Forced to travel over the route on which I unconsciously entered, and which I shall abandon without my will, I have strewed upon it as many flowers as my gaiety permitted: I say *my* gaiety, though I have no assurance that it is mine more than another's, nor even know what that *I* is with which I am conversant.—*Mariage de Figaro.*

P. 313, n. 1, l. 3.—You are very confused, Baruc Spinoza, but are you so dangerous as they allege? I maintain not; and my reason is that you are confused, that you have written in bad Latin, and that there are not ten persons in Europe who have read you from beginning to end. Who is the dangerous author? He who is read by the idlers of the court, and by the ladies.—*Voltaire.*

P. 314, n. 1, l. 3.—The whole philosophical learning of M. Bayle consisted of a slight Peripateticism, which he acquired from the Jesuits of Toulouse, and a little Cartesianism, which he had never fully analysed.—*Le Clerc.*

P. 317, n. 2, c. 2, l. 32.—When good, none better.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 320, n. 1, l. 1.—(Bayle)—Chaste and grave in conversation, temperate in his diet, austere in his mode of life.—*Saurin.*

P. 321, n. 3, l. 6.—In replying to the Manichean objections, I do not mean any offence to M. Bayle, whom I by no means suspect of favour towards them. I am persuaded that he has taken the philosophical liberty of stating, on many occasions, the *pros* and *cons* of questions, with impartiality, only to give exercise to the minds of those who understand the matters of which he treats, and not with the view of countenancing the opinions of those whose reasonings he expounds. —*Le Clerc.*

P. 322, n. 2, c. 2, l. 5.—We must hope that Bayle is now surrounded by that light which has been denied to earth, since there is ground for believing that his intention was good.

New wonders now fair Daphnis doth behold,
Th' Olympian threshold, and, beneath his feet,
The clouds and stars.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 322, n. *.—A degree of charity rare among theologians, with whom it is very common to damn their adversaries.—*Fontenelle.*

P. 323, n. 1, l. 3.—Histories are false facts composed upon true facts, or on occasion of true.—*Montesquieu.*

P. 325, n. 1, l. 7.—The ancient philosophy was not always in the wrong. It maintained that all that is in the mind *had come through the senses*, and we should not have gone wrong in taking so much from it. . . .

By means of operating on the first ideas formed by the senses, adding to them, retrenching them, rendering particular general, general still more general, the mind changes them so greatly from what they were at first, that one is sometimes at a loss to recognise their origin. Whoever, notwithstanding, will take the thread and trace it accurately, will always return from the most sublime and elevated idea to one that is gross and sensible.—*Fontenelle.*

P. 326, n., c. 1, l. 5.—I will suffer my critic to enjoy his triumph in peace; I allow that the devil is a prophet since the Jesuit wishes it, and believes that doctrine to be the more orthodox.—*Fontenelle.*

P. 326, n., c. 2, l. 5.—Fontenelle, greatly tempted to floor his adversary, from the ease with which he could have done it, was restrained by the prudent counsel of La Motte, who made him dread alienating by his rejoinder a society that was called *Legion*, when the matter concerned the greatest of its members.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 328, n. 1, l. 6.—We say it with pain, and with no wish to injure the memory of a celebrated man now no more, that there is perhaps no work in which we find more frequent proofs of the abuse of metaphysics than in the well-known work of M. Fontenelle, which has for its title, *Elémens de la Géométrie de l'Infini;* a work, the perusal of which is the more dangerous to young geometers, as the author presents its sophisms with a species of elegance and grace, of which the subject did not seem susceptible.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 328, n. 2, l. 6.—Both wrote in prose with much clearness, elegance, even simplicity; but La Motte, with a simplicity more natu-

ral, and Fontenelle, with a simplicity more studied; for simplicity can be studied, and thenceforward it becomes mannerism, and ceases to be a model.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 331, n, c. 1, l. 22.—What constitutes the excellence of this work is its containing but few errors, and many reflections that are true, new, and profound. It is deficient, however, in order, and especially in precision; it might have been written with more fire, grace, and elegance; *but the writer thinks, and causes others to think.—Voltaire.*

P. 331, n. 1, l. 20.—In fine, he (Fontenelle) is regarded as the first man in the new art of spreading light and grace over the abstract sciences, and he was not without merit in all the other branches of science which he cultivated. Talents so great were strengthened by an acquaintance with languages and history, *and he was without question superior to all the savans not endowed with the power of invention.—Voltaire.*

P. 332, n. 1, l. 7.—Fontenelle was thought wanting in sensibility, because, having the art of mastering his emotions, he acted in obedience to his judgment, which was uniformly just and wise. Moreover, he had, without reluctance, consented to maintain this reputation of insensibility; he had borne the pleasantries of society on his coldness, without seeking to undeceive them, because, being fully assured that his real friends would not be the dupes of them, he recognised in this sort of reputation a suitable means of freeing himself from those who were indifferent to him, without wounding their self-love.—*Condorcet.*

P. 342, n., c. 1, l. 1.—The conclusion is absolutely necessary, that distance, size, situation, are not, properly speaking, visible things; that is, are not the proper and immediate objects of sight. The proper and immediate object of sight is none other than coloured light; with regard to all besides, we only perceive it in the long-run and by experience. We learn to see, precisely as we learn to speak and read. The difference is that the art of vision is more easy, and that nature is equally to all our master.

The instantaneous, almost uniform judgments which the minds of all at a certain age form of distances, sizes, situations, lead us to think that we have only to open our eyes that we may see as we do. In this we are mistaken, the aid of the other senses is necessary to vision. If men possessed only the sense of sight, they would have no means of apprehending extension in length, breadth, and depth, and a pure spirit would not perhaps apprehend it, at least without a special

revelation from Deity. It is very difficult to separate in our understanding the extension of an object from the colours of the object. We see nothing that is not extended, and thence we are all induced to believe that we, in reality, see extension.—*Voltaire.*

P. 349, n. 2, c. 2, l. 14.—The assent and approbation of the vulgar, with respect to a difficult matter, is a sure proof of the falsity of the opinion to which the assent is given.—*Malebranche.*

P. 353, n., c. 2, l. 6.—Substances are either thinking or unthinking; we know two thinking substances—God and our own mind; that besides these there are others also we do not doubt.

There are also two unthinking substances known to us,—space and body.—*Gravesande.*

P. 354, n. 2, l. 1.—But the nerves are soft, they are not stretched like the cords of an instrument; would objects, then, excite in them vibrations analogous to that of a pinched cord? Would these vibrations be instantly communicated to the seat of the soul? The thing seems difficult to conceive. But if we admit the existence, in the nerves, of a fluid whose subtlety and elasticity approach the degrees of the same qualities in light or ether, we can easily explain, by aid of this fluid, both the speed with which impressions are communicated to the mind, and that with which the mind executes so many diverse operations. . . .

As to what remains, the physiologists who believed that the nervous fibres are solid, yielded to deceitful appearances. They supposed, moreover, an oscillation of the nerves to explain sensation; and the nerves are incapable of oscillation. They are soft, and not at all elastic. A nerve, when cut, does not shrink. It is the invisible fluid, which the nerves contain, that is endowed with that elasticity which they attributed to them, and even with an elasticity still greater.—*Bonnet.*

P. 354, n. 2, c. 2, l. 8.—Many physical philosophers have thought that the vibration of the nerves alone, caused by objects that touch the organs of the body, is sufficient to occasion motion and sensation in the parts where the nerves are shaken. They represent the nerves as cords at full stretch, which a slight contact puts in vibration through all their extent. Some philosophers, but slightly acquainted with anatomy, have formed such an idea. . . . But that supposed tension in the nerves, which renders them susceptible of shaking and vibration, is a fiction so palpable, that it would be ridiculous to engage in a serious refutation of it.—*Quesnai.*

P. 365, n. 1, l. 15.—The Roman language is perhaps the only one to the formation of which we can thus remount, in order to discover and explain the secret of its ingenious mechanism. . . . I venture to say that the philosophical mind, consulted as to the choice of means best suited to save ignorance from many painful and tedious efforts, would not have been so successful as ignorance itself has been; it is true that it had two great masters—NECESSITY and TIME.

In considering the epoch of ignorance and barbarism at which this new idiom was formed and perfected, according to principles indicated only by analogy and euphony, men will probably express themselves as I have done; man carries within himself the principles of a natural logic, a regulative instinct, which we sometimes admire in children. Yes, Providence has endowed us with the indestructible faculty and the ingenious means of expressing, communicating, immortalising by speech and by permanent signs in which speech is reproduced, thought which is one of our finest attributes, and which distinguishes us so eminently and advantageously in the order of creation.—*Raynouard.*

P. 366, n. 1, l. 4.—You know how the same names have been transferred from objects that fall under the senses to those that escape them. You have remarked that there are some of them still in use in both acceptations, and that some have become the proper names of things of which they were at first the depicted signs.

The first, such as the *motion* of the soul, its *leaning*, its *reflection*, give a body to things that do not possess it. The second, such as *thought*, *will*, *desire*, depict nothing, and allow to abstract ideas that spirituality which withdraws them from the senses. But if language should be the image of our thoughts, much has been lost, when, forgetting the primary signification of words, we have effaced the very traits which they gave to ideas. All languages are, in this respect, more or less defective; all likewise have pictures more or less accurately preserved.—*Condillac.*

P. 367, n. 1, c. 2, l. 5.—Condillac possessed an influence over the philosophical spirit of the last age, analogous to that which Voltaire wielded over the religious spirit, and J. J. Rousseau over political opinion. Condillac gave rise to a certain dryness and love of trifling in the minds of men; Voltaire a tendency to raillery and frivolity; Rousseau rendered them morose and dissatisfied. . . . Condillac gave a false bent to the mind of the nation, the more readily that his doctrine was taught in the course of their early studies to youths who

had as yet read neither Rousseau nor Voltaire, and that the manner of thinking, and the philosophical direction of the mind, make themselves universally felt—*De Bonald.*

P. 367, n. 1, c. 2, l. 27.—Condillac is, or appears to be, clear and methodical; but it is proper to observe, that clearness of thinking, like the transparency of physical objects, may arise from want of depth, and that method in writings, which implies patience of mind, does not always give proof of correctness, and still less fertility. There is also a clearness of style, in some respect altogether material, which is not incompatible with obscurity in thought. Nothing easier to understand than the words *transformed sensations*, of which Condillac has availed himself, because these terms are addressed only to the imagination, which frames at will transformations and changes. But this transformation, applied to the operations of the mind, is simply a word void of meaning; and Condillac himself would have been greatly embarrassed to give a satisfactory explanation of it. This philosopher appears to me more happy in his observations than in his demonstrations. The path of truth seems sometimes to open before him, but, restrained by the circumspection natural to a mind without warmth, and intimidated through the feebleness of his peculiar system, he does not venture to set out in it.—*De Bonald.*

P. 370, l. 13.—The spectacle of nature, so full of life and soul for those who recognise a God, is dead to the atheist; and in that grand harmony of beings, where everything speaks of God in a voice so gentle, he feels only an eternal silence.—*Rousseau.*

P. 371, n., l. 25.—On the doctrine that all our knowledge comes from the senses, nothing is easier than to form an exact notion of ideas: for they are only sensations, or portions extracted from some sensation, in order to be considered apart; whence arise two kinds of ideas,—the sensible and the abstract. . . .

As we have seen that to remember is only a mode of sensation, it follows that intellectual ideas are not essentially different from sensations themselves.—*Condillac.*

P. 371, n., c. 2, l. 17.—Locke has proved, as far as is possible for man, that the soul is a simple and indivisible substance, and consequently immaterial. Nevertheless he adds, that he would not dare to affirm that God could not endow matter with thought. Condillac is at one with him on the first point, and combats him on the second. I am entirely of the opinion of Condillac, *and all good metaphysicians*

agree that this is the only inaccuracy to be found in the work of Locke.—La Harpe.

P. 375, l. 18.—M. de Fontenelle related, that having gone one day to visit Malebranche, among the fathers of the Oratory of the Rue St. Honoré, a large dog of the house, and which was with young, entering the hall where they were walking, came to caress Father Malebranche, and roll itself at his feet. After sundry fruitless efforts to drive it away, the philosopher gave it a sharp kick with his foot, which caused the dog to utter a cry of pain, and M. de Fontenelle a cry of compassion. "What!" said Father Malebranche to him coolly, "are you not quite well aware that it does not feel?"—*Trublet.*

P. 375, l. 31.—This doctrine regarding animals is a debauch of reasoning.—*La Motte.*

P. 377, n., c. 1, l. 11.—The sagacity of the Abbé Galiani is highly creditable to him. The *Christianisme Dévoilé* is, in truth, the first philosophical work of the Baron d'Holbach. It is vain for the *Biographie Universelle* to assure us, on the testimony of Voltaire, that the work is Damilaville's.—*Editors of Galiani's Correspondence.*

P. 377, n., c. 2, l. 18.—What man of letters does not easily recognise, both in the book *De l'Esprit* and the *Système de la Nature*, all the fine pages that are, and only can be, the productions of Diderot?—*Grimm.*

P. 378, l. 5.—Some authors, and especially Leibnitz, have criticised this part of the doctrine of Descartes; but we believe it to be unassailable when rightly understood, and when it is observed that Descartes only speaks of the *total ends* of God. Doubtless the sun, for example, and the stars, were made for man, in this sense, that God, in creating them, had in view usefulness to man; and this utility was his end. But was this utility the only end of God? Is it supposed that by attributing to him other ends, we should weaken the gratitude of man, and the obligations under which he lies of praising and blessing God in all his works? Even the most mystical and the most approved upholders of the spiritual life have not believed this.—*Abbé Emery.*

P. 379, n.*, c. 2, l. 6.—In his latter years, and from 1789, Lalande affected to eat with delight spiders and caterpillars. He boasted of it as a philosophical trait.—*Delambre.*

P. 381, n. 2, l. 4.—Bacon, Locke, Condillac, sought in our senses the origin of our ideas. Helvetius found our ideas themselves there.

To judge, according to this philosopher, is *nothing more than to feel* (*sentir*). At the present time, good thinkers, enlightened by their issues with regard to the hidden tendency of all these opinions, have submitted them to a more severe scrutiny. The *transformation* of sensations into ideas appears nothing more than a word void of meaning. It turns out that *man the statue* resembles a little too much *man the machine*, and Condillac is modified, or even combated, on certain points, by all those who still avail themselves of his writings in the teaching of philosophy.—*De Bonald.*

P. 381, n., c. 2, l. 8.—'You pretend that *to think* is *to feel*,' said M. le Comte de Ségur, President of the Institute, in answer to M. Destutt-Tracy (the friend of M. Cabanis, and the analyst of his work), 'that is your principle and the basis of your system. But a feeling which withstands all reasonings will not readily suffer it to be conceded to you.'—*De Bonald.*

P. 383, n., c. 2, l. 13.—In reading him, I imagine I still hear him (Marquis de Vauvenargues), and I am not sure but that his conversation had in it something more animated and delicate even than his divine writings.

Gentle, full of fine feeling, compassionate, he held our hearts in his hands. An immovable serenity veiled his sufferings from the eyes of friendship. To enable one to sustain adversity, his example was sufficient; and as a tribute to his equanimity, no one in his presence dared to be unhappy.—*Marmontel.*

P. 386, n., c. 1, l. 1.—Actual events have a connexion with those preceding them, founded on the obvious principle, that a thing cannot commence to be without a producing cause. This axiom, known under the name of *the principle of the sufficient reason*, extends even to actions which we consider as indifferent. The most free will cannot, without a determining motive, give birth to them; for if, all the circumstances of two positions being exactly similar, it acted in the one case, and abstained from acting in the other, its choice would be an effect without a cause; it would then be, says Leibnitz, the blind chance of the Epicureans. The contrary opinion is an illusion of the mind, which, letting out of view the fugitive reasons of the choice of the will in things indifferent, persuades itself that it is self-determined.

We ought, accordingly, to consider the present state of the universe as the effect of its anterior state, and as the cause of the one follow-

ing. An intelligence which in a given instant could apprehend all the forces by which nature is animated, and the relative situations of the beings that compose it, and which, from its comprehensiveness, could, besides, submit these data to analysis, would embrace in the same formula the greatest movements of the universe and those of the smallest atom. To it there would be nothing uncertain, and the future as the past would be present to its view.—*Laplace.*

P. 388, n., c. 1, l. 12.—Placed between France and Germany, belonging to the first by the language in which I venture to write, to the second by my birth, my studies, my principles, my affections, and, I may add, by the complexion of my thinking, I would desire to be able to act as literary mediator, or philosophical interpreter, between the two nations.—*F. Ancillon.*

P. 390, n., c. 1, l. 15.—(Wolf) the chief philosopher of all the dogmatists.—*Kant.*

P. 390, n., c. 1, l. 22.—Scientific method is also either dogmatic or sceptical. Of the first class, it is sufficient to name that most celebrated author, Wolf; of the second, David Hume.—*Fredericus a Schmidt Phiseldek.*

P. 390, n.*, l. 1.—Philosophy has had no more copious writer than Wolf. His Latin writings form of themselves 23 vols. 4to. Those in German are almost as numerous. It may even be asserted that Wolf has written a great deal too much for his own advantage and that of others.—*Degerando.*

P. 390, n. 2, l. 21.—When, during the reign of the late King of Prussia, M. Wolf was teaching at Halle the system of Pre-established Harmony, the King made inquiry about the doctrine, which was making a great noise at the time; and a courtier told his Majesty in reply, that all soldiers, according to the doctrine, were simply machines; that when any one of them deserted it was a necessary result of his constitution, and that it was wrong consequently to punish him, as it would be wrong to punish a machine for the production of this or that movement. The King was so angry at this account of the doctrine, that he gave orders to banish M. Wolf from Halle, under pain of being hanged, if he should be found there at the end of twenty-four hours. The philosopher thereupon took refuge at Marbourg, where I conversed with him a short time afterwards.—*Euler.*

P. 391, n., c. 1, l. 18.—The King of Prussia, although he was

not a believer in the doctrine of Pre-established Harmony, set himself from the first day of his reign to render justice to Wolf.—*Condorcet.*

P. 391, n. 2, c. 2, l. 1.—The German school recognises Leibnitz as its chief. His famous disciple, Wolf, reigned in the Universities for nearly half a century with undisputed authority. His philosophy is known in France by a great number of abridgments, some of which are made by authors who of themselves would suffice to give it celebrity.

In spite of the countenance of all these names, *this philosophy has never even for an instant prevailed in France.* The apparent depth of the thoughts, an air of entireness and of system, have not been able to supply what appeared wanting in it to render it a doctrine solid and worthy of acceptance. Besides a certain want of clearness, which probably repelled many minds for whom this quality of style and thinking has fortunately become a need, the form under which it is presented has deterred many readers. Notwithstanding the efforts of interpreters, there has always peered through something of the incommodious dress that envelops it in its original form. Condillac more than once ridicules those forms, and that scientific jargon, and he endeavours to show that they are no less unsatisfactory to reason than offensive to taste. *It is at least certain that the French reader instinctively repels them, and finds them an obstacle very difficult to surmount.—Prévost.*

P. 392, n. 3, l. 5.—The ingenious and vigorous Lambert, whose power the mathematics, which owe much to him, could not exhaust, and who touched on no subject of physics or rational philosophy without shedding a flood of light on it. His *Lettres Cosmologiques*, which he wrote by way of recreation, are full of sublime thoughts, grafted on a philosophy at once the most healthy and wise. He also drew up, under the title of *Architectonique*, a table of the principles upon which human knowledges are founded. This work, in the judgment of men most versed in the study of their language, is not free from obscurity, which, however, may pertain in part to the nature of the subject. It is to be regretted that his logic, entitled *Organon*, has not been translated either into Latin or French, nor, I think, into any language. A well-executed abridgment of this work, from which what is repugnant to the national taste should be excluded, would excite the attention of philosophers, and direct them to a multitude

of objects which they are accustomed to regard with indifference.—*Prévost.*

P. 393, l. 4.—I say the critique of the pure reason, not the judgment of books and systems, but of the rational faculty in general, in respect of all cognitions towards which, free from all experience, it may strive, thereupon the determination of the possibility or impossibility of metaphysic in general, and the constitution, as well of its sources as of its sphere and connexion, then truly of its limits, but all these from principles.—*Kant.*

P. 393, n., c. 1, l. 2.—Those of my readers who are not acquainted with German, will find a very just and intelligent summary of the Theory of Forces of M. Lambert, in a small work published in France, at La Haye, in 1780, with the title, *Exposition de quelques points de la Doctrine des Principes de M. Lambert.—Bonnet.*

P. 393, n., c. 1, l. 15.—Wolf, after certain hints from Leibnitz, rescued from oblivion the syllogistic of Aristotle, a science which the scholastics had rendered so contemptible that neither Bacon nor Locke dared to bestow on it a look of interest. It was reserved for Lambert to exhibit it under the finest light, and in the richest dress. He has accomplished this in his *Novum Organon*, a work which is one of its author's chief titles to glory.—*Servois.*

P. 393, n., c. 2, l. 6.—His (Kant's) family was originally Scotch, a circumstance curious enough, if we consider that it is to the writings of David Hume that we owe the system of Kant.—*Staffer, Biog. Universelle.*

P. 394, n. 2, l. 1.—Some time elapsed after the first publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, without much attention being given to the book, and without even a suspicion among the majority of philosophers, who were previously devoted to eclecticism, of the grand revolution which this work, and the succeeding productions of its author, were calculated to effect in science.—*Buhle.*

P. 394, n. 2, l. 18.—The philosophy of Kant, which, *to the disgrace of the human mind*, appears to have acquired so much favour in certain schools.—*Trembley.*

P. 394, n., c. 2, l. 20.—He (Reinhold) translated the Kantian oracles into language, elegant, harmonious, and pure. . . . He has the art of expressing in eloquent language thoughts that were before unintelligible.—*Degerando.*

P. 395, n., c. 2, l. 13.—The labour of the editors was limited

entirely to the revision of the proofs, and the correction of those slight inaccuracies of style that escape observation in the most carefully prepared manuscript. This work was performed under the oversight of M. A. W. de Schlegel, whose rare superiority of mind and acquirements justifiy the confidence with which Madame de Staël was in the habit of consulting him in all her literary labours, as much as his honourable character merits the esteem and friendship which she never ceased to entertain for him during an intimacy of thirteen years.—*Editor of Madame de Staël's Considerations, &c.*

P. 398, n., c. 2, l. 4.—Meiners, in his general history of Ethics, denies that the moral system of Cudworth is identical with that of Plato; and maintains, on the contrary, that the principles considered as pertaining in the most special manner to the Ethics of Kant, were taught many generations before by the school of the English philosopher.—*Buhle.*

P. 398, n., c. 2, l. 16.—None of the ideas of Cudworth approaches those of Kant.—*Buhle.*

P. 399, n., c. 1, l. 13.—The moral philosophy of Price presents, in truth, a striking analogy to that of Kant. . . . The most remarkable of all the modern moralists of England is, without question, Richard Price. . . . The most striking analogy is observable between his ideas on the ground of morality, and those to which the critical philosophy has given birth in Germany, and yet it is not possible to entertain the slightest doubt of the complete originality of the latter. —*Buhle.*

P. 402, n. 2, l. 1.—Hume—who shed no light on this part of knowledge, but yet excited a spark, from which, indeed, a light might have been kindled, if it had fallen on material ready to receive it, and its first glimmerings been carefully nourished and increased. —*Kant.*

P. 403, n. 1, l. 1.—One cannot observe without mortification how far his adversaries, *Reid*, *Oswald*, *Beattie*, and lastly, *Priestley*, erred as to the real point at issue, in that they always assumed as granted what he called in question, while they vehemently, and, for the most part, with great intemperance, set themselves to establish what he never dreamt of doubting. They thus failed to avail themselves of the hint he gave as to what demanded emendation, so that all remained as it was before, and nothing seemed to have been accomplished.—*Kant.*

P. 404, n. †, l. 1.—Metaphysic has for its end to examine the generation of our ideas, and to prove that *all* come from sensation.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 406, n. 1, l. 2.—Necessary truths are the immediate product of the interior activity.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 410, n. 2, l. 4.—The whole morality of actions reposes singly on the practical disposition, in so far as it is determined by the moral law alone. If this disposition be considered as a *phœnomenon* in consciousness, it is a natural event, obeys the law of causality, reposes upon what man has before experienced in time, and constitutes part of the empirical character of man. But it may be also considered as an act of the rational liberty: it is, then, no longer subject to the law of causality; it is independent of the condition of time; it is related to an intelligible cause—liberty, and forms part of the intelligible character of man. We cannot, in truth, acquire the least knowledge of intelligible objects; but liberty is not the less a fact of consciousness. Hence, external actions are indifferent, so far as the morality of the man is concerned. The moral goodness of the man consists only in his will being morally good, and this consists in the will being determined by the moral law singly.—*Buhle.*

P. 411, n., c. 1, l. 25.—How to harmonise fate and freedom, moral imputation and the dependence of finite beings? Kant thought to escape this rock by subjecting to the law of causality (the *determinism* of Leibnitz) only the phænomenal world, and freeing from the sphere of this principle the mind as *noumenon*, or thing in itself; thus considering each action as pertaining at once to a twofold series,—to the physical order, in which it is enchained to what precedes and follows by the common bonds of nature, and to the moral order, in which a determination produces an effect without there being a necessity of recurring to an antecedent state to explain the volition and its result.—*Staffer* (or *Maine de Biran*).

P. 411, n. 1, l. 6.—I, for my part, say; whatever individual cannot, from the constitution of his nature, but act *under the idea of freedom* is, on that very account, in a practical relation, in reality free; that is, all the laws are of avail for him, in the same manner as if these were most intimately conjoined with liberty; and his will, even by itself, and tested by the standard of speculative philosophy, may be declared free.—*Kant.*

P. 412, n., c. 1, l. 4.—Man is accordingly free, since he has the

full conviction that he is so, and this goes quite as far as freedom. *Here, therefore, is the explication of the mechanism of the universe, clear as the water from the rock.* . . . The conviction of liberty constitutes the essence of man. We might even define man, *an animal which believes itself free*, and that would be a complete definition.—*Abbé Galiani.*

P. 413, n., c. 1, l. 1.—By this, therefore, alone (the Critical Philosophy), we are enabled to cut off by the roots materialism, fatalism, atheism, profane distrust, fanaticism, superstition, whose poison penetrates everywhere; and finally, even idealism and scepticism, which are more especially pestilential in the schools.—*Kant.*

P. 415, l. 11.—For from these sources must flow all the power and virtue of the critical philosophy of the pure reason; so perfectly admirable is the coherence of its parts, that the last are in harmony with the first, the middle with both, each part with another; in the first all is given.—*Born.*

P. 417, n. 1, l. 8.—Of all the complaints hitherto preferred against the *Critique of Reason*, the most trite and common is that which censures its obscurity. This is heard, too, from those who think they have refuted the Kantian system, and who, accordingly, must believe that they understood it. Nevertheless, amid the abundance of its adversaries, no one has hitherto appeared who asserted that he everywhere apprehended its meaning, and no one who must not certainly confess to himself that he has found insurmountable obscurity in many parts of it. To many this obscurity seems a necessary consequence of the manifest contradictions which they think they have discovered in passages that appear clear; while, on the contrary, the partisans of the new system fancy they have found the source of those contradictions in that obscurity, which to them at least is alleged not to be invincible, as they assert that it can be overcome though with the greatest difficulty. Their replies to all the objections hitherto preferred, as well as the statements made by Kant himself regarding some of them, have no other aim than to give to adversaries more just notions of the scope of the *Critique of Reason* which they have misunderstood; whereby, in truth, they rather acknowledge than remove the censure, admitting, as they thus do, that a book, which is misunderstood by so many subtle, and otherwise judicious men, must labour under very great obscurity.—*Reinhold.*

P. 420, n. 3, c. 2, l. 4.—This doctrine proceeded from the lips of

Fichte, clothed with those adornments that give youth, beauty, and force to discourse. One never wearied in listening to him. . . .

Schelling, called to the University of Wirtzburg, attracted thither by his reputation a numerous concourse of auditors, whom his lectures fascinated by richness of diction and extent of learning. From this he went to Munich, where I again saw him in 1813. He is said to have embraced the Catholic religion.—*Gley.*

P. 422, n. 1, l. 22.—The only work (Gerdil on Rousseau) published against me that I have found worthy of being read throughout. —*Rousseau.*

P. 422, n. 1, c. 2, l. 7.—Gerdil carries through all these discourses a geometrical spirit which is too often wanting in geometers themselves.—*Mairan.*

P. 422, l. 13.—Whilst Condillac gave lessons to a Prince of Italy without effect, Genovesi communicated his views with more success to his Neapolitan pupils: he combined in the best possible manner the theories of Leibnitz, for which he had always a predilection, with that of Locke, which he was the first to bring into repute in Italy.—*Sarpi.*

P. 423, n., c. 1, l. 3.—Ideology, which, from its recent baptism, might be considered as specially due to France, but which is as old as philosophy, since it has for its object the generation of ideas and the analysis of the faculties which concur in their formation, is not new to the Italians, as might be believed.—*Sarpi.*

P. 423, n., c. 1, l. 19.—But he who can truly be called the reformer of the Italian philosophy, who caused it speedily to be known and respected by the most learned philosophers of other nations, who succeeded in enriching logic, metaphysics, and morals with new honours, was the celebrated Genovesi. Although there have been many philosophers who have sought by subtle reflections and just precepts to assist the mind in thinking and reasoning with exactness and truth, and although Bacon, Malebranche, Locke, Wolf, and many others, seemed to have exhausted all that there was to write upon such arts; nevertheless Genovesi was able to make new observations, and to advance new ideas, to give a fuller and more perfect logic, as well as one more useful, not only for the study of philosophy, and generally for every scientific pursuit, but also for moral conduct and civil society.—*Giovanni Andres.*

P. 427, n. 1, l. 5.—He chiefly, however, endeavours to convince his readers that the Indians received the names of numbers and the

mathematical sciences from the Greeks, and investigates the ways in which the Grecian arts were communicated to the East. In a matter of this sort, our most learned author has not denied that much is to be set down to the score of conjecture. To surmise much is, he says, odious, yet, in my opinion, it is both necessary and useful, at the proper time and place, to have recourse to supposition; for as conjecture holds the first place in the obscurest questions, so, if we advance no further, it is fitting that our suspicions should have place, and become known, as by means of these an occasion may perhaps be afforded to others either of fortifying for themselves this very road, or a new and different one, by which the nearest approach may be made to the truth.—*Klotzius.*

P. 428, n. 2, l. 4.—Among the many and highly distinguished writers who flourished in Great Britain in the time of Queen Anne, there is hardly one who proceeded from Scotland. . . . Francis Hutcheson, having come to Scotland, as a professor of philosophy and humanity in the University of Glasgow, excited over the whole country, by his oral instructions, and by his excellent works given to the press, a lively interest in philosophical and literary studies, and there scattered fertile seeds, from which we have seen fruits singularly beneficial and abundant spring.—*Denina.*

P. 428, c. 2, l. 7.—The founder of the Scottish school is, in a manner, Hutcheson, the master and predecessor of Smith. It was this philosopher who impressed its character upon it, and to him is due the commencement of its renown. . . .

It is in this sense only that we can give a chief to a school of philosophy, which, as we shall see, professes, in other respects, absolute independence of authority.—*Prévost.*

P. 438, n. 1, l. 1.—If it is difficult to know all the doctrines of any one sect, how much more those of every sect? This knowledge, however, must necessarily be attained by those who, for the sake of discovering truth, make it their aim to discourse both against and for all the philosophers without partiality. Of this difficult and noble art, I do not profess to have acquired the mastery, but I do assert that I have sought to attain it.—*Cicero.*

P. 438, n.*, l. 10.—I confess that I became an orator—if I am one, or whatever I am—not in the schools of the Rhetoricians, but in the walks of the Academy.—*Cicero.*

P. 450, n., l. 5.—There are in his (Buffier's) metaphysical treatises,

fragments that Locke might not have disowned, and he is the only Jesuit whose works contain a rational philosophy.—*Voltaire.*

P. 450, n., c. 2, l. 4.—It is at least certain that I, for my part, am very sorry that I was not acquainted with these opinions of Father Buffier until quite recently; if I had seen them sooner enounced anywhere, they would have saved me many doubts and difficulties. . . .

I greatly regret that Condillac, in his profound and sagacious meditations on the human understanding, did not bestow more attention on the ideas of Father Buffier.—*Destutt-Tracy.*

P. 459, n., c. 2, l. 20.—As in a mirror it is not the things themselves that are seen, but their *images;* so the things we understand are in reality without us, and their species in us. For our intellect is, as it were, the mirror of things, to which unless things be represented by sense, it of itself knows nothing.—*J. C. Scaliger.*

P. 466, n., c. 1, l. 3.—He said that La Bruyère had spared himself the greatest difficulty of a work by foregoing transitions.—*Memoir of Jean Racine.*

P. 480, n., c. 1, l. 34.—I would willingly add that the didactic and regulated march to which our language is subjected renders it more fitted for science, and that by the turnings and inversions which Greek, Latin, Italian, English, admit of, those languages have greater advantages for letters; that we can give better expression to intelligence than any other people, and that good sense would select the French language, but that imagination and the passions would accord the preference to the ancient languages and those of our neighbours; that French should be spoken in society and in the schools of philosophy, and Greek, Latin, English, in the pulpit and on the stage; that our language would be that of truth were she to revisit the earth, and that Greek, Latin, and the others, would be the tongues of fable and deceit. French is formed to instruct, enlighten, and convince; Greek, Latin, Italian, English to persuade, move, and deceive; speak Greek, Latin, Italian to the people, but speak French to the learned. —*Diderot.*

P. 480, n., c. 2, l. 38.—The school of Port-Royal, fertile in thinkers, rendered illustrious by writers of the purest order, by the most laborious of the learned of the age of Louis XIV., would have conferred a sufficiently great service upon our philosophy, had it done nothing more than powerfully contributed to the determination of our

language, and impressed upon it that character of precision, clearness, and accuracy, which renders it so favourable to the exercises of the mind.—*Degerando.*

P. 483, n., c. 1, l. 4.—Thus, all philosophy is like a tree, of which metaphysics is the root, physics the trunk, and all the other sciences the branches that grow out of this trunk, which are reduced to three principal, namely, medicine, mechanics, and ethics. By the science of morals, I understand the highest and most perfect, which, presupposing an entire knowledge of the other sciences, is the last degree of wisdom. But as it is not from the roots and the trunks of trees that we gather the fruit, but only from the extremities of their branches, so the principal utility of philosophy depends on the separate uses of its parts, which we can only learn last of all.—*Descartes.*

P. 487, n. 1, l. 1.—Out of the bosom of feudalism, which was in itself a system much less suited than that of the ancient republics to the development of liberty and of the human mind, have, nevertheless, arisen, little by little, the almost general abolition of slavery, and a tendency towards civil equality that has not ceased to progress, and which is obviously proceeding with vast strides to its entire fulfilment. Public reason, always gaining ground, has made continual progress, often slow, sometimes interrupted, but in the long run surmounting all the obstacles that were opposed to it, without turning aside from its path; it has been continually spreading the subdivisions of instruction, adding to the treasures of the sciences, and, in spite of certain momentary vicissitudes, ameliorating our ideas of politics, morals, and even, if we may so speak, of religion, which it daily tends, in the face of a very inconsiderate opposition, to purge of those impurities with which the hand of man has only too much disfigured the Divine original.—*Xavier de Sade.*

P. 493, n., c. 1, l. 1.—Imperfection, as well of the moral as the physical world, is the characteristic of the globe we inhabit; it is labour lost to undertake its enlightenment, and the office is frequently dangerous to those who take it upon them. Each must rest satisfied with being wise for himself, if he can be so, and abandon the vulgar to error, while endeavouring to turn them aside from the crimes that disarrange the order of society.—*King of Prussia to D'Alembert.*

P. 499, n. 2, l. 1.—Looking to the seventeenth century, now past, and the first years of this, the eighteenth, how fertile were those years in celebrated discoveries. Let that period but be compared

with the present time, and it will seem that we have now arrived at that point at which the state of knowledge may be almost considered permanent, if indeed a regression has not already commenced. For what progress has been made in the direction of the discoveries of Descartes, especially his application of algebra to geometry, of Galileo and Huygens, particularly in optics, astronomy and mechanics? What has been done to advance the discoveries and improvements of Newton in analysis, geometry, mechanics, optics, above all astronomy, and, along with Newton's, those of Leibnitz and the Bernouillis in the infinitesimal calculus? Who can estimate aright their number, importance, and utility? But all these advances took place in the space of about a hundred years, at first crowding thickly together, then sensibly lessening in number, and now, during a period of thirty years, hardly anything has been done. The aberration of light, and the nutation of the axis, have in this latter period been added to astronomy, the measurement of degrees relating to the form of the earth to geography, the wonderful series of electrical phænomena, their causes, however, being as yet almost unknown, to physics, which, with whatever other advances may have been made, can in no way be compared with those important prior additions to the same sciences. Are we not, therefore, nearing the point at which, with the increments decreasing, the decrements must in a short time succeed, so that the curved line which express the condition and changes of this knowledge, being again deflected towards the axis, must fall into it and speed downwards?—*Boscovich.*

P. 501, n., c. 1, l. 11.—Those vast literary riches of the Arabians, of which we have had but a glimpse, are no longer to be found in any of the countries where Arabs and Mussulmans rule. It is not there we must seek either the renown of their great men, or their writings. What is preserved of these is entirely in the hands of their enemies, in the convents of the monks, or in the libraries of the kings of Europe. And yet those vast countries were not conquered; it was not the stranger who despoiled them of their riches, who annihilated their population, who destroyed their laws, manners, and national spirit. The poison was within themselves, it was self-developed, and it has annihilated all.

Who knows whether, in the course of ages, this same Europe, to which the reign of letters and science is to-day transferred, which shines with so great a lustre, is so excellent a critic of past times,

and compares with such skill the successive rule of literary men and ancient manners, will not be desert and savage as the hills of Mauritania, the sands of Egypt, or the valleys of Anatolia? Who knows whether, in a country wholly new, perhaps in the lofty regions whence descends the Orinoco or the river of the Amazons, perhaps in the hitherto impenetrable circuit of the mountains of New Holland, there will not arise peoples with other manners, languages, thoughts, religions, who will once more renew the human race, who, like us, will study the past, and who seeing with astonishment that we lived, that we knew what they know, that we, like them, believed in permanence and glory, will pity our powerless efforts, and recall the names of our Newtons, Racines, and Tassos, as examples of the vain struggle of man to attain that immortality of renown which destiny denies him?—*Simonde de Sismondi.*

P. 508, n., c. 1, l. 6.—Urban Grandier, arraigned and convicted of the crime of magic by a special commission, was burnt alive in 1634. La Peyrère, author of the *Preadamites*, but who, moreover, wrote a highly esteemed history of Greenland, was asked why there were so many sorcerers in the north; the reason is, he replied, that the goods of the pretended sorcerers that are put to death, are, in part, confiscated for the benefit of their judges.—*Hénault.*

P. 530, n. B, l. 3.—Money does not beget money. What does the sea produce? What does a house, from the lease of which I draw rent? Is it from the roof and walls that the money properly springs? (No), but the land produces, and there is borne on the sea what may thereafter yield money, and the accommodation of a dwelling is usually procured by, or exchanged for, a certain sum. If, therefore, a higher return be obtainable by laying out money at interest, than from the produce of a farm, will he be tolerated who has given in lease a sterile farm, it may be, to a husbandman from which he receives rent or produce, and the same tolerance not be extended to him who has derived a return from money? And he who acquires a farm by money, does not that money yield another sum annually? Whence really comes the profit of the merchant? From his own diligence and industry, you will reply. Who doubts that, money lying idle is wholly useless? And he who borrows money from me does not intend to keep it by himself unemployed. The profit, therefore, does not accrue from

the money, but from the produce of it. Those reasonings, accordingly, are indeed subtle, and possess a certain speciousness, but when more closely examined, they in reality lose all value. I now, therefore, conclude, that we must judge of usury, not from any particular passage of Scripture, but by the rule of equity alone.—*Calvin.*

P. 531, n. C, l. 7.—Machiavel [a most capricious and worthless character.—*Lat.*] was very greatly in error in saying that popular government is the best; and, nevertheless, having forgot his first opinion, he held in another place, that in order to restore Italy to liberty, it was necessary that it should have a single Prince; and indeed he laboured to form the most tyrannical government in the world; and in another place he admits that the government of Venice was the finest of all, which is a pure aristocracy, if ever there was one; so that he does not know what opinion to abide by.—*Bodinus.*

P. 532, l. 18.—We should, therefore, render thanks to Machiavel, *and other writers of that sort*, who openly, and without dissimulation, disclose what men are wont, not what they ought, to do. . . .

For as to what concerns *wicked arts;* if any one has become a pupil of Machiavel, who teaches, &c. . . .

Whether this also is not true, that youths are much less fit to become students of *Politics* than of *Ethics*, before they are fully instructed in religion and the science of manners and duties, lest, perhaps, depraved and corrupted in judgment, they fall into the opinion that there are in things no real or solid moral differences, but that all is a question simply of utility; for thus it pleases Machiavel to say, *that if Cæsar had happened to be conquered in war, he would have been more hateful than Catiline himself*, &c., &c.—*Bacon.*

P. 534, l. 5.—M. Ginguené continues his History of Italian Literature, and has recently communicated to the class one of the articles that compose the seventh volume of that History. It is a sketch of the life and writings of Nicolas Machiavel. The life of this celebrated writer is the true commentary on his books; and hitherto this commentary has remained very incomplete. Thus we could say nothing more regarding him than that the republic of Florence, of which he was the secretary, charged him with diverse political missions to the courts of France and Rome, the Duke de Valentinois, the Emperor, the camp of Pisa, &c. &c. M. Ginguené follows him year by year in all his legations, shows the aim, and the principal circumstances of them. His life thus becomes an essential part of the his-

tory of Florence, and extends even to the history of the powers which were then in relation with that republic. In the collection of the works of Machiavel, there is little of his political correspondence, which, nevertheless, presents all these details, and throws great light on his character and designs. Unfortunately this light is little favourable to him, and manifests but too clearly the real sense in which his Treatise of the Prince, so variously judged, must be taken. One of the most curious and decisive pieces is a letter which he wrote from the country, whither he had retired after the return of the Medicis to Florence. He had lately been deprived of his offices; implicated in a conspiracy against those Princes, he had been thrown into prison, put to the torture, and judged innocent, whether he was so in reality, or whether the torture had merely failed in extracting from him the avowal of his crime. In his letter he draws a picture of his occupations and projects, the labours and distractions that daily occupy him. To escape from a position bordering on wretchedness, he feels the necessity of being reinstated in the favour of the Medicis, and finds no better means than to dedicate the *Treatise of the Prince*, which he had just completed, to Julien the Young, brother of Leo X., and the Prince to whom that Pope had intrusted the government of Florence. Machiavel thinks that his Treatise cannot fail of being agreeable and useful to a prince, and especially to one inexperienced. Some time afterwards, he did, in fact, render the homage of a dedication of the work, not to Julien, but to Laurentius II. This letter, which was known in Italy only a few years ago, was still unknown in France. M. Ginguené has translated it. He is of opinion that it leaves no doubt as to the end and designs of the author of the Treatise of the Prince.—*Daunou.*

P. 536, n. D, l. 3.—It has been believed, and it is perhaps still credited, that Montesquieu was the first to speak of the influence of climate. This opinion is erroneous. Before him, the subtle and ingenious Fontenelle had applied himself to the subject. Machiavel, in several passages of his works, also refers to the influence of climate on the physical and moral condition of people. Chardin, a traveller remarkable for sagacious observation, made numerous reflections on the physical and moral influence of climate. The Abbé Dubos supported and developed the conclusions of Chardin; and Bodin, who probably had read in Polybius that climate determines the forms, colour, and manners of people, had already made it, one

hundred and fifty years before, the basis of his system, in his book of the *Republic*, and in his *Method of History*. Prior to all those writers, the immortal Hippocrates had treated the matter at great length in his famous work, *On the Air, Waters, and Places*. The author of the *Spirit of Laws*, without referring to a single one of these philosophers, set up a system in his turn; but he only modified the principles of Hippocrates, and gave a greater extension to the ideas of Dubos, Chardin, and Bodin. He wished the public to believe that he was the first to consider the subject; and the public took him at his word. —*Chevalier de Filangieri.*

P. 539, n. F, l. 6.—Born for letters, rather than for aught beside, and carried away contrary to his genius, by I know not what fatality, to take part in affairs.—*Bacon.*

P. 540, n. G, l. 5.—It (the Royal Society) may convene, compare results, institute what experiments they choose; but unless they make use of my principles, they will make no progress. . . .

But to the causes on account of which you have been, and will continue to be, unable to progress even a little, are also to be added others; as a hatred of Hobbes, because he wrote the truth too freely regarding academies; for from that period the enraged natural philosophers and mathematicians publicly avowed that they would not accept truth at his hands.—*Hobbes.*

P. 542, n. I, l. 19.—See above, p. 353, n., c. 2, l. 6.

P. 543, l. 11.—What time is, if no one asks me, I know; if one inquires, I do not know.—*Augustine.*

P. 543, n. K, l. 1.—The *Meditations* of Descartes appeared in 1641. Of all his works this was the one he esteemed the most. What specially characterises it, is, that it contains his famous demonstration of God by the idea,—a demonstration so frequently repeated since, adopted by some, and rejected by others; and that it is the first work in which the distinction of mind and matter is perfectly developed; for, prior to Descartes, there was no searching analysis of the philosophical proofs of the spirituality of the soul.—*Thomas.*

P. 543, n. K, l. 17.—Thus, the spirituality of the soul is not an opinion that has need of proof, but the simple and natural result of an exact analysis of our ideas and of our faculties.—*Condorcet.*

P. 543, n. L, l. 5.—As we were at one time children, and as we formed various judgments regarding the objects presented to our senses, when as yet we had not the entire use of our reason, numerous

prejudices stand in the way of our arriving at the knowledge of truth; and of these it seems impossible for us to rid ourselves, unless we undertake, once in our lifetime, to doubt of all those things in which we may discover even the smallest suspicion of uncertainty.

Moreover, it will be useful likewise to esteem as false the things of which we shall be able to doubt, that we may with greater clearness discover what possesses most certainty, and is the easiest to know.

Wherefore, if we would philosophise in earnest, and give ourselves to the search after all the truths we are capable of knowing, we must, in the first place, lay aside our prejudices; in other words, we must take care scrupulously to withhold our assent from the opinions we have formerly admitted, until, upon new examination, we discover that they are true.—*Descartes.* (Eng. Tran.)

P. 544, l. 13.—Some authors assert that Descartes had not read the works of Bacon; and he himself tells us, in one of his letters, that he did not read, until very late in life, the principal works of Galileo. . . .

If this is the case, it must be admitted that the glory of Descartes is still greater than theirs.—*Thomas.*

P. 544, l. 28.—Although Descartes formed for himself a route altogether new, before he ever heard of that great man (Bacon) or his aims, it nevertheless appears that his writings were not without some use to him. It is clear from various passages of his letters, that he did not disapprove of Bacon's method, &c.—*Baillet.*

P. 546, l. 9.—You ask how I can suppose that the species or idea of body, which is extended, can be received by me an unextended subject. I answer, that no corporeal species is received in the mind, but that the pure intellection, as well of a corporeal as of an incorporeal object, is realised apart from any corporeal species; but for imagination, whose objects are wholly corporeal, there is required a species that is truly body, *and to which the mind may apply itself*, but which is not received in the mind.—*Descartes.*

P. 547, l. 20.—To none more fitly applies than to that admirable man (Descartes) the verse of Horace, "Who is able for every great work he undertakes." . . . To you and all Cartesians most devoted, H. M.—*More.*

P. 548, n. P, l. 9.—The brilliant imagination of Descartes is everywhere apparent in his works; and if he had been indifferent to

geometry and philosophy, it lay within his power to become the finest mind of his age. . . .

I know not if there is anything in all Balzac so spirited and charming.—*Thomas.*

P. 548, n. Q, l. 4.—But experience contradicts this system of innate ideas, since the privation of a sense carries with it the privation of the ideas attached to that sense, as was remarked by the illustrious author of the *Analytical Essay on the Faculties of the Mind.—Trembley.*

P. 549, n. R, l. 8.—That the Deity is a geometer.—*Plato.* . . .

Shall we again, accordingly, consider the adorable mystery of the Trinity as a sphere, whose centre is as it were the eternal Father, who is appropriately called the fountain, origin, and principle of all divinity; the circumference the Son, in whom we read that the fulness of the Godhead dwells; and the radii passing from centre to circumference the Holy Spirit, who is the nexus and mutual bond of Father and Son? Or must we rather say, that there stands prominently out in this mystery whatever of sublime and magnificent human geometry is still in search of? It is very well known, that what is called the quadrature of the circle, is still unaccomplished; and that it consists in describing a triangle, which if its base were shown to be equal to the circumference of the circle, would itself be proved equal to the circle. But in this most sacred mystery, the most glorious Triad of Persons is so equalised, or, so to speak, and with more correctness, so entirely identified, with the infinite essence and its productiveness, as with a circle, that since of all and each the essence is one and the same, there is, therefore, one and the same immensity, eternity, and fulness of perfection.

Thus, while human geometry fails in trisecting the angle, or dividing it, and without a mechanical adaptation, in showing that it is divided into three equal angles, we have in this mystery one essence, not so much trisected, as communicated entire to three equal subjects, which while together and separately they possess it whole and undivided, are yet nevertheless among themselves really distinct.—*Gassendi.*

P. 550, l. 13.—(Gassendi) feeling that his last hour was close at hand, thought that what strength remained to him should be spent in preparing himself for death. He accordingly signified that a priest should be called as soon as possible, into whose ear he confessed his sins so long as he was able to speak. . . . Then, that nothing

might be wanting to the perfect armour of the Christian soldier, he earnestly requested that he might be anointed with the sacred oil. Inwardly attending to this ceremony, when the priest anointing his ears pronounced the usual words, and said with a slight lapse of memory, *The Lord pardon thee whatever sin thou hast been chargeable with through the sense of smell*, the sick man instantly restored the words *nay, through the sense of hearing;* so intent was he on this most important matter, and so eager was the desire he manifested, that even his slightest sins should be blotted out.—*Sorbière.*

P. 550, n. R. l. 24.—Looking again and again to the private life of Gassendi, he seems to me a sort of anchorite, who in the midst of a city ordered his life entirely after the severer monastic rule, so completely did he practise poverty, chastity, and obedience; although under no vow, he appears to have observed those three. He was naturally abstemious, drinking tepid barley-water to refresh and moisten his lungs. He used flesh rarely, herbs more frequently, and a soaked flour-roll morning and evening.—*Sorbière.*

P. 551, n. T, l. 3.—You are doubtless right in saying that (self)-evident propositions, regarding which the question now is, are not simple ideas but judgments. But have also the goodness to observe, that as Mr. Locke produces these as examples of ideas that pass for innate, and which, according to him, are not so; if there is any error in this, it must be laid to his door, not to mine, it being my part merely to refute his manner of controverting the innateness of those ideas or judgments. Besides, you will be pleased to remark, that the question in dispute is really as to whether certain evident and common truths, and not merely certain simple ideas, are innate or not. Those holding the affirmative give as examples of simple innate ideas hardly any but those of God, unity, existence; the other examples are entire propositions, which you call judgments.

But, you say, are there then in the mind innate judgments? Is judgment anything more than an act of our intellectual faculties comparing ideas? Is not the judgment of (self)-evident truths the mere sight of those truths, a simple glance of the mind upon them? All this I grant. And pray what is *idea?* Is it not *sight*, or, if you will, a glance of the eye? Do they not manifestly depart from the meaning and import of the word, who give a different definition of it? Do we not talk nonsense, rather than define, when we say that ideas are the *species* of things impressed on the mind, as

the image of the object of sense is traced on the eye? This, however, is an error into which all metaphysicians have fallen; and although Mr. Locke clearly saw it, he was more inclined to be angry with them, and to direct his shafts against the weather-cocks of the place, than to apply his powers in disentangling the web of nonsense. He should have said, not only are there no innate ideas in the sense of those gentlemen, but *there are no ideas at all in that sense; every idea is an act, a vision, a glance of the mind.* After that, to ask whether there are innate ideas, is to inquire whether there are certain truths so evident and common that every mind not stupid is able naturally, without culture and teacher, without discussion, without reasoning, to know them by a glance, and often even without being conscious that a glance is bestowed. The affirmative appears to me incontestable, and in my opinion the question is thereby exhausted.

Now observe, that this way of putting the matter secures the end of the partisans of innate ideas, as much as their own method; and over and above confutes Mr. Locke in his. For why should we contend for innate ideas? In order to be able to oppose their certitude and evidence to the universal doubt of the sceptics, which is crushed by a single stroke, if there are truths the view of which is natural and necessary to man. But you perceive, that I am in a position, by my way of explaining the matter, to say that there are such truths, quite as well as the ordinary partisans of innate ideas by theirs. And it seems to reduce Mr. Locke somewhat to straits, who, without declaring himself a Pyrrhonist, discovers rather too strong a leaning towards Pyrrhonism, and has greatly contributed to its growth in this age. By way of seeking to mark out the limits of our knowledge, which was very much needed, he now and then absolutely narrowed it.—*Allamand.*

P. 553, l. 8.—You propose to sit as my judges! but, in order to come to a sound decision, a vast extent of knowledge is required; moreover, it is very doubtful whether we have any certain knowledge whatever. . . . Before, then, you undertake to pronounce on my case, I demand that you first of all examine with me our knowledge in general, its degrees, extent, reality; that we agree as to what truth is, and whether it is really to be found. We will, therefore, treat of universal propositions, maxims, trifling propositions, and of the weakness or solidity of our understandings. . . . Some hold as truth, that man is born with certain innate principles, certain

primitive notions, certain characters that are engraven as it were on his mind, from the first moment of his being. For my own part, I have long ago examined that opinion, and I undertake to combat, to refute, to annihilate it, if you have the patience to hear me.—*Destouches.*

P. 554, l. 35.—Although the idea of God is so impressed on the human mind, that no one is devoid of the power of knowing him, it is quite consistent with this that the majority of men may have never distinctly represented the idea to themselves; and indeed they who think they have the idea of a plurality of gods, have no idea of God whatever. . . . The idea is the thing itself thought, in so far as it is objectively (representatively) in the understanding. . . . Where (referring to the immediately preceding) it must be remarked that I am speaking of the idea which means nothing as out of the understanding, and the objective being of which signifies no other thing than being in the understanding in the manner in which objects are ordinarily there.—*Descartes.*

P. 555, l. 7.—With regard to Voltaire, he has *too much genius to understand me;* he makes all the books he reads, and then approves or censures what he himself has made.—*Montesquieu.*

P. 555, l. 30.—Many of the opinions of Plato are most beautiful . . . that there is in the Divine mind an intelligible world, which I also am in the habit of calling the region of ideas; that the object of science is *the really existent*, simple substances to wit, which by me are called *monads*, and which once in existence always continue to be, *the first recipients of life*, that is, God and souls, and minds the chief of these, images of divinity produced by God. . . . Moreover, whatever mind, as Plotinus rightly teaches, contains in itself a certain intelligible world, in my opinion also represents to itself this sensible world. . . . *Their seeds* are in us, which we learn to know, ideas to wit, and eternal truths that spring from them. . . . *The innate notions* of Plato, which he veiled under the term *reminiscence*, are, therefore, to be far preferred before the *tabula rasa* of Aristotle and Locke, and other more recent philosophers, of the exoteric school.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 559, n. B B, l. 4.—It appears that natural religion itself is at a very low ebb. Many make the mind corporeal; others make God himself corporeal.—Mr. Locke and his followers, are at least *in doubt* as to whether the mind is material, and by nature mortal.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 561, n. D D, n. 1, l. 1.—If in the entire time before the contact of the subsequent body, the antecedent superficies possessed twelve degrees of velocity, and in the following time nine, a saltus having taken place in the very first moment of contact, then in the very moment that divides those times, there must have been both twelve and nine degrees of velocity at once, which is absurd; for a body cannot have two velocities at one and the same time.—*Boscovich.*

P. 563, l. 29.—Since the Law of Continuity is so much in accordance with reason and nature, and is of so wide an application, it is surprising withal that no one (so far as I remember) should have made use of it before. I had referred to it some time ago in the News of the Literary Republic (July 1687, p. 774), on occasion of a short correspondence with Malebranche, who, persuaded of its truth by the considerations I urged, afterwards changed his doctrine of the laws of motion as expounded in the search after truth; a change he afterwards averred in a short pamphlet published by him, in which he ingenuously explained the occasion of his adopting the new opinion. He was, however, somewhat more prompt than was proper in determining new laws of motion in the pamphlet referred to, before he had communicated with me; and he raised anew, though less openly, objections not only against the truth, but against the Law of Continuity itself. I felt disinclined from making this criticism, lest I should appear desirous of detracting from the reputation of a truly excellent man.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 563, n. 2, c. 2, l. 11.—All philosophers appear to concur in the opinion, that the speed with which falling bodies begin to move, is absolutely none.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 564, l. 13.—I am satisfied with your criterion for testing the laws of motion, which you name *the Law of Continuity;* for it is self-evident, and as it were a dictate of nature, that as the irregularity of hypotheses vanishes, there must also disappear the irregularities of events. Hence it has been frequently matter of unfailing surprise to me, how Descartes, a man in general of the highest genius, could lay down laws, with the single exception of the first, so incongruous, inapplicable, and so manifestly mutually conflicting. It appears to me that their falsity is discoverable even by a child, from the fact that the saltus, so opposed to nature, so clearly shows itself throughout.—*John Bernouilli.*

P. 564, l. 23.—Will any one who holds the infinite divisibility of

all kinds of quantity, have any difficulty in dividing the least duration that falls under sense into an infinite number of small parts, and supposing in these all possible degrees of velocity, from repose to a definite motion?—*John Bernouilli.*

P. 564, n. E E, l. 1.—But there still remained the most important question, as to what those souls or forms become on the death of the animal, or the destruction of the individuum of the organized substance. And this is the most embarrassing inquiry; as it appears hardly reasonable that souls should remain in a state of inaction in a chaos of confused matter. I was thus led to the conviction, that there was but one rational course open; and that is to hold the conservation not only of the soul, but likewise of the animal itself, and the organic machine; although the destruction of the gross parts may have reduced it to a bulk so small as to escape our senses just as before birth.

. . . Experimenters of great accuracy in our time, have already discovered grounds for doubting if an animal altogether new is ever produced, and if all the parts of animals that are developed in life are not already in embryo in the seed before conception, in the same manner as plants. On this doctrine it is reasonable to conclude, that what has no commencement of life, cannot any more have an end; and that death, like generation, is but the transformation of the same animal, which is one while augmented, and then diminished.

. . . And as there is thus no original birth, nor absolutely new generation of the animal, it follows that there will be no final extinction of it, nor absolute death, taking the term in metaphysical strictness; and, consequently, that in place of the transmigration of souls, there is merely a transformation of one and the same animal, according to the varied arrangements of its organs, and their higher and lower degrees of development. . . .

With respect to Metempsychosis, I believe that the order of things does not permit it; in accordance with which, all is distinctly explicable, and nothing is done by leaps. But the passage of the soul of one body into another would be a strange and inexplicable saltus. What now takes place in the animal, always takes place. The body, like a river, is in perpetual change, and what we call generation or death, is only a greater and more prompt change than ordinary, similar to the fall or cataract of a river. But those leaps are not absolute, and such as I disallow, as would be the case with a body

that should pass from one place to another, without passing through the intermediate place. *Leaps such as I admit are observed not only in movements, but besides in every order of things and of truths.* But just as in a geometrical line there are certain distinctive points called summits, points of inflexion, of return, or otherwise; and as there are lines with an infinity of those, so must we conceive of the periods of extraordinary change in the life of an animal or a person, that fall withal under the general rule, precisely as the distinctive points of the curve can be determined by its general nature or equation. We may at any time say, if an animal, *it is throughout as here;* the difference is merely one of degree.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 567, n. G G, l. 1.—I have just received a letter from a reigning Prince of the Empire, in which His Highness tells me that he had twice seen this spring, at the last fair at Leipsic, and examined with care, a speaking dog. The dog distinctly pronounced more than thirty words, replying even with sufficient propriety to its master; it likewise pronounced all the letters of the alphabet, except m, n, x.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 567, l. 11.—Without a guarantee, such as M. Leibnitz, an eye-witness, we should not have had the boldness to report, that near Zeitz in Misnia, there is a dog that speaks. It is a peasant's dog, of the ordinary form, and middle size. A child heard him utter sounds, which he thought resembled German words, and thereupon took it into his head to teach him to speak. The master, who had nothing better to do, spared neither time nor pains in his task, and fortunately the disciple possessed capacities which it would have been difficult to find in another. At last, at the end of some years, the dog was able to pronounce nearly thirty words; among these are *Thé*, *Caffé*, *Chocolat*, *Assemblée*, French words that have passed into Germany without change. We may remark, that the dog was fully three years old when put under tuition. He speaks only by echo, that is to say, after his master has pronounced a word; and he appears to repeat it only by force, and against his will, although he is not beaten. M. Leibnitz once saw and heard him.

(Report of a letter of M. Leibnitz to the Abbé de St. Pierre, on a dog that speaks.) This report of the letter of M. Leibnitz, is found in the History of the Academy of Sciences, for the year 1706. The report is by the author of the History of the Academy.—*History of the Academy of Sciences.*

P. 568, l. 8.—Of this I am perfectly certain, that that spiritual man (the Maréchal de Richelieu) was superstitious, and believed in the predictions of astrologers, and other follies of that sort. I have seen him at Versailles refuse to go to pay his court to the eldest son of Louis XIV., seriously alleging *that he knew* the son was not destined to fill the throne. This superstitious credulity, general during the league, was still very common under the regency, when the Duke de Richelieu entered on the management of affairs. By an inconsequence of the most extraordinary kind, it was very generally allied with the greatest impiety, and the majority of the materialists believed in *ghosts*. At the present time, this kind of folly is very rare; but many people who deride astrologers, believe in predictions of another species.—*Duke de Levis.*

P. 568, n. I I, l. 4.—Leibnitz, as bold as Descartes, as subtle as Bayle, less profound perhaps than Newton, and with less of wisdom than Locke, but alone universal among all those great men, appears to have embraced the domain of reason in all its extent, and contributed the most to spread that philosophic spirit which to-day constitutes the glory of our age.—*Bailly.*

P. 572, l. 35.—Although Spinoza presented the principles of Descartes in the order of mathematical demonstration, it was not from Descartes he learned his Pantheism; *there were some at home whom he followed.—Heineccius.*

P. 573, l. 21.—There is nothing uncaused. (*Maxim.*)

P. 573, l. 42.—

> Had all one motion uniform, the new,
> Th' anterior skilful copying, if throughout
> Primordial seeds declined not, rousing hence
> Fresh springs of action, potent to subvert
> The bonds of fate, and break the rigid chain
> Of laws on cause eternal; whence, resolve,
> Flows through the world this freedom of the mind?
> This power to act, though fate the deed forbid,
> Urged by the will alone?—*Lucretius* (by Goode).

P. 574, l. 5.—One cannot, in my opinion, more completely establish, not only fate, but even the necessary and forcible determination of all events, and do away with the voluntary movements of the mind, than by acknowledging that a doctrine of fatalism cannot be

otherwise opposed than by having recourse to these fictitious subterfuges.—*Cicero.*

P. 574, l. 10.—The will severed from necessity.—*Lucretius.*

P. 574, l. 16.—It is surprising that Epicurus should found human freedom on the declension of atoms. Either this is necessary, or it is simply accidental. If the former, how can freedom be its result? If the latter, by what is it determined? It is still more surprising, however, that it should have occurred to him to make man free, in a system that implies a necessary concatenation of causes and effects. The inquiry would be an interesting one, as to how Epicurus became the apostle of liberty.—*De la Grange*, or *Baron d'Holbach.*

P. 575, l. 12.—Wherefore we are in no way constrained, either, holding the prescience of God, to do away with the free choice of the will, or, retaining the freedom of the will, to deny (which is blasphemy) the foreknowledge of God; but we embrace both, faithfully and truly profess both: the former, in order to right belief; the latter, with a view to right conduct.—*Augustine.*

P. 575, l. 30.—But just as the knowledge of the Divine existence ought not to do away with the certainty of the freedom of our will, because of that we have internal experience and consciousness; so, on the other hand, the knowledge of the freedom of our will ought not to render us doubtful of the existence of God; for the independence we experience, and are perfectly conscious of, and which renders our actions worthy of praise and blame, does not conflict with the dependence of another kind, in accordance with which all things are subject to God.—*Descartes.*

P. 576, l. 17.—The faculty of doing as one pleases, whatever be the determination of the will.—*Gravesande.*

P. 577, l. 2.—Admitting no action without a motive, as he says there is no effect without a cause, Bonnet defines *moral liberty* as the power of the mind to obey without constraint the motives of whose impulse it is conscious. He thus obviates the objections drawn from the foresight of God; but, at the same time, he perhaps destroys the ordinary notion of freedom. Notwithstanding these opinions, bordering on Materialism and Fatalism, Bonnet was a highly religious man.—*Cuvier.*

P. 580, n. P P, l. 1.—All that is ought to be, merely because it is. Such is the only sound philosophy. So long as we do not know

the universe *à priori*, as they say in the schools, all is necessity. Freedom is a word without meaning, as you will learn from the letter of M. Diderot.—*Grimm.*

At this point, my dear friend, I would abandon the style of the preacher, to assume, if I can, that of the philosopher. Consider it closely, and, you will see that the word *liberty* is meaningless; that there are not, and that there cannot be, free beings; that we are only what we are made by the general order, organization, education, and the chain of events. We are at the irresistible disposal of these causes. It is no more conceivable that a being should act without a motive, than that the arm of a balance should act without the influence of a weight; and the motive is always external to us, foreign, applied by some nature or cause that is not ourselves. The source of our mistake is the wondrous variety of our actions, joined to the habit we have acquired from birth of identifying the voluntary with the free. We have bestowed praise and blame so frequently, and we, in our turn, have so often been the objects of the same, that it is one of the oldest of our prejudices to suppose that we and others will act freely. But if there be no freedom, there is no action that merits praise or blame; there is neither vice nor virtue; nothing which it is necessary to reward or punish. What, then, is the distinctive peculiarity of men? Ill-doing or well-doing. The ill-doer is a man whom it is necessary to destroy, and not punish; well-doing is good fortune, not virtue. But although man, as well and ill doer, is not free, he is not the less on that account capable of being moulded; hence the necessity of the public execution of the malefactor. Hence the good effects of example, discourse, education, pleasure, pain, greatness, misery, &c.; hence a species of philosophy full of commiseration, that clings ardently to the good, that is not angry with the wicked any more than with the hurricane that fills our eyes with dust. There is, properly speaking, but one kind of causes; these are physical;—there is but one species of necessity, the same for all beings. Thus am I reconciled with the human race; for this reason did I exhort you to philanthropy. Adopt these principles if you think them good, or show me that they are bad. Their adoption will reconcile you also with others and with yourself; you will experience neither satisfaction nor the reverse, whatever your condition chance to be. Never to reproach another, never to repent of aught,—such are the first steps towards wisdom. All beyond

is prejudice, false philosophy.—*Diderot to the Duke of Saxe-Gotha.*

P. 585, n. T T, l. 10.—Allow that it would be absurd to deny to our fellows the faculty of thought. Doubtless it would. But what ensues from the admission? It follows, that if the universe—the universe, do I say?—if the wing even of a butterfly affords to me traces of an intelligence a thousand times more distinct than are the indications you are able to allege of the existence of thought in your fellow-man, it is a thousand-times more absurd to deny the existence of God than of thought in your equal. But, to establish the point, let me appeal to your understanding and consciousness: Did you ever observe, in the reasonings, actions, and conduct of any man whatever, greater intelligence, order, sagacity, adaptation, than the mechanism of an insect gives proof of? Is the Divinity not as vividly marked on the eye of a hand-worm as the faculty of thought in the writings of the great Newton? How! Can it be that the world of reality displays less intelligence than the philosophy of it? Will it be asserted that the intelligence of a first existence is not more fully established by his works than the intellect of a philosopher by his writings? Consider, therefore, that I rest my proof against you on nothing more than the wing of a butterfly, when I could crush you under the weight of the universe.—*Diderot.*

P. 586, l. 3.—I open the leaves of a celebrated philosopher, and I read: "Atheists, I grant you that motion is essential to matter; what do you thence infer? that the world is the result of the fortuitous play of atoms? As well tell me that the Iliad of Homer and the Henriade of Voltaire are the product of the fortuitous throw of characters." I should solicitously guard against reasoning thus with an atheist. That analogy would afford him easy game. On the laws of the analysis of chances, he would urge, I must not be surprised that an event should take place which is possible, and the improbability of which is compensated for by the number of the throws. With a certain number of strokes allowed, I should engage, with a chance of success, to throw a hundred thousand, six at a time, with a hundred thousand dice. Whatever might be the finite sum of characters with which I should be set down to produce fortuitously the Iliad, there is such a finite sum of throws as would favour the proposed production. The probability in my favour would be even infinite, if the number of throws allowed me were infinite. You readily concede

to me, he would continue, that matter is eternal, and that motion is essential to it. By way of return, I am ready to hold with you that the world is unlimited, that the multitude of atoms is infinite, and that the amazing order we behold is everywhere unbroken. But from these mutual admissions nothing further follows (unless that the possibility of a fortuitous production of the universe is very slight), than that the number of throws is infinite; in effect, that the improbability of the event is overweighed by the multitude of the throws. Hence, if there be anything repugnant to reason in the circumstances, it is the supposition that matter, being in motion from all eternity, and having, perhaps, in the infinite sum of possible combinations, an infinite number of admirable arrangements, it should not be found in any one of those arrangements amid the infinite multiplicity of forms it has successively assumed. The mind should, therefore, feel more surprise from the hypothetical duration of chaos than from the actual rise of the universe.—*Diderot.*

P. 586, l. 34.—The beautiful is not uniformly the work of an intelligent cause. Motion frequently establishes, whether in an object considered apart, or in objects viewed in conjunction, a vast multitude of wonderful relations. Of this truth the cabinets of natural history afford numerous illustrations. Relations are, at those times, the effects of fortuitous combinations, at least so far as we can discover. Nature, on hundreds of occasions, imitates in sport the productions of art; and the question might be raised, I will not say as to whether the philosopher who was cast in a storm on the shores of an unknown island, was right when he exclaimed, on seeing some geometrical figures, "*Courage, my friends; here are the traces of men!*" but as to how many relations must be discovered in an object, before we can reach a perfect assurance of its being the work of an artist[1] (in which case a single symmetrical defect would go further on the question of authorship than the whole given sum of the relations); what the connexion between the time of action of the fortuitous cause, and the relations observed in the effects produced; and whether (with the exception of the works of the Omnipotent) there are instances in which the number of relations can never be compensated for by the number of the chances.—*Diderot.*

[1] (The *Acervus*)—A mode (of reasoning) faulty indeed and sophistical.—*Cicero.*

P. 587, n. 2, l. 4.—

For never, doubtless, from result of thought
Or mutual compact, could primordial seeds
First harmonise, or move with powers precise;
But ever changing, ever changed, and vest
From earliest time, through ever-during space,
With ceaseless repercussion, every mode
Of motion, magnitude, and shape essay'd.
At length the unwieldy mass the form assumed
Of things created. . . ,
For if thou weigh th' eternal tract of time
Evolved already, and the countless modes
In which all matter moves, thou canst not doubt
That oft its atoms have the form assumed
We bear ourselves this moment.—*Lucretius* (by Goode).

P. 588, l. 33.—One day, in the company of Baron d'Holbach, Diderot proposed to name a counsel for God, and the Abbé Galiani was chosen. After seating himself he thus began: Once at Naples, a man of the Basilicate brought before us six dice in a dice-box, and took a bet that he would throw a pair of sixes. I said the chance was possible. He threw again on the ground a second time. I still said it was possible. He replaced the dice in the box three, four, five times, and each time he threw a pair of sixes. *Blood of Bacchus!* cried I, *the dice are loaded;* and such was the case.

Philosophers, when I consider the perpetual recurrence of the order of nature, its immutable laws, the uniform constancy of its revolutions amid an infinite variety; the unparalleled chance that acts as conserver of a universe such as we see, resulting unfailingly, notwithstanding a hundred millions of possible chances of perturbation and destruction besides, I am constrained to exclaim, *Assuredly nature is loaded!—Abbé de Lille.*

P. 589, l. 28.—Pure Machiavelism, without modification; raw, fresh, in all its force, in all its harshness.—*Galiani.*

P. 589, n. U U, l. 8.—He who attacks revealed religion attacks but it; but he who attacks natural religion attacks all religions. An attack on revealed religion is not impossible, for it rests on particular facts, and these, from their nature, are liable to be disputed. The case of natural religion is different, which is founded on the nature of man, a subject that no longer admits of dispute. I would add, What

motive can any one have for assailing revealed religion in England? There religion has been so completely purified from every admixture of hurtful prejudice, as to be incapable of doing evil, and fitted, on the contrary, to effect a vast amount of good. I can understand how a person in Spain or Portugal, who is on the eve of being burnt, and who dreads this fate, because he does not believe in certain articles that are, or are not, parts of revealed religion, may have good ground for assailing it, as he may entertain a hope of thereby providing for his personal safety. In England, however, matters are entirely different. No man who there assails revealed religion does so with an interested motive; and should one succeed in overthrowing it, and even be fundamentally in the right, he would but destroy an infinite amount of practical good for the sake of a merely speculative truth.—*Montesquieu.*

P. 590, l. 34.—Two epochs, perfectly distinct, appear to me to be observable in France during the eighteenth century,—that in which the influence of England made itself felt, the other in which the minds of the age rushed headlong on destruction; in the latter, the light of the time became a conflagration, and philosophy, like an exasperated sorceress, set fire to and consumed the palace that had been the scene of her wonders.

In politics, Montesquieu belongs to the first epoch, Raynal to the second; in religion, the writings of Voltaire, whose aim was to forward toleration, were inspired by the spirit of the first half of the age; but his miserable and vain-glorious profanity disgraced the second.—*Madame de Staël.*

P. 591, l. 3.—Consult Zoroaster, Minos, and Solon, the sage Socrates, and the great Cicero. All of these revered a martyr, a judge, and a father. This sublime system is necessary to man. It is the sacred bond of society; the first foundation of holy equity; the curb of the wicked, the hope of the just. If the heavens, despoiled of their august impress, could cease to declare God—if God existed not—it would be necessary to invent him. . . .

Behold this factious foe of liberty, blind partisan of a blind destiny; hear how he consults, approves, or deliberates—with what reproach he covers an adversary; see how he seeks to avenge himself on a rival, how he punishes his son, and wishes to correct him. Did he then believe himself free? yes, doubtless, and he himself gives the lie, at each step, to his destructive doctrine. He lies to his heart,

in wishing to unfold this dogma, absurd alike in belief and in practice. He recognises in himself the sentiment which he braves; he acts as if he were free, and he speaks as if he were a slave.—*Voltaire.*

P. 592, l. 1.—I am accordingly constrained, in spite of myself, to lean to the ancient idea, which I see is at the root of all systems, upon which all philosophers fall back after making a thousand circuits, and which is impressed upon me with the force of demonstration by all the actions of other men, by my own, by all the events I have read about and seen, and by those in which I have had a share; that is Fatalism,—Necessity, of which I have already spoken to you.—*Letters of Memmius to Cicero—Works of Voltaire.*

It would indeed be a very singular thing if all nature, all the stars, obeyed certain eternal laws, and there were withal a little animal of the height of five feet, who, despite those laws, could uniformly act according to the mere pleasure of his caprice.

. . . . The ignorant (philosopher) who is of this opinion now, did not always think thus, but he has been constrained in the end to betake himself to it.—*Voltaire.*

P. 592, l. 20.—Objects of meditation were much too foreign from the excessive vivacity of his (Voltaire's) mind. To seize powerfully by imagination objects he must exhibit in but one point of view, is the function of the poet; to take in all their aspects, is the part of the philosopher, and Voltaire was too exclusively the one to be the other.—*La Harpe.*

P. 592, n. *, l. 3.—I am well aware that many philosophers, and especially Lucretius, have denied final causes; and I know that Lucretius, though somewhat censured, is a very great poet in his descriptions and morality; but in philosophy he appears to me, I confess, very much inferior to the porter of a college, and the beadle of a church. To assert that the eye is not made for seeing, nor the ear for hearing, nor the stomach for digestion,—is that not, I would ask, the most enormous absurdity, and revolting folly, that ever occurred to the human mind? Sceptic as I am, that appears to me plain madness, and I call it such.

For my own part, I discover in nature, as in the arts, nothing but final causes; and I believe an apple-tree was made to bear apples, just as I see a clock made to mark the hour.—*Voltaire.*

P. 595, n. Z Z (in 1st Ed. Y Y), l. 2.—1. The idea of time does not

arise from, but is supposed by, the senses. 2. The idea of time is singular, not general; for any particular length of time can be conceived, only as a part of one and the same immense whole. 3. The idea of time, accordingly, is an intuition; and since it is conceived prior to any sensation, as if the condition of the obvious relations among sensible objects, it is a pure, not a sensuous intuition. 4. Time is a continuous quantity, and the principle of the laws of continuity in the changes of the universe. 5. Time is nothing objective and real, neither substance, accident, nor relation, but the subjective condition, inseparable from the constitution of the human mind, under which, according to a certain law, it effects for itself the co-ordination (arrangement in succession) of sensible phenomena, and is a pure intuition. 6. Time is a true conception, and, extending over all the possible objects of the senses, even to infinity, is the condition of intuitive representation. 7. Time is therefore absolutely the first formal principle of the sensible world.—*Kant.*

P. 596, l. 1.—A. The concept of space is not obtained by abstraction from external sensations. B. The concept of space is a singular representation, comprehending *in it*, not an abstract and common notion containing *under it*, all (sensible phenomena). C. The conception of space is, therefore, a pure intuition; since it is a singular conception; not the product of sensations, but the fundamental form of every external sensation. D. Space is not anything objective and real, neither substance, accident, nor relation; but subjective and ideal, proceeding by a fixed law from the nature of the mind, as the form under which the mind arranges for itself (as out of each other) all the objects of external perception. E. Although the conception of space as an objective and real being, or affection of such, is imaginary, yet, looking to sensible phenomena, not only is it true, but even the ground of all the truth we ascribe to our perceptions of external objects.—*Kant.*

P. 598, l. 12 [596, 33, 1st Ed.]—As the order of the parts of time is immutable, so also is the order of the parts of space. Let these be moved from their places, and they will be moved, so to speak, from themselves. *For times and spaces are as it were the places of themselves and of all things. All existence is located in time, with respect to the order of succession; in space, with regard to the order of situation.* They are essentially places; and it is absurd to suppose primary places moved.—*Newton.*

P. 598, l. 26 [597, 11, 1st Ed.]—Since every particle of space *always* is, and every indivisible moment of duration is *everywhere*, the Maker and Lord of all things will assuredly be *in time and place.* —*Newton.*

P. 598, l. 31 [597, 16, 1st Ed.]—Several learned men are at this moment engaged in transferring into our language the principles of the Kantian philosophy. The undertaking, however, is one of great difficulty, as its terms are obscure, and the French reader, especially, is desirous of perfect lucidity. So marked is the difference of the intellectual tastes and habits of the two nations, that the works of Kant, which have had so wonderful a success in Germany, if written in French, in the same style, would not, I believe, have found readers.

The German language, marked by copiousness, and boldness and variety of flexion, is prepared to bear a strain which one of greater severity and limitation could not sustain. A language of the latter kind would repel foreign neologisms that now approach the jargon of the school, at another time are attached to modes of thinking that are peculiar, even fantastical. It shuns a style that is fatiguing from its obscurity; such especially as requires, on the admission even of those who employ it, long study in order to understand it.

If, in the face of those difficulties, I desired to anticipate the results of the labours of others, and trace the outline of the new philosophy, I should especially insist on distinguishing between what is properly its own, and what it has appropriated from others. There must assuredly be, in the genius of its author, ground to justify the enthusiasm of an enlightened and judicious nation, and the eulogiums of men of learning who are both profound and ingenious. But have not the riches that are natural to the system been imperceptibly enhanced by others that are borrowed? And do the latter not sometimes constitute the principal merit of the doctrine that is admired? I shall better explain myself by an example.

M. Kant, after distinguishing the sensibility from the intelligence, remarks, that the notions of time and space are as it were the natural forms of the sensible faculty of the mind; that those notions cannot come from without; that they are primitive dispositions; that in consequence of this constitution of the human mind, every impression made on it is necessarily lodged at once in both those forms; and this doctrine forms an important part of his principles. But to restrict ourselves for a moment to space, Locke, before Kant, had

remarked that extension is a primary quality; in other words, that the mind necessarily judges it external and independent of sensation.[1] That philosopher, and his successors, especially Condillac, had strongly insisted on the point, that we only know external things relatively to the particular constitution of our mind; that the internal and absolute nature of substance is unknown to us.[2] If our mind recognises extension as external, and always existent; if this conception is purely relative to its constitution, it is then a constant form, and one that depends on the nature of the mind itself. Thus far the two philosophies appear to differ merely in expression.[3] All that is peculiar to the Kantian, is the remark that the mind necessarily relates all phenomena to a point of space—a circumstance rather passed over than unobserved by the others. There are, doubtless, more novel assertions in that part of the Kantian doctrine, which is occupied with the division of notions and judgments or of the forms of intelligence, but also more doubtful positions.[4] When we see new theories of morals, or others relative to important subjects which are apparently exhausted, reared on those principles, we cannot help conceiving somewhat of distrust. Do the conclusions validly flow from the premises? Is the coherence of the system as real and solid as its defenders imagine?[5] Is there no ground to suspect that the discoveries, or at least the researches that are elsewhere brought together without display, are here but set in a frame, in which they assume an air of novelty? These doubts, or hints, are designed to excite a special interest in the projected translations of works relative to the Kantian philosophy. If the authors of those translations succeed in distinguishing what is peculiar to the philosophy from what it has in common with all; if in what is peculiar to it they render selection

[1] *Essay concerning the Human Understanding*, book ii. chap. viii. See also Smith's *Dissertation on the External Senses*.

[2] *Ibid.* book iv. chap. vi. § 11, and following. *Art of Thinking*, chap. xi. &c.

[3] It was said of the chief of the Stoics: that Zeno was less a discoverer of truth than an inventor of words.—Cic. *De Fin.* iii. 2. Without applying this judgment to the modern philosopher, we should at least make it a point to distinguish what in the doctrine is absolutely new, from what, really old, is only clothed in new terms.

[4] See among others the memoir of M. Sello on *The Reality and Ideality of the Objects of our Knowledge*, inserted in the Memoirs of the Academy of Berlin for 1786 and 1787, in particular at page 601, and those following.

[5] It is indeed on this coherence and indissoluble concatenation of the system that their admiration is chiefly founded; in particular, as this appears in the famous *Critique of Pure Reason*, which is the first and principal body of doctrine of this philosophical sect. On this point I give the following quotation from one of its most zealous professors. "For from these sources must flow all the power and virtue of the critical philosophy of the pure reason; so perfectly admirable is the coherence of its parts, that the last are in harmony with the first, the middle with both, and each part with another; in the first, all is given."—*Born.* See above, p. 415, l. 12.

easy, they will doubtless contribute to the progress of the human mind; and those who, like myself, are imperfectly acquainted with the new doctrine, will eagerly seek lights separated from deceitful shadows, and judiciously distributed.—*Prévost.*

P. 602, l. 9 [600, 25, 1st Ed.]—Reid assailed the systems of his predecessors, and in particular that of Hume, simply because he felt convinced of their defective foundations. But another antagonist, not less celebrated, of the scepticism of Hume, was besides moved by the grudge he entertained towards his illustrious countryman, *who replied, to him with much bitterness and animosity.* James Beattie, *Professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh*, afterwards of Logic and Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen, *had the preference over Hume in the competition for the vacant chair at Edinburgh.* This circumstance doubtless became the chief source of the enmity which the two savans conceived for one another, and which even affected the tone of their controversial writings.—*Buhle.*

P. 602, l. 21 [600, 36, 1st Ed.]—The work of Dugald Stewart, entitled *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, is a fusion of the views of Hartley and Reid. Stewart absolutely limits the knowledge, whether of the mind or of outward objects, to the teachings of common sense, and believes that he thereby frees the study of metaphysics from the reproach of dealing with matters that lie beyond the sphere of our understanding, or that are wholly useless in practice. The chapters that follow contain the development of the principle of the association of ideas. They are taken almost entirely from Hartley. Stewart derives from this principle all the intellectual and practical faculties of man.—*Buhle.*

P. 602, l. 42 [601, 11, 1st Ed.]—With an extent of erudition (referring to Bouterwek) and a *loyalty* in the mode of rendering it available to his readers, which appear specially to belong to German scholars.—*Sismondi.*

P. 603, n. C C C, l. 5.—The Art of Symbols, popularly the universal character and philosophical language, by which persons of the most different dialects may, in the space of two weeks, communicate to each other all their thoughts on ordinary topics either in writing or orally, and that quite as intelligibly as in their native tongues. Besides, by means of it, youths may acquire the principles of philosophy, and the true application of logic, sooner and much more easily than from the ordinary works of philosophers.

P. 609, n. E E E, l. 18.—The ground of the belief, that out of ten millions of white balls with one black, it will not be the black I will draw at the first trial, is of the same nature as the ground of belief that the sun will not fail of rising to-morrow; and the two opinions differ only in the greater and less degree of probability.—*Condorcet.*

P. 610, l. 10 [609, 41, 1st Ed.]—The analogical conviction, of which every one is conscious on seeing the recurrence of a natural event, as the rising of the sun, is of a different nature from the belief represented fractionally in the theory of probabilities. The latter may be joined to the former, but the one may exist without the other. They depend on two different orders of faculties. A child, an animal, is conscious of the first, without making any calculation explicit or implicit; there is no necessary connexion between the two beliefs. The estimate of the calculus is reasoned out, and is even to a certain point artificial. The other is the work of instinct and nature. It is dependent on certain intellectual faculties, whose analysis is difficult, and probably in great measure on the principle of the association of ideas. . . .

I would now establish, that this whole array of method, so beautiful and beneficial, by which the calculation of the probability of causes through their effects is reached, supposes a previous determination of the degree of that probability itself; and, in particular, that in all the interesting applications of this calculus, we are uniformly of necessity guided by an instinctive persuasion, whose degree cannot be specified, and that our whole reasonings on this subject depend on our confidence in a principle of belief, which the calculus of probabilities cannot estimate.

. . . I maintain, therefore, that man possesses a principle (we may call it *an instinctive belief*), which every application of the calculus of probabilities supposes. So long as we reason abstractly, we are not called upon to furnish the grounds upon which the estimate of the probability of chances is founded. But in all concrete or individual instances, experience alone can enable us to determine this probability. As there is no connexion between the past and the future, we anticipate the like results in like circumstances only from the unreasoning but irresistible conviction of the constancy of the laws of nature. If we take the example of a die, it will appear that the maker, to give it the proper shape, must finally be guided by his previous acquaintance with similar gaming instruments, and with dice in particular. When, therefore, he anticipates in this instance results

similar to what he before experienced, he is building on a foresight, the ground of which is inappreciable by the calculus. It is vain to attempt to escape the circle by remounting from cause to cause; for all probability estimated conjecturally, is in the last resort reducible to this type. The probability of life is determined by empirical tables; so also is the probability of meteorological phenomena and others.—*Prévost and L'Huillier.*

P. 611, l. 33.—Amid the variable and unknown causes we embrace under the term chance, and which throw an uncertainty and irregularity into the course of events, there is seen arising, in proportion as events are multiplied, a striking regularity, which wears the appearance of design, and which has been regarded as a proof of a superintending providence. But, on reflection, it readily occurs that this regularity is but the development of the respective possibilities of simple events that must take place more frequently as the probability of them is increased. Suppose, for example, an urn containing white and black balls; suppose, further, that each time we draw a ball, we replace it in the urn before proceeding to draw anew. The proportion of the number of white balls extracted, to the number of black extracted, will be most generally very irregular in the first drawings; but the variable causes of this irregularity producing results by turns favourable and opposed to the even course of events, and, being mutually destructive in the totality of a large number of drawings, allow more and more the proportion of the white to the black balls contained in the urn to be seen, or the respective possibilities of extracting a white or a black ball at each chance. Thence results the following theorem: The probability that the proportion of the number of white balls extracted to the total of balls drawn, does not, in a given interval, pass beyond the proportion of the number of white balls to the total of balls contained in the urn, indefinitely approaches certitude by the indefinite multiplication of events, however small we suppose this interval to be. . . .

The preceding theorem yields this result, which ought to be regarded as a general law, viz., that the proportions of the effects of nature, when considered on a great scale, are within a very little of being constant. Thus, despite the variety in the character of the years, the sum of products during a considerable number of them is sensibly the same; so that man is able, in the exercise of a beneficial foresight, to shelter himself from the bad effects of the irregu-

larity of the seasons, by equalising, in accordance with his circumstances, what nature distributes unequally. I make no exception to the preceding law of effects due to moral causes. The proportion of yearly births to the population, and that between marriages and births, exhibit but very slight variations. In Paris, the number of births in a year has always been pretty nearly the same; and I have heard it said, that at the post-office, in ordinary circumstances, the number of misdirected letters consigned to the dead-letter office varies little from year to year. The same has been observed in London.

It follows, besides, from this theorem, that in a series of events indefinitely prolonged, the action of regular and constant causes must, in the long run, surmount that of irregular causes. . . .

If we apply this theorem to the proportion of the births of males to those of females, observable in the different states of Europe, it will be found that the proportion, everywhere pretty nearly equal to that of 22 to 21, indicates with the highest probability a greater tendency to the production of males. Considering, in the next place, that it is the same at Naples as at Petersburg, we perceive that it is not due to the influence of climate. We might, therefore, be led to suspect, contrary to the popular opinion, that the superiority in number of male births holds even in the East. I accordingly suggested to the French scholars sent to Egypt to bestow some attention on this interesting question; but the difficulty of procuring accurate statistics of births prevented them from solving it. Fortunately Humboldt did not neglect this subject amid the infinite variety of new observations which he made and collected in America with so great sagacity, perseverance, and courage. He found between the tropics the same proportion between the births of males and those of females as is observed in Paris; *on which ground we must regard the superiority in number of male births as a general law of the human race.* The laws by which the various species of animals are regulated in this respect appear to me to merit the attention of naturalists.—*Laplace.*

P. 613, l. 25.—The constancy of the surplus of male births over female, in Paris and London, from the earliest observation, has appeared to some learned men a proof of *providence*, without which they thought that the irregular causes that unceasingly disturb the course of events, must have frequently given a superiority to the yearly number of female births over those of males.

But this proof is a fresh example of the abuse that has been so

often made of final causes, which always disappear after a searching examination of the question, once we have obtained the data necessary for its resolution. The constancy in question is a result of the REGULAR CAUSES that give the superiority to male births, and overbear the anomalies due to chance when the number of yearly births is considerable.—*Laplace.*

P. 614, n. FFF, l. 4.—

Oft hath my doubtful mind essay'd to scan
If aught celestial hath a care for man;
Or leaves him sport of every wind and wave—
No will to govern and no arm to save.
If then, perchance, my better reason found,
I turn'd to contemplate the world around,
And seek the source of power, whose laws ordain
The year its seasons and its bounds the main,—
That bid the night and day alternate reign;
In all I own'd and bow'd me to the God
Who taught the planets their appointed road,
And earth her stores exuberant forth to bring—
Her fruits of autumn and her flowers of spring;
Pour'd flood of radiance from the solar throne;
Lit the pale moon with brightness not her own;
Enfolded earth in ocean's ambient robe,
And poised immovably the central globe.
But, turn'd to man, when on my baffled gaze
All drear and dark arose the moral haze,
Where still the worst to power and glory climb,
While virtue trembles at the feet of crime,—
My past conviction failed: Religion fled,
Her hope bewilder'd and her spirit dead.

. . . . . .

The punishment of Rufinus at length quieted this tumult of feeling, and absolved the gods.—*Claudian*—(Howard.)

P. 616.—SUPPLEMENT.

GENEVA, 23*d November* 1821.

No literary present could be more acceptable to me than your *Dissertation.* The second part completely fulfils the promise of the first. I read it with unbroken attention and sustained interest. It

is very far from true that the brief remarks [contained in] the fly-leaf appended to this letter, indicate all the subjects . . . which the perusal of it suggested, and I interdicted myself from [giving expression to] the general effect it produced upon me, and the feelings it elicited. Apart from the order and clearness that prevail throughout, the union, so rare, of vast erudition and sound philosophy, the tone and style are so well measured, and withal possess such warmth and elevation, as to captivate and engage the reader in the midst of apparently very dry discussions. Your judgments also manifest remarkable equity and even impartiality; and in many respects the picture is a fine pendant to that which your illustrious friend Playfair has sketched. I have been much affected by the solicitude you have shown to accord to myself in different parts of this work (as you had done in others) an honourable mention.

I desire, sir, a continuance of that degree of friendship you have already bestowed on me, and that your health may be preserved amid so many severe and useful labours.—Yours devotedly,

P. Prevost.

Dissertation, &c., Part II.

P. 421.—These memoirs formed part of those for the years 1796 and 1797. It is to those for 1796 that reference is made in the citation of pages 15 and 31, indicated in this note.

Pp. 284-286.—In confirmation of these remarks, I cannot help adding the question: How was it that Leibnitz, furnished as early as Newton with the instrument of the calculus, did really nothing in physics?

P. 356, l. 14.—*But I must—a life to come.* Although I lived at a time, place, and in society where admiration of Ch. Bonnet was a species of worship, I had never much relish for his metaphysics. I must say, however, in reply to the charge advanced against him, that that philosopher thought he had fully met it by his *Palingénésie.* Besides, on that point, he followed pretty nearly in the track of Leibnitz; but he put great value on the feature that distinguished his view from that of his predecessor. And in truth (system for system) it is more plausible.

P. 369, l. 18.—*His thoughts—attention.* I somewhat regret this éloge, as I do not think it merited. As soon as that volume appeared, with the somewhat fastidious title of *Moral Arithmetic*, I studied it with eagerness, and discovered that it contained a tissue of paralo-

gisms. Some of its positions are, it is true, indisputable; and how could its author fail to enounce, in conclusion, acknowledged truths? But his ridiculous experiments on a frivolous game, and the absurd or inconsequent conclusions he deduces from these, are of no moment. I supposed at the time that the writer (who, though not a mathematician, was no stranger to mathematics) had, towards the end of his life, lost the power of close reasoning, which the kind of topics he had undertaken to discuss demands.

P. 373, l. 4.—There are here two things that surprise me: 1. Why, if the English have not the word *ennui*, do they not supply the deficiency? How is it the English term *lassitude* is a synonym of *ennui*, when in French these words denote two things so different?

P. 596, l. 3.—*Forms . . . Does Kant mean*, &c. 1. The word *form*, applied to the sensibility, is explained, vol. i. p. 25, of Born's transl., *In vision*, &c.; and in a more general way by the two characteristics of *à priori* knowledge, p. 3, last line. *Hence, therefore*, &c. The term does not appear to be very inappropriately applied to denote what constitutes the *laws* of our spiritual nature, just as Bacon employs it to signify the laws of nature. Kant, indeed, seems to me to have borrowed it from Aristotle rather than from Bacon. Be this as it may, it was requisite, in the Kantian doctrine, to have a term applicable to the three faculties of the mind, to express what is native to it, what is not derived from experience. 2. To the question, *Does Kant*, &c., I would reply: Kant means to say that the concept of space is *necessary*, that is, that we cannot rid ourselves of it; and further, that it is *universal*, that is, extends to all the phenomena of the external senses. With a doctrine such as he professes, he did not go far wrong in substituting the term *form* in this double character. I make this remark from a feeling of simple justice, as I am not myself a Kantian; and, in particular, as I had, a long time ago, given a very different analysis of the ideas of *time* and *space*.

P. 429, n. 1.—The last observation is very just. I have frequently made the same remark, though I never had the pleasure of visiting Scotland; and I have uniformly attributed to the philosophy of the Scottish school, a share of the honourable features that distinguish the sentiments, manners, and character of those who are most intimately connected with it. I can only speak, of course, of persons and books that are known to myself.

P. 446, l. 5.--*But to which*, &c. I most readily embrace this opinion. I would even extend its application somewhat further, so as to apply it to other aberrations. It is a principle of toleration.

VOL. II.

(ELEMENTS, VOL. I.)

P. 6, n. 1, c. 1, l. 1.—Hitherto I have explained the phenomena of the heavens and the sea, by the force of gravity, without, however, assigning any *cause* of this force. . . . For whatever is not deduced from phenomena is to be called *hypothesis*, and hypothesis, whether metaphysical or physical, can have no place in *experimental philosophy*. In this philosophy, propositions are drawn from phenomena, and rendered general by induction. It is thus we have obtained our knowledge of impenetrability, mobility, and the impetus of bodies, and the laws of motion and gravity. We ought to rest satisfied *with the fact that gravity really exists, and acts according to laws laid down by us, and affords a sufficient explanation of all the motions of the heavenly bodies and of the sea.—Newton.*

P. 6, n. 2, c. 2, l. 1.—We must not understand by cause *every* antecedent, but the *efficient* antecedent.—*Cicero.*

P. 9, n. 1, c. 1, l. 1.—Let no one accuse us of vanity before he has seen the result of our attempt, which tends to despoil us of all ground of boasting. If men for so long a series of years had been in the right path for discovering and cultivating the sciences, and withal made no more progress than they have done, it would doubtless have been presumption and rashness to suppose that any further progress could be made in that direction. But if they were in error as to the path itself, and their efforts were vainly spent in quarters where they should not have been exercised at all, it thence follows that the hindrance does not arise from things themselves, which are not in our power, but from the human intellect itself, and the manner of using and applying it; an evil susceptible of remedy and cure. It were therefore the best course to point out the errors themselves, for in proportion as the impediments of progress in the past have arisen from error, are our grounds of hope of advancement for the future.—*Bacon.*

P. 10, l. 3.—Regarding ourselves, we are silent; but touching our undertaking, we have to request that men will look upon it, not as a system of opinions, but as a work to be done; and be assured that we seek to lay the foundations of no sect or dogma, but of human usefulness and greatness.

Besides, that they may have good grounds of hope, let them not think of our restoration as something infinite and superhuman, since, in truth, it is but the lawful limit and term of boundless error.—*Bacon.*

P. 25, n. 1, c. 1, l. 1.—Nor do they think it right to commit them to writing, [because they do not wish] that learners, trusting to written materials, should be less assiduous in the cultivation of memory; since it for the most part happens that when the aid of writing is called in, diligence in learning, and in the exercise of memory, is relaxed.—*Cæsar.*

P. 25, n. 2, l. 1.—I do not think, however, that I ought to tarry on the question as to how memory is caused, although the prevalent opinion is that certain traces are preserved in the mind, after the manner of the impression of a signet-ring on wax.—*Quintilian.*

P. 55, n. c. 1, l. 3.—See above, vol. i. p. 157, n. 1, l. 1.

P. 68, l. 23.—No one has yet appeared of such intrepidity of mind as to resolve and bind himself utterly to reject theories and popular opinions, and anew to apply his mind without hindrance and bias to facts. Thus it is that human reason, as we have it, is a mixture and accumulation of indiscriminate beliefs, of casualties, and of the childish impressions we received in our earliest years. But if any one of mature years, and unimpaired powers, and of a purified mind, should anew apply himself to experience and to facts, of him might better things be expected.—*Bacon.*

P. 80, n., l. 1.—Another error is, that after the individual sciences and arts have been distributed into their respective classes, presently the search after universal knowledge and the first philosophy is, by the greater number, renounced. This is most inimical to the progress of learning. Distant outlooks are made from towers and places of great elevation; and it is impossible that any one can explore the more remote and interior parts of any science, if he stand on the level of that same science, and do not ascend, as it were, the watch-tower of a higher science.

But the greatest error of all the rest, is the mistaking and mis-

placing of the last or farthest end of knowledge. For men have entered into a desire of learning and knowledge; sometimes upon a natural curiosity and inquisitive appetite; sometimes to entertain their minds with variety and delight; sometimes for ornament and reputation; and sometimes to enable them to win the victory by wit and contradiction; and most times for lucre and profession, and seldom sincerely to give a true account of their gift of reason to the benefit and use of men, [as if there were sought in knowledge, a couch whereupon to rest a searching and restless spirit, or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect, or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon, or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contentions, or a shop for profit or sale, and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator, and the relief of man's estate]. But this is that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge, if contemplation and action may be more nearly and strictly conjoined and united together than they have been.—*Bacon.* (*Of the Advancement of Learning*, Book I.)

P. 82, l. 10.—Men may rest assured of this, that sound and genuine skill in invention grows and flourishes with the things invented.—*Bacon.* (*Of the Advancement of Learning*, Book V. chap. iii.)

P. 84, n.—It is better to possess skill in analysis, than to have many demonstrations of individual propositions.—*Marinus.*

P. 85, n., c. 1, l. 1.—Many are acquainted with Mathematics; few possess mathematical skill. For it is one thing to know some propositions, and deduce from them others that are obvious, more by accident than on any certain principle of investigation, and another to have a complete acquaintance with the nature and character of the science itself, to penetrate its recesses, and to be instructed in those general rules, by which we may acquire a readiness in devising, and also in demonstrating innumerable theorems and problems. For as the common crowd of painters, by repeatedly copying a model, attain some skill in painting, but no scientific knowledge of the art, such as optics afford; so many, from reading the books of Euclid and other geometricians, are in the habit of framing and demonstrating propositions after their manner, who are yet entirely ignorant of the most rare and elegant method of solving the more difficult theorems and problems.—*John de la Faille.*

P. 103, n.—

Next, what keen eye e'er followed, in their course,
The light-wing'd odours? or develop'd clear
The mystic forms of cold, or heat intense?
Or sound through ether fleeting?—yet, though far
From human sight removed, by all confess'd
Alike material; since alike the sense
They touch impulsive; [and since nought can touch
But matter; or, in turn, be touched itself].
—*Lucretius* (Good).

P. 104, n. 2, c. 1, l. 9.—See above, vol. i. p. 546, l. 9.

P. 106, l. 28.—The mind unites itself intimately to whatever object it pleases; distance, size, figure, nothing can prevent that union when the mind wills it: it is effected, and in an instant. Is the will then only a corporeal movement, and contemplation merely an act of touch? How can this contact take place with respect to a remote object, or an abstract subject? How can it be accomplished in an indivisible instant? Can we conceive motion apart from space and time? If will be motion, is it not a material motion; and if the union of the mind with its object be touch, or contact, does not that contact take place at a distance? Is it not penetration?—*Buffon.*

P. 122, l. 22.—It cannot be doubted that in this matter the close attention of the mind plays a most important part, and is, as it were, the glance of the eye fixed on the objects which it contemplates.—*Quintilian.*

P. 123, n. 1, c. 2, l. 1.—It is the higher or lower degree of attention that impresses more or less deeply objects on the memory.—*Helvetius.*

P. 128, n. 1, c. 1, l. 1.—The contractions of the muscles are performed and repeated with incredible rapidity. Of this we have a proof in the act of running, especially in the case of quadrupeds; or in the movements of the tongue, which pronounces four hundred words, containing, perhaps, two thousand letters, in the space of time we usually call a *minute*, although several contractions of the muscles are required to express many of the letters.—*James Gregory.*

P. 130, n., c. 1, l. 38.—It seems to be quite well ascertained that it is from touch we learn the distances of objects from ourselves.

When the blind man, couched by Cheselden, recovered his sight, all objects appeared to him to touch his eyes, *so at least it is said.—Cuvier.*

P. 130, n., c. 2, l. 31.—Among the theories of those instinctive actions that have been suggested, the only one that appears to me to have a probable foundation, and to be admissible, is that of Reid, &c. —*Cuvier.*

P. 130, n., c. 2, l. 36.—Habit differs from instinct, not in its nature, but in its origin [the latter being natural, the former acquired]. Both operate without will or intention, without thought, and, therefore, may be called *mechanical principles.—Reid* (see *Collected Works*, p. 550).

P. 133, n. 1, c. 1, l. 1.—Again, among the products of the wit and hands of men, we ought not altogether to despise feats of jugglery and jests; for some of these, though of slight use, and devised only for amusement, may yet afford valuable instruction.—*Bacon.*

P. 160, n. 1, c. 1, l. 4.—A child gives the name *tree* to the first tree that is pointed out to him. A second tree recalls to his mind the same idea; he gives it the same name. The same thing happens with a third and a fourth, and thus the term *tree*, at first applied to an individual object, becomes with him the name of a class or kind—an abstract idea, comprehending trees in general.—*Condillac.*

P. 180, n., c. 2, l. 3.—Beings must not be multiplied beyond necessity. (*Maxim.*)

P. 180, n., c. 2, l. 4.—This was to uphold a good thesis by a bad enough reason; for it conceded the possibility of those realities, and that to establish their existence all that was needed was to find a use for them. This principle, nevertheless, was called *the Razor of the Nominalists.—Condillac.*

P. 182, n. 2, c. 2, l. 3.—See above, vol. ii. p. 180, n., c. 2, l. 3.

P. 183, n., c. 1, l. 2.—Defend you me with the sword, and I will defend you with the pen.—*Occam.*

P. 184, l. 7.—First of all there is clamour to hoarseness, then disgraceful conduct, derisive grimaces, threats, abuse, while they struggle together and strive to beat each other down. After exhausting the force of words they proceed to fists, and from the appearance of wrestling to the reality. Nor are the practices of the wrestling-school wanting to the contest, for they buffet, cuff, spit upon each other, kick, and bite; and even going beyond what such practices allow,

they use clubs, weapons of iron, so that many are wounded, and some even killed.—*L. Vives.*

P. 184, l. 17.—In their contests they become pale with rage, and have recourse to abusive language, spitting, and sometimes even contend stoutly with each other fist to fist; some speak the language of Nominalists, some of Realists.—*Erasmus.*

P. 189, n., c. 1, l. 1.—The Nominalists, departing somewhat from the hypothesis of Abelard, held universals to consist in the notions and concepts of the mind, formed from singulars by abstraction, whence they were called Conceptualists.—*Brucker.*

P. 189, n., c. 1, l. 8.—There were three sects of Nominalists. One party, with Roscelinus, taught that universals are mere names. Others, again, placed them in the understanding alone, and asserted that they were mere concepts of the mind. By some this sect was distinguished from the Nominalists, and styled Conceptualists; others, however, made no distinction between them. There was a third party who sought universals not so much in words as *in whole sentences.* This doctrine is ascribed by John of Salisbury to Peter Abelard. I do not altogether comprehend its import.—*Morhoff.*

P. 197, n. 2, c. 1, l. 1.—M. Leibnitz had conceived the project of a philosophical and universal language. Wilkins, Bishop of Chester, and Dalgarno had been engaged on a similar work; but after Leibnitz was in England, he had said to Mr. Boyle and Mr. Oldenburg, that he did not think those great men had quite hit the mark. They could easily enable nations, who were ignorant of each other's language, to hold commercial intercourse, but they had not hit upon the true and real characters that constituted the most refined instrument of which the human mind could make use, and which would greatly facilitate the processes of reasoning, memory, and invention. These should resemble, as far as possible, algebraic characters, which are, in fact, highly simple and expressive, are without superfluity and ambiguity, and all whose variations are founded in reason. He has somewhere spoken of an alphabet of human thoughts, which he contemplated. To all appearance, that alphabet had reference to his universal language.—*Fontenelle.*

P. 198, n., c. 2, l. 5.—The memory of our sensations, and the faculty we possess of reflecting on them and combining them, constitute the sole source of our knowledge. The supposition of the existence of unvarying laws, to which all observed phenomena are

subject, so that they reappear in such times and circumstances as are determined by those laws, is the sole ground of the certainty of our knowledge.

We are conscious of having observed this uniformity, and an involuntary conviction constrains us to believe in its continuance. The probability it affords, how high soever, does not amount to certainty. No necessary relation, so far as we can discover, connects the past with the future, nor the uniformity of what I have seen with that which I should have observed had I remained in similar circumstances; but the impression that leads me to regard as existing, as real, that which has presented this character of uniformity, is irresistible.—*Turgot* (by Condorcet).

P. 199, n., c. 2, l. 11.—When a Frenchman and an Englishman think alike, they must needs be right.—*Voltaire.*

P. 200, n., c. 1, l. 6.—A friend of mine, an intelligent and trustworthy person, has related to me two facts of which he was witness. He had a most sagacious monkey, and was in the habit of amusing himself by giving the animal nuts, of which it was very fond, placing them, however, at such a distance that the monkey, being chained, could not reach them. After a variety of fruitless efforts, that served but to whet his invention, the monkey, observing a domestic passing with a napkin under his arm, laid hold of it, and used it for reaching the nut and drawing it to him. The way to break it taxed his invention anew. He succeeded in that by putting the nut on the ground and letting fall upon it a stone from above. You perceive, sir, that without being acquainted, like Galileo, with the laws regulating the descent of bodies, the monkey had been a good observer of the force which bodies acquire in their fall. That plan, however, proved a failure. One day some rain had fallen, the ground was soft, the nut sank into it, and the stone had not force to crush it. What did the monkey do? He possessed himself of a tile, placed the nut upon it, and letting fall the stone, he broke it, as it no longer sank into the substance beneath it.—*Bailly.*

P. 224, l. 34.—What things usage has sanctioned, if not beneficial, are at least in harmony with each other.—*Bacon.*

P. 226, l. 30.—With how scanty a supply of wisdom the world is governed.—*Oxenstiern.*

P. 229, l. 22.—What innovator imitates time, which innovates so silently as to mock the sense?

Time is the greatest innovator; shall we then not imitate time?

The sullen conservation of usages is as fruitful a source of disquiet as novelty.

When things of themselves are tending to the worse, if they be not changed to the better by prudent counsel, what end shall there be of the evil?—*Bacon.*

P. 244, l. 8.—For time effaces the fictions of opinion, confirms the dictates of nature.—*Cicero.*

P. 253, n., l. 1.—Wherever we walk, our step is on a spot of historical interest.—*Cicero* (speaking of Athens).

P. 259, n., l. 2.—A sequence or series of imaginations. . . . By a series of imaginations, I understand a succession of thought upon thought.—*Hobbes.*

P. 261, n., c. 2, l. 7.—When, therefore, we accomplish an act of reminiscence, we pass through a certain series of precursive movements, until we arrive at a movement on which the one we are in quest of is habitually consequent. Hence, too, it is, that we hunt through the mental train, excogitating [what we seek] from [its concomitant in] the present or some other [time], and from its similar, or contrary, or coadjacent. Through this process reminiscence is effected.—*Aristotle* (See Hamilton's Reid, p. 897).

P. 265, l. 22.—

> There, at some future day, as farmers toil
> With the curved plough to break that fatal soil;
> Spear-heads, with rust deep canker'd, shall be found,
> And ponderous rakes on empty helmets sound;
> While in rent graves their wondering eyes will trace
> The mighty relics of a former race.—*Virgil* (Bathurst).

P. 287, l. 16.—It would have been well if the mathematical authors had left us their discoveries in the same method, and according to the same modes of research, in which they themselves originally hit upon them; and not done as those artificers of whom Aristotle speaks in his Mechanics, who exhibit to the public the instruments they have made, but conceal the method of construction, with a view to enhance the wonder of the spectators. At any rate, in every art invention is very different from communication; and it must not be supposed that the majority of the propositions of Euclid and Archimedes were thought out by them in the same way in which they have communicated them to us.—*P. Nonius.*

P. 296, l. 28.—

Cruel Æneas, as she raves in dreams,
Torments her still. Or she is ever left
In solitude, ever appears to go
A tedious journey, guideless, and to seek
Her Tyrian people on deserted shores.
—*Virgil* (Kennedy).

P. 310, l. 12.—

For as the boy, when midnight veils the skies,
Trembles, and starts at all things, so, full oft,
E'en in the noon men start at forms as void
Of real danger as the phantoms false by darkness conjured.
—*Lucretius* (Good).

P. 313, n., c. 1, l. 1.—We become accustomed to all we see; and I am not sure if the actual observation of the consulship of Caligula's horse would have filled us with as much surprise as we imagine it would.—*Cardinal de Retz.*

P. 316, n., c. 2, l. 11.—The levity and inconstancy of men may be best seen from this, in that until a thing is completed, they wonder whether it can be done; and once it is accomplished, they again wonder that it had not been done long before.—*Bacon.*

P. 320, l. 13.—That it could not be obliterated or severed without impairing the whole statue.

P. 334, l. 2.—The earth delighting in the laurelled plough and triumphal ploughman.—*Pliny.*

P. 341, n. 2, l. 2.—The use that should be made of imagination. . . . In accordance with your habit of imagination will be the character of your thought; for the mind takes its colour from the imagination. Imbue your mind, therefore, with the continuance of such acts of imagination.—*Antoninus.*

P. 349, n., c. 2, l. 5.—Think but of the last moment of your existence; a moment in which the mere remembrance of the most transcendent feats would not weigh with the tender recollection of having humanely given to one perishing of thirst a cup of cold water.—*Diderot.*

P. 352, n., c. 2, l. 4.—The things we expect and that excite the attention are more easily remembered than events that receive merely a cursory notice. In accordance with this principle, if you were to read through any work twenty times, you would not fix its contents

in your memory so readily as if you read it only ten times, trying to repeat it at the end of each perusal, and when your memory failed, looking into the book.—*Bacon.*

P. 354, n., c. 1, l. 1.—If in the course of our life we see things that are trifling, usual, of daily occurrence, we do not ordinarily remember them; for this reason, that the mind is impressed only by what is new or strange. But if we see or hear anything strikingly base or honourable, unusual, great, incredible, ridiculous, we are wont to keep it in mind for a long time.—*Cicero.*

P. 357, n., c. 1, l. 25.—His (Parr's) brain was healthy, of the firmest texture, and very solid to the touch. Accordingly, shortly before his death, and though he had been blind for twenty years, he was known to possess his sense of hearing quite unimpaired, understood what he heard, replied promptly to questions, and put himself in readiness to receive what was brought to him. He was, moreover, able to walk about, lightly supported by a person on each side. His memory, however, was greatly impaired. He remembered nothing whatever of what he had been engaged in when a young man; nor had he any recollection of the public events, the kings or nobles, the wars or commotions, the manners, the men, the prices of marketable articles during the period of his early youth, or any of the other accidental circumstances which people usually remember. He recollected only what he had done repeatedly in his last years. When in the hundred and thirtieth year of his age, however, he was wont to engage with energy in every species of rural labour, by which he could obtain a livelihood, not excepting the thrashing of corn.—*Harvey.*

P. 357, n., c. 2, l. 17.—Old men especially are dangerous, who preserve the recollection of past events, but have no remembrance of their repeated accounts of them.—*Montaigne.*

P. 357, n., c. 2, l. 34.—How is it that our memory is powerful enough to retain what has happened to us, even to the most minute particulars, while we forget the number of times we have related them to the same person?—*La Rochefoucauld.*

P. 359, n., c. 2, l. 25.—The illness of Broussonet presented a peculiarity fitted to throw light on the mental history of man. Broussonet, in the last months of his life, after his fall, entirely lost the memory of proper names and substantives; adjectives, both French and Latin, occurred to him in abundance, and he made use of them to characterise the objects of which he wished to speak.—*Biog. Univ.*

P. 368, n., c. 1, l. 14.—See above, vol. ii. p. 25, n. 1, c. 1, l. 1.

P. 368, c. 2, l. 5.—Although I find in Plato, that the use of letters is prejudicial to memory, for the reason, as he intimates, that what we have laid aside in writing we as it were cease to watch over, and we lose it through mere negligence.—*Quintilian.*

P. 369, n., c. 2, l. 9.—He read largely and made extracts, and of almost every book of interest he committed brief notes to sheets of paper, which he immediately, however, laid aside; nor did he ever again require to read them, so vigorous was his memory.—*Acta Eruditorum.*

P. 370, l. 15.—The powers of theory consist in a suitable and mutually sustaining harmony of the parts, and in a certain circle of demonstration, and hence appear weak when communicated in parts. —*Bacon.*

P. 371, l. 2.—I cannot lay claim to much self-possession or command of myself. Chance has a greater share in that than I myself have. The particular occasion, company, even the sound of my voice, draw more from my mind than I can bring out of it, when I search it and busy myself upon it in solitude. It also happens with me that I do not find what I seek; and when I do hit upon it, it is more by accident than in virtue of the exercise of my judgment.—*Montaigne.*

P. 379, n., c. 1, l. 5.—In memory, Pascal was a perfect prodigy; it was rather, however, of things than of words. So great was his power, that he said without boasting, that nothing he had once understood ever escaped him.—*Nicole.*

P. 379, l. 18.—O Mnemosyne! revered mother of the Muses, whom Jupiter himself, the father of the gods, ardently loved, dost thou then, my patroness, desert me—a faithful client? Ah! I remember when I, a young man, could recount the names of innumerable sages and sects, when I could narrate a thousand genealogies, and all the nations in their order. All these names are now forgotten. My own name hardly clings to my mind. I remember when I could recite the most of Homer, and of the Pelignian poet (Ovid), when I retained all Virgil. Now these verses are forgotten. I am not even able to keep in mind the verses composed by myself a moment before.—*Menage.*

P. 380, l. 1.—Revered mother of the Muses, whom Jupiter himself, the father of the gods, tenderly loved, thou hast heard my prayer.

Thou hast, O Goddess! restored to me, an old man, the power of memory. I am able to recount a thousand names of the great, and all the Sablolian nobles from their origin, the Roman laws, the sects of the wise, and to recite a thousand passages of Tully, and hundreds of verses of Homer and Virgil. That part of my endowments, by which as a youth I found favour with thee, lo! is restored to me. These are thy gifts, O Goddess! by thee has the youth of my genius been renewed.—*Menage.*

P. 380, n. 2, l. 1.—All who have met the Abbé de Longuerue, speak with amazement of his prodigious and almost *terrible* erudition. He had read everything, and a boundless memory enabled him to retain all that he read. He was thus not only the terror of pretenders to learning, whom he put to silence in his presence, but the plague of scholars themselves, whose learning did not suffice to teach them modesty.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 382, n. 1, l. 1.—As much time as is occupied in infancy is an acquisition to youth. Let us not, therefore, lose even the earliest moment of life; and so much the less as the foundations of learning rest on the memory alone,—a power which not only exists in childhood, but is even then most tenacious.—*Quintilian.*

P. 383, l. 30.—There was no subject in which any one could desire instruction, which he (Joseph Scaliger) was not capable of giving. He had read nothing (and what had he not read?) which he did not forthwith remember; there was nothing so obscure or obsolete in any ancient author, Greek, Latin, or Hebrew, with regard to which, when interrogated, he could not at once give a reply. He was at home in the history of all nations and all ages, the successions of government, the affairs of the ancient church; the properties, differences, and names, whether ancient or modern, of animals, plants, metals, and all natural objects, he knew accurately. With the situations of places, the boundaries of provinces, and their various divisions at different times, he was perfectly familiar. He had left untouched none of the severer studies or sciences. So extensive and accurate was his acquaintance with languages, that if, during his lifetime, he had made but this single acquirement, it would have appeared miraculous.—*Casaubon.*

P. 386, l. 21.—Invention or ingenuity, like memory, is twofold. The one kind is prompt, and dependent on natural parts; the other, solid, and springing from judgment. Men of eloquence possess the

first; those who are slow, though not disqualified for the management of affairs, the second. Some are singularly variable, so that, at a particular time and place, they are wonderfully prompt, in other circumstances extremely slow, *with whom I have to class myself. I am conscious likewise that there are few of my character, and that all easy things are difficult to me, and all difficult things easy.—Leibnitz.*

P. 401, n., c. 1, l. 10.—It is ascertained that the eclipses of the sun and moon complete their revolution in two hundred and twenty-three months.—*Pliny.*

P. 411, n., c. 1, l. 1.—When, after a time, we return to particular places, we not only recognise the places themselves, but remember what we have done there; persons recur to us, sometimes also silent thoughts come back upon our minds. The art, therefore, as in most other cases, arose from experience.—*Quintilian.*

P. 417, n., c. 1, l. 1.—Plato indeed observes justly, "He who searches for anything has a general notion of that which he seeks, otherwise how could he recognise it when found out?" Therefore, in proportion as our anticipation is more full and certain, our investigation will be more compendious and direct.—*Bacon.*

P. 417, l. 27.—A wise interrogation is the half of science; for vague experiment, with but itself for a guide, is mere groping, and tends rather to bewilder than inform.—*Bacon.*

P. 422, n., c. 1, l. 6.—I recollect that in my tenth year, when I would have devoured history and poetry with avidity, I was forced to commit to memory a system of logic, and that CLAUBERG's, than which there could be nothing more unprofitable for such a manikin. —*Haller.*

P. 424, n., c. 1, l. 1.—There is no one whom it so ill becomes to speak of memory as I, for I hardly discover a trace of it in myself, nor do I think there is another person in the world in whom this defect is so marked.—*Montaigne.*

P. 428, n. 2, c. 1, l. 1.—By memory we obtain credit for promptitude of mind, so that what we say has not the appearance of being brought from home, but drawn forth on the spot.—*Quintilian.*

P. 432, l. 34.—

> Cool springs are here, soft meadows, and a grove,
> Lycoris; here with thee could I consume
> My life.—*Virgil* (Kennedy).

P. 432, n. 2, c. 2, l. 2.—Virgil has comprised in two verses all the delightful feelings that two beings can experience at once,—those of tender love and full enjoyment, freshness and silence, absence of interruption and break.—*Diderot.*

P. 434, l. 16.—*Phébus* (bombast) has a brilliancy that signifies, or seems to signify, something. The sun usually forms part of it, and it is that perhaps which in our language has given rise to the term *Phébus.*—*Abbé Girard.*

P. 447, l. 21.—(Visions)—when, under the influence of enthusiasm and passion, you seem to behold what you describe, and display it before the eyes of your hearers.—*Longinus.*

P. 447, n., c. 1, l. 1.—What the Greeks call φαντασίαι, we name *visiones;* images through which absent objects are so represented to the mind, that we seem to perceive them by sight, and be present to them.—*Quintilian.*

P. 459, n., c. 1, l. 1.—How is it that all men who have been eminently distinguished, whether in philosophy, statesmanship, poetry, or the arts, appear to have been melancholic?—*Aristotle.*

P. 467, l. 24.—Something boundless and infinite.—*Cicero.*

P. 473, n. A, l. 4.—Since the existence of bodies is for us but the permanence of beings whose properties accord with a certain order of our sensations, it follows from this that we have no higher certainty of their existence than of the existence of other beings, that equally manifest themselves by their effects upon us; and since the observations we make on our own faculties, confirmed by what we remark of other thinking beings that also animate bodies, reveal no analogy between the being that perceives or thinks and the being that presents the phenomenon of extension or impenetrability, there is no ground to suppose that these beings are of the same nature. The spirituality of the soul is thus not an opinion that requires proof, but the simple and natural consequence of an exact analysis of our ideas and faculties.—*Life of Turgot,* by Condorcet.

P. 473, l. 32.—By substance we can conceive nothing else than a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence. And, in truth, there can be conceived but one substance which is absolutely independent, and

that is God. We perceive that all other things can exist only by help of the concourse of God. And, accordingly, the term Substance does not apply to God and the creatures *univocally*, to adopt a term familiar in the schools; that is, no signification of this word can be distinctly understood, which is common to God and them.

Created substances, however, whether corporeal or thinking, may be conceived under this common concept; for these are things which, in order to their existence, stand in need of nothing but the concourse of God. But yet substance cannot be first discovered merely from its being a thing which exists independently, for existence by itself is not observed by us. We easily, however, discover substance itself from any attribute of it, by this common notion, that of nothing there are no attributes, properties, or qualities: for, from perceiving that some attribute is present, we infer that some existing thing or substance to which it may be attributed is also of necessity present.

But, although any attribute is sufficient to lead us to the knowledge of substance, there is, however, one principal property of every substance which constitutes its nature or essence, and upon which all the others depend. Thus, extension in length, breadth, and depth, constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought the nature of thinking substance.—*Descartes* (Eng. Tr.)

P. 475, n. B, l. 5.—It must be observed, besides, that the mind does not stand in need of images sent from objects to the brain, in order to perceive (as is the generally received opinion of the philosophers); or at least that the nature of these images is to be conceived far otherwise than is commonly done. For, as philosophers consider in them nothing beyond their resemblance to the objects they represent, they are unable to show how these images can be formed by the objects, and received into the organs of the external senses, and finally transmitted by the nerves to the brain. And they had no ground to suppose there were such images, beyond observing that our thought can be efficaciously excited by a picture to conceive the object pictured; from which it appeared to them that the mind must be, in the same way, excited to apprehend the objects which affect the senses, by means of certain small images delineated in our head. Whereas we ought to consider that there are many things besides images that can excite our thoughts; as, for example, words and signs, which in no way resemble the things they signify.—*Descartes.*

P. 475, l. 20.—[But I may even perhaps come to be of opinion

that all my ideas are of the class which I call adventitious, or that they are all innate, or that they are all factitious, for I have not yet clearly discovered their true origin;] and what I have here principally to do, is to consider with reference to those that appear to come from certain objects without me, what grounds there are for thinking them like those objects.

The first of these grounds is, that it seems to me I am so taught by nature; and the second, that I am conscious that those ideas are not dependent on my will, and therefore not on myself, for they are frequently presented to me against my will—as at present, whether I will or not, I feel heat; and I am thus persuaded that this sensation or idea of heat is produced in me by something different from myself, viz., by the heat of the fire by which I sit. And it is very reasonable to suppose, that this object impresses me with its own likeness rather than any other thing.

But I must consider whether these reasons are sufficiently strong and convincing. When I speak of being taught by nature in this matter, I understand by the word Nature, only a certain spontaneous impetus that impels me to believe in a resemblance between ideas and their objects, and not a natural light that affords a knowledge of its truth. But these two things are widely different; for what the natural light shows to be true can be in no degree doubtful, as, for example, that I am because I doubt, and other truths of the like kind; inasmuch as I possess no other faculty whereby to distinguish truth from error, which can teach me the falsity of what the natural light declares to be true, and which is equally trustworthy; but with respect to [seemingly] natural impulses, I have observed, when the question related to the choice of right or wrong in action, that they frequently led me to take the worse part; nor do I see that I have any better ground for following them in what relates to truth and error. Then, with respect to the other reason, which is, that because these ideas do not depend on my will, they must arise from objects existing without me, I do not find it more convincing than the former; for, just as those natural impulses, of which I have lately spoken, are found in me, notwithstanding that they are not always in harmony with my will, so likewise it may be, that I possess some power, not sufficiently known to myself, capable of producing ideas without the aid of external objects; and, indeed, it has always hitherto appeared to me, that they are formed during sleep, by some power of this

nature, without the aid of aught external. And, in fine, though I should grant that they proceeded from those objects, it is not a necessary consequence that they must be like them. On the contrary, I have observed in a number of instances, that there was a great difference between the object and its idea. Thus, for example, I find in my mind two wholly diverse ideas of the sun; the one, by which it appears to me extremely small, draws its origin from the senses, and should be placed in the class of adventitious ideas; the other, by which it seems to be many times larger than the whole earth, is taken up on astronomical grounds, that is, elicited from certain notions born with me, or is framed by myself in some other manner. These two ideas cannot certainly both resemble the same sun; and reason teaches me, that the one which seems to have immediately emanated from it is the more unlike. And these things sufficiently prove, that hitherto it has not been from a certain and deliberate judgment, but only from a sort of blind impulse, that I believed in the existence of certain things different from myself, which, by the organs of sense, or by whatever other means it might be, conveyed their ideas or images into my mind [and impressed it with their likeness].—*Descartes* (Eng. Tr.)

P. 476, l. 8.—You seem to doubt not only whether any ideas proceed from external objects, but even whether there be any external objects at all.—*Gassendi.*

P. 476, l. 10.—It must be observed that I have not affirmed that the ideas of material objects are evolved from the mind, as you here impute to me, hardly with perfect fairness; for I have subsequently expressly shown that they often arise from bodies, and that the existence of bodies is thence established.—*Descartes.*

P. 478, n. C, l. 38.—Man, as the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands as much as he has observed of the order of nature, whether in respect of things or the mind; he neither knows, nor does his power extend to more.—*Bacon.*

P. 479, l. 5.—It is clear that we shall follow the best way of philosophising, if we essay to deduce from the cognition (notion) of God himself our knowledge of created things, that so we may attain to the most perfect science, that is, the knowledge of effects through their causes.—*Descartes.*

P. 481, n. F, l. 1.—What Plato meant by Idea we have considered at length in a special treatise, which must be consulted by those who

desire a full and accurate acquaintance with the subject. For the purpose of our present work, we remark in brief, that idea, according to Plato, is not that which results from the contemplation of individual objects; the universal notion and general concept of a thing, which more recent philosophers call *idea*, but which he designated by the term εἶδος (*species*), and distinguished from idea. With him ideas are the essential models of all individual objects, self-existent, according to the nature and character of which singulars were formed, and which impart to them a true, definite, and stable essence. He laid it down that these ideas have their root in, and spring from the Divine mind, but possess their own special substance, and have thus an absolute existence; and he maintained that these essences of things are the proper objects of the human intellect, that the whole of philosophy hinges on the knowledge of them, as they exist apart from and beyond the sphere of matter. To Aristotle it appeared ridiculous to suppose that there are universal essences of this sort, by which all singulars should be essentially modified; and he thought that these were but the pratings and trifles of an idle subtlety, and that Plato had needlessly borrowed these dreams from the schools of the Pythagoreans, which were perpetually ringing with them, and incorporated them with his own system. But as he did not venture to deny that there are essential forms in things, he asserted that these ideas, or *forms*, which was the word he used as synonymous with the Platonic term, were impressed on matter from eternity, and latent in it, and that so matter was at length produced from those principles and seminal forms.—*Brucker.*

P. 481, n. G, l. 5.—Stilpo manifestly took away universals; for, said he, he who says *man* speaks of nobody, because the word does not denote this or that man, and is not more applicable to one than to another. His view clearly was, that man was not to be admitted in the abstract, and, therefore, that those species and genera of things did not exist in nature, since the universal man could be shown to be realised neither in this nor in any other man. Thus gathering from induction that neither this, nor that, nor any other, was a man, he inferred that no one was a man, and so playing on the ambiguities of the term, regarded both in the general or abstract, as the logicians say, and in the individual or singular, he perplexed the unwary. Bayle, however, supposes that he had something deeper than this in view, and that he did not mean merely to rest in a play on words,

but that he denied universals or predicables. It is not unlikely that Stilpo was of the number who taught that universals are mere names; a doctrine shared by the Cynics and others, as we have elsewhere shown, and afterwards adopted by the followers of Abelard, and the whole sect of the Nominalists.—*Brucker.*

P. 481, n. H, l. 1.—In the eleventh century, Roscelinus or Rucelinus, a philosopher and priest of Compiegne, receded from Aristotle, and concurred with the Stoics in maintaining that universals existed neither before the thing nor in the thing, that they had no real existence, but were mere names and words by which the genera of singulars are denoted.—*Brucker.*

P. 482, l. 4.—While Porphyry prudently judged it best to omit consideration of the question as to whether universals really exist, about which, he was aware, the Platonists and Stoics had a grand controversy, he left room for the unoccupied genius of Roscelinus to take it up and discuss it with fresh acuteness.—*Brucker.*

P. 482, l. 19.—One Rucelinus of Bretagne is said to have been the first of the Nominalists.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 482, l. 23.—One takes his stand on words, although this opinion has almost entirely disappeared, with its partisan Roscelinus; another looks upon sentences [as universals], and by distorting, seeks to harmonise with this doctrine whatever has been written on the subject of universals. Our Abelard, a Peripatetic, has been discovered to be of this opinion.—*John of Salisbury.*

P. 482, l. 30.—See above, vol. ii. p. 189, n., c. 1, l. 1.

P. 482, l. 36.—So that, resigning to my brothers the pomp of military glory, with my inheritance and right of primogeniture, I wholly abandoned the hall of Mars, that I might be reared in the bosom of Minerva.—*Abelard.*

P. 483, l. 13.—I found those whom I had left there just where they were; they did not appear to have succeeded in bringing to a conclusion their old debates, nor had they increased their stock of knowledge by a single proposition. . . . I thus became aware by experience, of what might be readily inferred, that how much soever dialectics may further other sciences, it remains sterile and lifeless when prosecuted by itself.—*John of Salisbury.*

P. 483, l. 20.—The question concerning genera and species, on which the world has toiled until it has grown old, and more time been consumed than the Cæsars took to conquer and govern the

world, and more money wasted than Crœsus with all his wealth ever possessed. For this question occupied multitudes so long, that as they pursued it exclusively during their whole lifetime, they, in the end, discovered neither what they sought nor aught else.—*John of Salisbury.*

P. 483, n. I, l. 1.—The sect of the Nominalists, the most profound among the scholastics, and harmonising most completely with the present reform in the manner of philosophising, though formerly one of the most flourishing, is now extinct among the schoolmen; a fact that implies the decline rather than the growth of acute speculation. But as our author, Nizolius, without reserve or hesitation, professes himself a Nominalist (near the end of chapter vi. book i.), and as, indeed, the force of his whole disputation is chiefly directed to the overthrow of forms and universals, I have thought it worth while to supply a few remarks on the Nominalists. The Nominalists are those who hold that all beyond individual existences, are mere names, and, accordingly, they do away with the reality of the abstract and universal. They allege that one Rucelinus of Bretagne was the first of them, who gave occasion to bloody contests in the University of Paris. . . .

The sect of the Nominalists, however, remained for a long time in obscurity, until it was of a sudden resuscitated by a man of the greatest genius, and the highest erudition for that age, William Occam, an Englishman, disciple of Scotus, and shortly afterwards his most formidable opponent. The doctrine of Occam was adopted by Gregory of Rimini, Gabriel Biel, and most of the Augustinians; hence it is that the earlier writings of Martin Luther manifest an attachment to the Nominalists, until, in the course of time, he began to hold all orders of monks in equal dislike. The general canon upon which the Nominalists uniformly found is, *That entities are not to be multiplied unnecessarily.* This principle is always assailed by the opposite party, on the ground that it injuriously limits the Divine creativeness, which is profuse rather than stinted, and delights in a variety and abundance of things. Those who make this objection, appear to me somewhat to misunderstand the meaning of the Nominalists, which, though not clearly expressed, amounts to this,—that a hypothesis is more perfect as it is simple, and that, in accounting for appearances, it is best to make the fewest gratuitous suppositions; for any other course charges nature, or rather God, its author, with

acting superfluously and in vain. Were an astronomer able to account for the celestial phenomena by a few suppositions, merely, for example, by simple circular movements, his hypothesis would certainly be preferable to that which postulates a multitude of orbits of varied intricacy to explain those phenomena. From this principle, the Nominalists concluded, that everything in nature could be explained without the assistance of any real universals or forms whatever. Than this opinion nothing can be more correct, nothing more worthy of the philosophy of our time, so much so, that I do not believe Occam himself was more of a Nominalist than Thomas Hobbes, who, I must confess, appears to me more than a Nominalist; for not satisfied with reducing, like the Nominalists, universals to names, he affirms that the truth of things consists in names, and, what is more, that it depends on human will, because it depends on the definition of terms, and definition on human will. This is the doctrine of a man who must be regarded as one of the profoundest thinkers of the age, and nothing, as I have said, can be more Nominalist.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 484, l. 22.—Leibnitz classes Thomas Hobbes with the Nominalists, whom he calls more of a Nominalist than Occam himself, and more than a Nominalist; as he is not content to reduce, with the Nominalists, universals to names, but affirms that the truth of things consists in words, and, what is more, depends on human will. This fine opinion of his, though lauded by Leibnifz, involves something monstrous, and is obviously execrable; for frightful absurdities flow from one towering paradox.—*Morhoff.*

P. 484, l. 38.—And we have thus, likewise, a distinction between nominal definitions, which contain merely the marks whereby a thing is to be distinguished from others, and real, from which the possibility of the thing is apparent; and in this way Hobbes is met, who held truths to be arbitrary, because they depend on nominal definitions, forgetting that the truth of definition is not a matter of will, and that it is not all notions whatever that are capable of being conjoined. Nor can nominal definitions by themselves constitute perfect knowledge, unless when it is otherwise manifest that the thing defined is possible.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 486, n. L, l. 3.—I have examined attentively the great work of Mr. Wilkins, on a real character and philosophical language. I find that it contains a vast number of good observations, and as perfect a table of predicaments as we possess. But the applica-

tion to characters and language is not conformable to what we could and ought to make. I had considered this matter before the appearance of the book of Mr. Wilkins, when I was a youth of nineteen, in a treatise *De Arte Combinatoria*, and it is my opinion, that these truly real and philosophical characters ought to correspond with the analysis of our thoughts. It is true that these characters presuppose the true philosophy, and it would only be at a future time that I should undertake to frame them. The objections of Mr. Dalgarno, and of Mr. Wilkins, against the truly philosophical method, are urged merely to excuse the imperfection of their essays, and serve but to indicate the difficulties by which they were repulsed.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 486, l. 20.—See above, vol. i. p. 603, n. C C C, l. 5.

P. 487, l. 15.—But generally, especially in an analysis of some length, we do not behold at a glance the whole nature of the thing, but employ signs in place of things, the explication of which in present thought we are accustomed, for the sake of brevity, to omit, knowing or believing that we have it in our power; thus, when I think of a chiliogon, or polygon of a thousand equal sides, I do not always consider the nature of a side, equality, and a thousand (or cube of ten), but I mentally employ those words (the sense of which is obscurely, at least, and imperfectly present to my mind), in place of the ideas which I have of them, since I remember that I know the meaning of those words, but do not judge the explication to be for the present necessary. Knowledge of this nature, which we employ in algebra, arithmetic, and indeed in almost everything, I am accustomed to call *hidden* or *symbolical.* And, certainly, when a notion is very complex, we cannot think at once all the notions that go to make it up. When we are able to do so fully, or at least in as far as it can be done, I call the knowledge *intuitive.* Our knowledge of a distinct primitive notion is always intuitive, while of a complex notion we have commonly nothing more than a symbolical knowledge.

From these considerations, it is plain that we are percipient of the ideas of the things we distinctly know, only in as far as we have an intuitive thought. And, indeed, it happens that we are frequently deceived in the belief that we have in our minds the ideas of things, when we erroneously suppose that we are employing terms that were before explicated by us. And we must hold the statement as false, or at least as open to ambiguity, which some make, that we cannot speak of a thing, and understand what we say, without having the

idea of it [present to the mind]. For we frequently, in some sort of way, understand the words taken singly, or remember that we formerly understood them; yet as we rest satisfied with this blind knowledge, and do not sufficiently pursue the resolution of the notions, it may happen that the contradiction, which, perchance, a composite notion involves, escapes us.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 489, n. N, l. 27.—M. Turgot studied the doctrine of M. Gournay and M. Quesnay with advantage, and made it his own; and, combining it with the knowledge he had of the law of right, and the expansive views of civil and criminal legislation that had occupied his mind and interested his heart, he succeeded, in this way, in forming a body of principles concerning national government, which comprehended both systems, and was more complete.

He was reported as being connected with several sects or societies so called. His friends in those societies were incessant in their complaints that he did not agree with their views. He, in his turn, continually reproached them with being desirous to establish a community of opinions, and with becoming security for the views of each other. He even considered such a course calculated to retard the progress of their discoveries.—*Dupont.*

P. 491, Continuation of Note O in second edition, l. 12.—Without an act of the will there is no effort of attention. Without some effort of attention there is no recollection. In sleep the action of the will is suspended. How, then, do we preserve any recollection of our dreams?

I see two or three answers to this difficulty. For the present, they reduce themselves to the statement, either that in a state of perfect sleep there is no recollection, and that, when we have recollection, our sleep was not perfect, or that the effort of will, which is sufficient for recollection, is not suspended in sleep; that the mind preserves this degree of activity; that it is, so to speak, only an elementary, and, as it were, unconscious volition.—*Prévost.*

P. 497, n. P, l. 12.—There can be no doubt that the word *colour* does not denote any property of body, but simply a modification of our mind; that whiteness for example, redness, &c., only exist in us and not at all in the bodies to which we refer them. The tendency we have to ascribe to a material and divisible substance that which really belongs to a spiritual and simple substance, and which is a habit in operation from infancy, is a very singular one,

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and worthy of the attention of metaphysicians; and there is nothing, perhaps, more extraordinary in the operations of our mind than to observe it transport its sensations beyond itself, and, so to speak, spread them over a substance to which they cannot belong.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 497, l. 28.—We might suppose a case in which smell would teach us to judge with perfect accuracy of size, figure, situation, and distance. On the one hand, it would only be necessary to subject the odoriferous particles to the laws of dioptrics, and, on the other, to construct the organ of smell nearly on the model of that of sight; so that the odoriferous rays, after crossing each other at the opening, might impress upon an interior membrane as many distinct points as there were on the surface from which they were reflected.

In such a case, we should very soon acquire the habit of spreading smells over objects, and philosophers would not fail to say that the sense of smell had no need of the information of touch in order to perceive size and figure.—*Condillac.*

P. 498, n. Q, l. 1.—It is indeed true, that musicians of the present day are accustomed so to express themselves, considering acute above and grave below, and that some of the later Greeks seem to have expressed themselves in the same way, though rarely, and that the habit gradually grew on them. But the more ancient Greeks employed a totally opposite mode of expression, considering the grave above and the acute below. This practice continued even to the times of Boethius, who, in his scales, uniformly places the grave in the highest place and the acute in the lowest.—*David Gregory.*

P. 498, l. 12.—And, indeed, the grave takes place when from the lower part of the throat the breath is carried upwards, but the acute when it issues from the highest part.—*Aristides Quintilianus.*

P. 499, footnote 1, c. 1, l. 5.—By *the association of ideas* is to be understood, not any natural and necessary conjunction of them, but one which is fortuitous, or produced by custom or superinduced disposition; in virtue of which ideas, that in themselves have no natural connexion, are so joined that, on the recurrence of one, the whole troop of them present themselves to the view of the mind. —*Brucker.*

P. 501, n. S, l. 8.—What then? Are we to suppose that the mind is impressed like wax, and that memory is the trace in the mind of the objects stamped? What traces can there be of words?

what of things themselves? what magnitude, again, is there so vast, which can give rise to so many impressions?—*Cicero.*

P. 501, l. 14.—See above, vol. ii. p. 25, n. 2, l. 1.

VOL. III.

(ELEMENTS, VOL. II.)

P. 9, n., c. 2, l. 2.—Supposing the planets to be inhabited by reasoning beings, the question remains, as to whether what we call *reason* is the same with them as with us? It would seem that it is in every respect the same, and that it cannot be otherwise, whether we consider the use of reason in matters pertaining to morals and equity, or in those that relate to the principles and foundations of the sciences. For with us, reason is that which generates a sense of justice, honour, praise, clemency, gratitude, and, in general, teaches us to distinguish between good and evil; and, besides, renders the mind a proper subject of instruction, and fits it for making various discoveries.—*Huygens.*

P. 10, n. 1, c. 2, l. 10.—There is indeed a true law, right reason, . . . whose office it is to summon to duty by a command; to deter from crime by a prohibition.—*Cicero.*

P. 12, n., c. 1, l. 15.—

All my household are busy reasoning,
And from it reasoning has banished Reason.—*Molière.*

P. 36, n., c. 2, l. 4.—All mathematical propositions are identical, and represented by the formula $a = a$.—*Berlin Dissertation.*

P. 44, l. 13.—That which most astonishes me here, is to see myself here.—From *D'Alembert.*

P. 58, n. 1, c. 1, l. 10.—I likewise applied myself to logic, which taught me to argue incessantly. So strong was my relish for debate, that I pounced on the passers by, whether I was acquainted with them or not, and set about a discussion with them. I sometimes addressed myself to Irish characters, who liked nothing better, and then you should have seen us disputing. Such gestures, such grimaces, such contortions! Our eyes spoke fury, and our mouths foamed. You

would have taken us for demoniacs rather than philosophers.—*Le Sage.*

P. 60, n. 1, c. 2, l. 4.—The consent of all nations on one point is to be esteemed a law of nature.—*Cicero.*

P. 60, n. 1, c. 2, l. 7.—We are accustomed to defer greatly to what all have concurred in presuming to be true; with us it is a proof of truth when all agree in one opinion, &c.—*Seneca.*

P. 65, n. 2, c. 2, l. 9.—See above, vol. i. p. 450, n., l. 5.

P. 66, n., c. 1, l. 8.—See above, vol. i. p. 450, n., c. 2, l. 4.

P. 66, n., c. 2, l. 1.—I greatly regret that Condillac, in his profound and sagacious reflections on the human understanding, has not paid more attention to the views of Father Buffier.—*Destutt-Tracy.*

P. 96, n. 1, c. 1, l. 9.—See above, vol. ii. p. 483, n. I, l. 1.

P. 97, l. 14.—See above, vol. ii. p. 483, n. I, l. 1.

P. 99, n., c. 1, l. 6.—Wherefore, this mode of deceiving is to be placed among those paralogisms which lie in the diction. In the first place, because we more readily fall into the error when considering along with others than by ourselves; for examination with others is carried on by speech, but by ourselves it is performed no less by the thing itself. And, in the next place, it happens, in examining by ourselves, that we fall into error when we employ speech in the consideration. Still farther, the deception is from resemblance, but resemblance arises from language.—*Aristotle.*

P. 124, l. 4.—The geometrician proceeds from hypothesis to hypothesis; and while the thought assumes a thousand forms, it is still but by an incessant repetition of the principle, *the same is the same*, that he performs all his prodigies.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 128, n., c. 1, l. 1.—When Archimedes demonstrated that a circle is equal to a right-angled triangle, the base of which is equal to the radius, and the altitude to the circumference of the circle, he did nothing more than prove, if we examine the matter more closely, that the area of a circle, or of a regular polygon having an indefinite number of sides, could be divided into so many very small triangles as would be equal to just as many very small triangles of the given triangle; now the equality of those triangles is demonstrated in the elements from coincidence alone. Whence, accordingly, Archimedes demonstrated the coincidence of the circle with the triangle, howsoever dissimilar to it. . . . Thus, the dissimilarity of figures is no barrier to their coincidence; but whether similar or dissimilar, provided they

be equal, they always can, they always must coincide. Wherefore, the eighth axiom either, when converted, does not at all hold good, or it can be universally converted; the former, if the coincidence specified in it denote *actual* coincidence, the latter, if it be understood of *potential* coincidence simply.—*Barrow.*

P. 128, l. 9.—All mathematical propositions are identical, and represented by the formula $a = a$. They are *identical truths*, expressed under various forms, even that itself which is called the principle of Contradiction, enounced and involved in various ways; indeed, all propositions of this class are really contained in it. But, according to our faculty of understanding, the difference of propositions consists in this, that some by a longer, others by a shorter process of reasoning, are reducible to and capable of resolution into the first principle of all. Thus, for example, the proportion $2 + 2 = 4$, is at once resolved into this, $1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1$; that is, *the same is the same;* and properly speaking, it ought to be thus enounced. If it should happen that four entities are anywhere or exist, then four entities exist, for geometricians do not positively deal with existence, but only *hypothetically* assume it. Accordingly, he reaches the highest certainty who thus runs back propositions to their last grounds, for he observes the identity of ideas; and this is the evidence that immediately compels our assent, which we call mathematical or geometrical. It is not, however, peculiar and proper to the science of mathematics, for it springs from the apprehension of identity which can have place, although the ideas do not represent extension.—*Berlin Dissertation.*

P. 130, l. 15.—*The evidence of reason consists solely in identity*, as we have demonstrated. This truth must needs be very simple to have escaped the observation of all the philosophers, who are so deeply interested in reaching the ground of evidence, a word which is ever in their mouths.—*Condillac.*

P. 130, n. 1, c. 2, l. 2.—Interrogate honest mathematicians, and they will admit that their propositions are all identical, and that so many volumes on the circle, for example, amount merely to the repetion in a hundred thousand different ways of the truth, that it is a figure of which all the lines drawn from the centre to the circumference are equal. *We know therefore next to nothing.—Diderot.*

P. 130, n. 2, c. 2, l. 2.—The whole system of human knowledge

can be expressed in a more compendious and absolutely identical proposition, *sensations are sensations.* If, in every science, we could with equal facility trace the generation of ideas, and apprehend the true scheme of things, we should discover that a single truth is the source of all the others, and find the summary expression of all we could know in this identical proposition, *The same is the same.*—*Condillac.*

P. 131, l. 9.—But it will be said, It is thus we reason in mathematics, where the process is carried on by means of equations; will this hold good in the other sciences, where the reasoning is performed in propositions? I reply, that *equations, propositions, judgments* are at bottom the same, and, consequently, that the reasoning process is the same in every science.—*Condillac.*

P. 133, l. 13.—But by reasoning I understand computation. Now to compute is *to collect the sum of many particulars added together, or, one being deducted from another, to take note of the remainder.* To reason, therefore, is but to *add* and *subtract;* or, if one join to these, to *multiply* and *divide,* I will not dissent, since multiplication is the same as the *addition* of equal quantities, *division* the same as the *subtraction* of equal quantities as often as it can be done. Reasoning, accordingly, is reduced to the two operations of the mind, *addition* and *subtraction.*—*Hobbes.*

P. 133, n. 2, c. 2, l. 1.—The work, as a whole, deserves to be regarded as a precious result of the speculations of Bacon and Descartes on the system of Aristotle, and as the germ of the subsequent developments of the science.—*Destutt-Tracy.*

P. 140, n. 2, l. 4.—I have resolved, as soon as I am at leisure, to reduce the whole of Mechanics to Pure Geometry, and rigorously define the problems regarding impulse, water, the pendulum, projectiles, the resistance of solids, and friction, &c., which no one has as yet essayed. I am persuaded, however, that I am now in a position to accomplish all this, as I have arrived at results thoroughly satisfactory to myself, in complete demonstrations relating to the laws of motion, and desiderate nothing more on that part of the subject. But the whole matter, as you will learn with surprise, depends on a very beautiful metaphysical axiom, which is of no less importance, with regard to motion, than the axiom that "a whole is greater than its part" is with respect to magnitude.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 143, n. 2, c. 2, l. 6.—The fundamental propositions of geometry

may be reduced to two, the measure of angles by the arcs of circles, and the principle of superposition.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 143, n. 2, c. 2, l. 20.—The measure of angles by the arcs of a circle, described from their vertex, is itself dependent on the principle of superposition; for when it is said that the measure of an angle is the circular arc described from its vertex, we mean, that if two angles be equal, the angle described from their vertices with the same radius will be equal,—a truth which is demonstrated by the principle of superposition, as every one but slightly acquainted with geometry will readily perceive.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 149, n. 1, c. 1, l. 7.—The principle of superposition is not, as many geometers have alleged, a doubtfully exact and purely mechanical method of demonstration. Superposition, as mathematicians understand it, does not consist in the clumsy application of one figure to another, that we may judge by the eye of their equality or difference, as a workman applies his rule to a block of wood to measure it; it consists in imagining one figure placed upon another, and in concluding from the supposed equality of certain parts of the two figures that those parts mutually coincide, and, from their coincidence, that of the remaining parts, from which are inferred the perfect equality and similarity of the whole figures.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 149, n. 1, c. 2, l. 17.—Whence the very acute Willebrod Snell justly calls this very superposition the most luminous among the methods of geometry. Those, therefore, who despise and reject it as an instrument of mathematical demonstration, as in some degree savouring of mechanical coarseness and one's own hand labour, apply themselves, though inconsiderately and in vain, to destroy the very basis of geometry. For geometers perform their superposition not by the hand but by the mind, and determine its accuracy, not by the sense of sight but by the judgment of the understanding. They suppose, what no hand can execute and no sense discern, an accurate and perfect coincidence, and from that supposition evolve just and logical consequences. There is here no application of the rule, compasses, or square; no labour of the arms, nor effort of the sides; it is wholly the result of the skill and contrivance of reason. There is nothing mechanical, unless in so far as, all magnitude being somehow involved in matter, the object of the senses, visible and tangible, that which the mind desires to be understood, the hand to some extent may execute, and practice essays somehow to rival speculation. This

imitation, however, by no means weakens or depresses the force and dignity of mathematical demonstration, but rather conduces to its strengthening and elevation.—*Barrow.*

P. 152, n., c 1, l. 6.—Demonstration is a syllogism or series of syllogisms proceeding to its ultimate conclusion on the definitions of names.—*Hobbes.*

P. 152, n., c. 2, l. 29.—But if we are to believe the illustrious Leibnitz, Hobbes must also be reckoned a Nominalist, for this reason, that, being more of a nominalist than Occam himself, he asserts that the truth of things consists in words, and, what is more, depends on human will.—*Brucker.*

P. 161, l. 17.—

Here golden harvests wave, there vineyards glow,
Fruit bends the bough, or herbs unbidden grow;—
Her saffron, Tmolus, Ind her ivory boasts,
Soft Saba yields the spice that scents her coasts;
Pontus the pow'rful Castor, Chalybs' steel,
And Elis' palms the Epiran steeds reveal.
In stated regions, from the eternal cause,
Such nature's compact and unbroken laws.

Virgil (Sotheby.)

P. 161, l. 28.—

They, sole, their town, their race in common rear,
Know their fix'd households, and just laws revere.

Virgil (Sotheby.)

P. 161, n., c. 1, l. 7.—Montesquieu appeared to Thomas the first of authors, in vigour and breadth of thought, in the multitude, profundity, and originality of his analogies. What Montesquieu has shown to be comprehended in the brief term *law*, is, he says, incredible.—*Nouv. Dict. Hist.*

P. 162, l. 3.—

[Told to their wondering ears
The primal origin of this great world;]
The cause of things; what nature is, what God;
Whence snow; and whence tremendous thunder springs,—
From Jove, or from the rattling of rent clouds;
What shakes earth's pillars; by what laws the stars
Wander; and what besides lies hid from man.

Ovid (Howard.)

P. 162, n., c. 1, l. 9.—When Jupiter beheld the firmament [represented] in a little glass, he smiled, and thus addressed the gods above:—Has the power of human ingenuity advanced thus far? Here is my handiwork mimicked in a brittle sphere [of glass]. Lo, the Syracusan sage by his skill has copied the ordinances of the heavens, the constancy of the universe, and the laws of the gods! A spirit within attends the various stars, and impels the animated frame with regular motions. The counterfeit sun (*lit.* zodiac) runs through his proper year, and the fictitious moon returns with [each] new month; and now daring industry rejoices to set its world a-rolling, and regulates the stars with human intelligence. Why should I wonder at Salmoneus, innocent with his artificial thunder? A little hand has been found that rivals nature.—*Claudian.*

P. 162, n., c. 2, l. 13.—Another party ascribe events to their star, and to the laws of nativity, and hold that a decree has once for all been made by God with respect to future events, and that he never afterwards interferes. . . . This opinion begins to gain ground, and the learned no less than the vulgar are falling into it.—*Pliny.*

P. 163, note.—Prudence is a species of divination.—*Nepos.*

P. 167, l. 20.—

> Then a new Tiphys, then again shall rise
> An Argo, chosen heroes to convey;
> Then shall be waged new warfare; then again
> A great Achilles shall be sent to Troy.—*Virgil* (Kennedy.)

P. 167, n. 2, l. 1.—It is then effected when the revolution of the sun and moon and of the five planets has been accomplished, and, the periods of all of them being completed, they reach their original position. When this shall take place is a matter of great uncertainty; there must, however, be a definitely fixed period for it.—*Cicero.*

P. 167, n., c. 2, l. 3.—Some maintain, that after this interval everything in the world will recur in the same order in which we now see it.—*Clavius.*

P. 169, l. 35.—Hence we have the warnings of lightning, the presages of oracles, the predictions of soothsayers, and even such trifling occurrences as sneezing and stumbling of the feet, reckoned among omens. The late Emperor related, that on the day in which he was nearly assaulted in a mutiny of the soldiers, he put the left shoe on the wrong foot.—*Pliny.*

P. 173, n. 2, l. 1.—M. Turgot thought it a mistake to suppose that in general the mind acquires its general or abstract ideas only by comparing particular ideas. On the contrary, our earliest ideas are of great generality, because, as we receive at first but a small number of qualities, our idea comprehends all the objects that possess those qualities in common. With the increase of knowledge and a closer inspection, our ideas become more particular without our ever attaining the farthest limit of individuality; and what has led metaphysicians into error is, that then, and only then, we become aware that these ideas are more general than we had at first supposed them to be.—*Life of Turgot.*

P. 175, n., c. 1, l. 8.—From individuals brutes draw universals; from the sight of a single man they form a notion of men in general. —*Charron.*

P. 175, n., c. 2, l. 6.—I had remarked that Massieu was more ready to give the same name, a common noun, to several individuals in whom he found resembling features; proper names supposed differences which he had not yet had time to remark.—*Sicard.*

P. 183, l. 20.—In logic, the structure of the syllogism rests on strictly mathematical demonstration.—*Wallis.*

P. 184, l. 1.—There follows an introduction to logic fitted for ordinary use. From it learners may perceive that the laws of syllogisms are throughout founded on the strictest mathematical demonstrations, so that their conclusiveness is irrefragable, and they afford facilities for the discovery of delusions and fallacies.—*Wallis.*

P. 185, n., c. 1, l. 8.—Sound demonstration, however, is that which observes the form prescribed by logic, not to the extent of having our reasonings drawn out in formal syllogisms as in the schools, in the way that Christian Herlinus and Conrad Dasypodius have done with the first six books of Euclid; but so at least that the reasoning be formally valid.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 187, n. 1, c. 1, l. 2.—The *Topical* syllogism, also usually called the *Dialectical*, is considered to be a syllogism or series of syllogisms, which begets strong presumption or high probability rather than absolute certainty; not, indeed, in respect of *form*, for all syllogisms, if valid in form, are demonstrative, that is, if the premises be true the conclusion will also be true; but in respect of matter, or *the premises*, which, for the most part, are not absolutely certain and universally true, but at least probable and generally true.—*Wallis.*

P. 194, n. 1, l. 1.—It is also obvious that, if the propositions of which the syllogism consists be universal, the conclusion of a demonstration of this sort, and, to speak plainly, of every demonstration, must likewise be eternal. There is, therefore, no demonstration nor science absolutely speaking of the perishable, but only as it were by accident.—*Aristotle.*

P. 194, n. 2, l. 1.—From sense, therefore, arises memory; but from repeated memory of the same thing, experience; for memories many in number form but one experience. But from experience, or from all the universal arrested and reposing silently in the mind, the one over and above the many, and which in all those individual objects is one and the same, arises the principle of art and science; the former, if it concern production, the latter, if it regard being.—*Aristotle.*

P. 196, n., c. 2, l. 7.—Demonstration, therefore, is a reasoning from necessary propositions.—*Aristotle.*

P. 201, n., c. 2, l. 1.—Analysis is the same in every science, since in all it conducts from the known to the unknown by reasoning, that is, by a series of judgments *involved* the one in the other.—*Condillac.*

P. 203, n. 1, c. 2, l. 1.—To those who know what philosophy is, it will afford matter of abiding wonder to observe, that the authority of Aristotle was so powerful in the schools for some ages, that when a disputant cited a passage from that philosopher, he who maintained the thesis durst not say *transeat*, but was under the necessity either of denying the authenticity of the quotation, or of explaining it in accordance with his own views.—*Bayle.*

P. 206, n., c. 1, l. 17.—All skill in that ingenious calculus, of which Aristotle has given us the rules, the whole art of syllogism, is founded on the use of words *in the same sense.* The employing the same word in two different senses makes all reasoning sophistical; and this kind of sophism, perhaps the most common of all, is one of the most frequent sources of error.—*Turgot.*

P. 211, n., c. 2, l. 4.—Minds fierce from reason, and on fancies fed. —[*Abraham Remi.*]

P. 212, n. 2, c. 1, l. 13.—Some learning, but disconnected; glances rather than views; and on great questions, a facility in seizing small details; no capacity for embracing the whole.—*Marmontel* on M. de Brienne.

P. 222, n., c. 1, l. 2.—Sagacity is a certain happy faculty of hitting on the middle term in the shortest time.—*Aristotle.*

P. 222, n., c. 1, l. 10.—Debate demands especially quickness and flexibility of parts, presence and acuteness of mind; we are not called upon to think, but to express our opinion without hesitation.—*Quintilian.*

P. 222, n. 2, c. 2, l. 6.—Some have doubted whether this art be really in itself of any use. As, however, logical terms frequently occur in the works of distinguished authors, it would appear to be absolutely necessary to have explanations of these terms, and consequently of the principal parts of the art itself. This, accordingly, it is proposed to do in the following compend.—*Dublin Logical Compend.*

P. 223, n., c. 1, l. 5.—It has been judged proper to give separate instruction in Dialectic, which teaches the use of philosophical language, and to disjoin Logic, which institutes an analysis of reason, from all discussion regarding words.

We divide Logic, however, into three parts; in the first, we treat of *truth*, in the second, of *error*, in the third, of *method;* that the medical science of the mind, like that of the body, may exhibit in their order the normal state, the diseases, and the remedies.—*Prévost.*

P. 223, n. 1, c. 2, l. 6.—From the time of Plato and Aristotle until Alexander Aphrodisias, who lived under the Emperor Severus and his sons, Aristotle was more spoken about than either read or understood by the learned. He was the first to undertake an exposition of that philosopher, and was thus of material assistance to many students of him, besides stimulating to the investigation of other parts of his writings. Plato, however, was much more in the hands of men, and more read, up to the period of the establishment of public *schools* in Gaul and Italy, that is, during the time the Greek and Latin languages flourished. But afterwards, when learning became mere display, and was only regarded as important in as far as it conferred the ability to dispute sophistically, silence an opponent, and throw dust in his eyes, and that by a species of skill which did not deserve the name of knowledge, and by coining terms at will, the logical and physical books of Aristotle appeared better adapted for these purposes, *his numerous excellent works being passed by.* As for Plato, he was not even named, both because he was not understood, though Aristotle was still less so, and because the study of his works did not seem fitted to make men skilful disputants; not that I am to be understood as thinking Plato inferior in genius or

erudition to Aristotle, but that it is intolerable that Plato, a most divine philosopher, should be overlooked, and Aristotle read in such a way that, *the better portion of his works being rejected, those retained were made to express the meaning it was desired to put upon them* [and that mere folly such as neither Aristotle nor any one of that time ever in delirium dreamt of].—*Ludovicus Vives.*

P. 224, n. 1, c. 2, l. 10.—What must cause the learned the greatest surprise, is that professors were so madly possessed with the philosophical hypotheses of Aristotle. If they had manifested such predilection for his *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*, there would have been less ground for astonishment; but they were infatuated about his *Logic* and *Physics*, the least valuable of his works.—*Bayle.*

P. 226, n. 2, l. 1.—The Peripatetic philosophy is everywhere so completely established, that no other is studied in any Christian university. Even those who are compelled to accept the impostures of Mahomet, teach the sciences in conformity with the principles of the Lyceum, to which they are so strongly attached, that Averroes, Alfarabius, Albumassar, and many other Arabian philosophers, have frequently abandoned the doctrines of their prophet, that they might not contradict Aristotle, whose works the Turks have both in Turkish and Arabic, as Belon relates.—*La Motte le Vayer* (quoted by *Bayle*).

P. 226, n. 2, l. 18.—The author, from whom I quote, mentions in another volume, that, according to Olearius, the Persians have all the works of Aristotle, expounded by many Arabic commentaries. Bergeron, he says, remarks in his *Treatise on the Tartars*, that they possess the books of Aristotle, translated into their language, and that his doctrine is taught with as great submission as among us, at Samarcand, a university of the Great Mogul, and the present capital of the kingdom of Usbec.—*Ibid.*

P. 228, n. 1, c. 1, l. 2.—In this art, *if it be one*, there is no rule for the discovery of truth, but only for judging of it. . . . Wherefore let us dismiss this whole art, which says too little as to how arguments are to be discovered, too much as to how they are to be judged. —*Cicero.*

P. 232, l. 3.—A cause is that which effectively produces the thing of which it is the cause. We must not suppose every antecedent to be a cause, but only the *efficient* antecedent. . . . Wherefore Carneades said that Apollo himself could not foretell events, unless it were those whose causes nature so contained that they must necessarily

take place. . . . . For the causes that produce each thing being known, it can then be ascertained what must come to pass.—*Cicero.*

P. 232, n. 1, c. 1, l. 3.—We think that each thing is known absolutely, not sophistically, that is by accident, when we suppose that we know the cause through which the thing is, that it is the cause of that thing, and that the thing cannot be otherwise [than as we know it].—*Aristotle.*

P. 232, n. 2, l. 9.—A cause differs from a simple precursory sign, by its force or productive energy. Impulse is a phenomenon so common, regulated by laws so well defined and so general, that every cause reducible to it seems to belong to a prominent class, and alone to merit the name of *agent.—Prévost.*

P. 234, n. 3, c. 2, l. 1.—The chief fault to be found with them is not that they are erroneous, but on the contrary that they are too true, and contain nothing of which one can possibly be ignorant.—*Port-Royal Logic.*

P. 235, n., c. 1, l. 4.—For in the entrance of philosophy, when the second causes, which are next unto the senses, do offer themselves to the mind of man, if it dwell and stay there, it may induce some oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man passeth on farther, and seeth the dependence of causes, and the works of Providence, then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that the highest link of nature's chain must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair.—*Bacon* (*Adv. of Learning*).

P. 235, n., c. 2, l. 1.—Since fate is nothing more than *an interlaced series of causes*, that is the first cause of all upon which the others depend.—*Seneca.*

P. 235, n., c. 2, l. 7.—The work which God carries on from first to last.—*Bacon.*

P. 236, l. 7.—In proportion as Physics shall from day to day receive greater increments, and evolve new axioms, so will Mathematics demand fresh cultivation in many points, and the kinds of the mixed mathematics be at length increased.—*Bacon.*

P. 237, n., c. 1, l. 1.—Cosmographical Mystery, concerning the admirable proportion of the celestial orbits and the genuine and proper causes of the number, magnitude, and periodical motions of the heavens, *demonstrated by means of the five regular geometrical bodies.—Kepler.*

P. 237, n., c. 1, l. 10.—The burden of Brahe's letter was this,

that leaving off speculations *à priori*, I should rather apply my mind to the observations which he was prosecuting at the same time, and from these ascend afterwards to causes.—*Kepler.*

P. 237, n., c. 1, l. 27.—In the second Platonic school, that of Proclus and others, Natural Philosophy was vitiated and corrupted by Mathematics; which ought to form the terminating point of natural philosophy, not to generate or beget it.—*Bacon.*

P. 238, l. 5.—I deny that any perpetual motion *not rectilinear* has been produced by God, so as to take place without the control and guidance of mind. There are, as is manifest, two functions of this *mover;* the one, that it possess the power of transporting body from one place to another, the other, that it be endowed with skill to trace the circular boundary through the pure ether, which is in no way marked by any such lines.—*Kepler.*

P. 238, l. 16.—It is probable, therefore, if these movers be endowed with any faculty of observing this diameter, that it is more acute than our eye-sight, in proportion as its work and perpetual motion are more constant than our disturbed and confused affairs.

Will you, then, Kepler, ascribe two eyes to each of the planets? Not at all. Neither is it necessary, any more than to attribute to them feet and wings to explain their movements.—*Kepler.*

P. 238, l. 24.—See above, vol. ii. p. 478, n. C., l. 38.

P. 243, n., c. 1, l. 8.—*Observation* consists in watching that which nature spontaneously presents; such is the process in Astronomy and Natural History. *Experiment* consists in placing nature in those circumstances in which it must act and show to us what we seek, as in Experimental Physics; further, we use both iron and fire, and forcibly dissolve the structure of bodies, especially in Chemistry, and putting nature, as it were, to the torture, we compel it to reveal its secrets. —*Boscovich.*

P. 246, n., c. 1, l. 1.—The Induction that would be really useful for the discovery and demonstration of the sciences and arts, should separate nature by means of proper rejections and exclusions.—*Bacon.*

P. 249, n., c. 1, l. 1.—We must therefore effect a complete solution and separation of nature; not certainly by fire, but by the mind, which is, as it were, a divine fire.—*Bacon.*

P. 249, n., c. 2, l. 10.—For our path is not along a plain, but one of *ascent* and *descent;* we first ascend to axioms, and then descend to works.—*Bacon.*

P. 255, l. 8.—But to me, on the other side, that do desire as much as lieth in my pen to ground a sociable intercourse between antiquity and proficience, it seemeth best to keep way with antiquity "usque ad aras" (as far as the altar); and, therefore, to retain the ancient terms, though I sometimes alter the uses and definitions, according to the moderate proceeding in civil government; where, although there be some alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, "eadem magistratuum vocabula" (the names of the magistracy are the same).—*Bacon* (*Adv. of Learning*).

P. 255, n. 1, l. 8.—Why do you publicly reject *real qualities* and *substantial forms*, so dear to the scholastics? I have declared that I did not mean to deny them, but that I had no need of them to express my thoughts.—*Descartes.*

P. 255, n. 2, l. 1.—But it is manifest that Plato, in his opinion of ideas, as one that had a wit of elevation situate as upon a cliff, did descry "that forms were the true object of knowledge;" but lost the real fruit of his opinion, by considering of forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not confined and determined by matter [and so turning his opinion upon Theology, wherewith all his Natural Philosophy is infected]. But if any man shall keep a continual, watchful, and severe eye upon action, operation, and the use of knowledge, he may advise and take notice what are the forms, the disclosures whereof are fruitful and important to the state of man.—*Bacon* (*Adv. of Learning*).

P. 255, n. 3, l. 1.—When we speak of forms, we mean nothing else than those laws which arrange and constitute any simple nature, as heat, light, weight in every variety of matter, and in a subject capable of having them. The *form* of heat, therefore, and the *form* of light, is the same as the *law* of heat, or the *law* of light.—*Bacon.*

P. 256, l. 17.—In constituting axioms, however, we must invent a form of induction different from that hitherto in use, for the induction which proceeds by *simple enumeration* is puerile, and its conclusions uncertain. But the induction which would really be of service in the discovery and demonstration of the sciences and arts, should separate nature by proper rejections and exclusions, and then, after examining a sufficient number of negatives, conclude regarding the affirmatives. This has not hitherto been done or even attempted, except by Plato alone, who certainly employs this form of induction to some extent in sifting definitions and ideas. But a great deal that has never occurred

to the mind of man, must be employed in order to construct a good and legitimate mode of induction or demonstration, so much so that greater attention must be bestowed upon this than was ever given to the syllogism. On an induction of this kind our highest hope is assuredly based.—*Bacon.*

P. 256, l. 32.—He also thought that induction remained as the last and sole help and refuge; but that its name alone is known; its power and use have hitherto escaped men.—*Bacon.*

P. 258, n. 1, l. 8.—Should it be objected that this is not a legitimate syllogism in Darapti, because the conclusion is universal, the answer would be that this universal (of whatever sort it may be) is a *collective universal*, which is a *singular;* and the word *all* is here (as is commonly said) a *categorematic* part, as part of the minor term (as is clear from the minor proposition), which is here (not *planets* but) *all the planets* (*except the sun*), or a total collection of the other planets (the sun excepted), which *collection* is singular, and accordingly the conclusion is *singular*. This proposition, though (like other singulars) universal in respect of its matter, is not, however, incapable of standing as a conclusion in the third figure, inasmuch as in this figure whenever the minor term or predicate of the minor proposition (and therefore the subject of the conclusion) is a *singular*, a conclusion of that sort must (by virtue of its matter, not of its form) be universal. —*Wallis.*

P. 258, n. 1, c. 2, l. 8.—I retain the trite examples of the logicians, drawn from the philosophy which they call Ancient and Peripatetic, because I am here treating of Logic, and that the Peripatetic, not of Natural Philosophy. Accordingly, I speak, after the fashion of the Peripatetics, of the four elements, the repose of the earth in the midst of the universe, the descent of heavy bodies, and the ascent of light ones, the number of the plants as seven, and other matters.—*Wallis.*

P. 258, n. 2, l. 1.—In the art of judging (according even to the vulgar doctrine), the conclusion is reached either by means of Induction or of Syllogism. The judgment of induction need not detain us, since *by one and the same operation of the mind is that which is sought both discovered and judged of.* But we would dismiss entirely the faulty form of induction; the sound we refer to the *Novum Organum.* —*Bacon.*

P. 261, l. 31.—There remains mere experience, which, if it turn up, is called chance · if it be sought after, experiment. But this sort

of experience is nothing else than mere groping, such as men have recourse to in the night-time when they try all things, if perchance they may happen on the right way, whereas it would be a preferable and more prudent course to wait for day, or kindle a light, and then proceed on their way. On the other hand, the true order of experience consists in first setting up a light, and then by its means showing the way, commencing by a well-arranged and digested, not by an irregular or desultory experience, and thence educing axioms, and from those axioms once established being led to new experiments; a method analogous to the Divine procedure in creation, for the operations of the Word on chaos were not without a fixed order.—*Bacon.*

P. 270, n. 3, c. 2, l. 1.—There is nothing more remote from, or opposed to, true and genuine analysis, than the tentative method; for it is the chief aim of analysis to banish this mode, and lead us to the thing sought for by the most certain and direct course.—*Simson.*

P. 271, l. 13.—The unravelling of a problem, or the demonstration of a theorem, is the mark of much higher powers of mind than the discovery of new ones; for these, for the most part, occur by chance to those thinking in a desultory manner, but the other process, through its whole extent, demands the closest application of the reasoning faculty, directed to a single point.—*Galileo.*

P. 271, l. 30.—Such chances happen only to good players.—*Fontenelle.*

P. 274, l. 26.—This process is called analysis, being, as it were, inverted solution.—*Pappus.*

P. 274, n., c. 2, l. 6.—See above, vol. iii. p. 249, n., c. 1, l. 1.

P. 281, n. 1, l. 1.—What is called the *method of invention* is *nothing but* analysis. By it all discoveries have been made; by it we shall discover anew all that has been found.—*Port-Royal Logic.*

P. 282, n., c. 1, l. 5.—See above, vol. iii. p. 274, l. 26.

P. 282, n., c. 2, l. 11.—To analyse, and to form synthesis, and to define according to the case.—*Pappus.*

P. 285, n., c. 1, l. 4.—The original meaning of the term *analogy* is simply resemblance, but usage applies it to denote a remote resemblance; whence it is that analogical conclusions are often incautiously hazarded, and need to be carefully and skilfully drawn. Whenever, therefore, in our reasonings, we form similar judgments on objects that but remotely resemble each other, we reason analogically. Near resemblance is the basis of the first generalisation, and

that which we call *species*. That resemblance, which is the ground of higher generalisations, that is, the *genus*, and its different degrees, we call remote. This distinction, however, is not strictly adhered to.

Be this as it may, cases are conceivable between which the resemblance is so complete as to present no observable difference, beyond those of time and place. And there are cases in which we perceive a great resemblance, but in which we also discover certain differences independent of the diversity of time and place. When we form a general judgment, founded on the first kind of resemblance, we shall say that we use the *inductive method*. When the second species of resemblance is the foundation and warrant of our reasonings, we shall say that it is the *analogical method* which we employ. It is usually said that the inductive method concludes from the particular to the general, and that the analogical method concludes from similar to similar. If these definitions be analysed, it will appear that we have merely rendered them precise.—*Prévost.*

P. 292, n., c. 2, l. 2.—One flowing together, one breathing together, an entire sympathy.—*Hippocrates.*

P. 294, l. 16.—That there is sympathy between things above and those below.—*Persian Magi.*

P. 298, l. 17.—For the harmony of a science, supporting each part the other, is and ought to be the true and brief confutation and suppression of all the smaller sort of objections. But, on the other side, if you take out every axiom, as the sticks of the fagot, one by one, you may quarrel with them, and bend them, and break them at your pleasure. . . . For were it not better for a man in a fair room to set up one great light, or branching candlestick of lights, than to go about with a small watch-candle into every corner?—*Bacon* (*Adv. of Learning.*)

P. 299, n. 1, l. 1.—See above, vol. ii. p. 6, n. 1, c. 1, l. 1.

P. 300, l. 15.—It was from a regard to simplicity that Copernicus re-assigned to the sun its place in the centre of the world; on the same principle, Kepler banished all the epicycles which Copernicus had allowed to remain. Principles limited in number, means great but few, phenomena infinite and varied,—such is the picture of the universe.—*Bailly.*

P. 300, n., c. 1, l. 10.—Simplicity is not essentially a principle, or an axiom, but the result of study; it is not an idea properly belonging to the infancy of the world, but to the maturity of the race; it

is the highest truth which persevering observation wrests from the illusory appearances of effects; it can be nothing but the relic of primitive science. When amid a people, possessing a complicated mythology, and with no physical philosophy beyond those fables, philosophers seeking to reduce nature to a single principle, proclaim water to be the source of all things, or fire the universal agent, we should say to those philosophers, You speak in a language that is not your own; you have seized, by virtue of the philosophical instinct, those truths that transcend your age, your nation, and yourselves; it is the wisdom of the ancients that has been transmitted to you by tradition.—*Bailly.*

P. 302, n. 1, l. 1.—Meanwhile we warn every one against being cast down in spirit, or confounded, in case the experiments on which he relies do not answer his expectation. For what succeeds gives greater pleasure, but what does not succeed is very frequently not the less instructive. And it must be always borne in mind that *light-bringing* experiments are even more to be sought after than *fruit-bearing*. And this much may be said of the *experientia literata*, which is rather a species of *sagacity*, and instinct of hunting out, than *science.—Bacon.*

P. 305, n., c. 1, l. 9.—It is reserved for God (the creator and imposer of *forms*), and perhaps angels, to take immediate cognisance of forms by affirmation, and from the first moment of contemplation. This is assuredly beyond the power of man, to whom the only course open is to proceed first by *negatives* and finally land in *affirmatives*, after exhausting every species of exclusion. . . .

. . . After negation and exclusion, made in due form, an affirmative form will remain at the bottom, solid and true, all volatile opinions going off in smoke. This is easily said, but it is only accomplished after many circuits.—*Bacon.*

P. 305, n., c. 2, l. 12.—See above, vol. ii. p. 417, l. 27.

P. 306, n., c. 1, l. 4.—See above, vol. ii. p. 417, l. 27, and p. 417, n., c. 1, l. 1.

P. 306, n., c. 1, l. 12.—I will find a path, or make one.—*Bacon.*

P. 308, n. 1, l. 1.—Do we not admit as true the key of a letter written in cipher, or of a riddle, when it applies exactly to all the characters that require to be explained?—*Le Sage.*

P. 310, n. 1, l. 2.—Analogy, that is the greater or less resemblance of facts, the more or less obvious relation they present, is the only

rule of physical philosophers, whether for the explanation of known facts or for the discovery of new.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 311, l. 10.—Men may rest assured that the true and solid arts of invention grow to maturity and receive increase along with inventions themselves.—*Bacon.*

P. 312, n., c. 1, l. 5.—Men have the conviction that nature is simple; the positions and the retrograde motions of the planets presented strange and unaccountable appearances; the principle which reduced them to a simple and natural order, *could not but be true.*—*Bailly.*

P. 314, n., c. 1, l. 5.—Out of this difficulty I cannot otherwise extricate myself than by again making certain experiments, which may be such that their result is not the same, if it is in one of these modes that we must explain it, as it would be if it were to be explained in the other.—*Descartes* (Eng. Tr.)

P. 318, n. 1, l. 3.—By the help of a skilfully conducted induction, and the thread of analogy which he (Wallis) knew always how to employ with success, he brought within the sphere of Geometry a multitude of objects which had up to that time been excluded from it.—*Mantucla.*

P. 318, n. 1, l. 21.—This method of demonstration, which is founded on induction, rather than on reasoning according to the model of Archimedes, will occasion some difficulty to the inexperienced, who expect demonstrative syllogisms from beginning to end. Not that I would disapprove of it, but as all his propositions can be demonstrated in the ordinary and legitimate way, that of Archimedes, and in much fewer words than he employs, I do not know why he prefers his mode to the ancient, which is more convincing and elegant, as I hope to be able to show him the first time I am at leisure.—*Fermat.*

P. 318, n., c. 2, l. 23.—The inductive method, *although excellent for the discovery of general truths*, ought not to lead us to dispense with a rigorous demonstration of them.—*La Place.*

P. 319, l. 29.—The process of Newton, in the discovery of universal gravitation, was *exactly* the same as in that of the binomial formula.—*La Place.*

P. 326, n. 1, l. 1.—The art of conjecturing in medicine cannot consist of a series of reasonings resting on a baseless system. It is simply the faculty of comparing a disease which is under treatment with similar diseases that have already come under one's own experi-

ence or that of others. This art sometimes also consists in discovering a resemblance between diseases that seem to offer none, as well as essential differences, although fugitive, between those that appear to be the most nearly alike. In proportion as we have amassed facts shall we be prepared for conjecturing happily; it being supposed, however, that we are possessed of that soundness of judgment which nature alone can give.

Thus the best physician is not (as is the vulgar opinion) he who cursorily and without discrimination accumulates facts in the course of a large practice, but he who exercises great scrutiny and penetration in making his observations, and joins to what he has himself observed an acquaintance with the far greater number of observations that have been made in all ages, by men animated with the same spirit as himself. Such knowledge constitutes the true *experience* of the physician.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 329, n., c. 1, l. 1.—The body possesses a perfectly marvellous power whereby it protects itself against diseases, wards off many, cures in the best and speediest way many of those that have set in, and by a process of its own brings others more slowly to a favourable issue.

This *innate power* is called *the healing virtue of nature*, being quite well known to philosophers and physicians, and most justly celebrated by them. Of itself it is sufficient to cure numerous diseases; in almost all its influence is beneficial; and, moreover, the remedies that are in their own nature the best, are only of use in as far as they stimulate, direct, and control this inherent virtue, for medicine is of no avail on a corpse, and fails where nature is repugnant.—*Jas. Gregory.*

P. 335, l. 32.—The search after final causes is barren, and, like a virgin consecrated to God, produces nothing.—*Bacon.*

P. 337, l. 23.—It is incredible what a host of fictions has been introduced into philosophy, by the reduction of natural operations to the parallel of human actions.—*Bacon.*

P. 338, n. 1, l. 21.—So differing a harmony there is between the spirit of man and the spirit of nature.—*Bacon* (*Adv. of Learning*).

P. 338, n. 2, l. 1.—The excellent work of Newton will prove an impregnable bulwark against the assaults of atheists.—*Cotes.*

P. 344, l. 5.—We ought to dissect animals in which the parts whose functions we seek are the same with, or at least similar to, those of man; whence we may be permitted to form a judgment of

the organs of the human body without fear of error. Other animals moreover, if they in any respect resemble man, are fitted to supply some information.—*Albinus.*

P. 344, n. 2, l. 1.—I regard, with the great Bacon, the philosophy of final causes as sterile; but I confess it is very difficult for the most guarded philosopher to keep perfectly clear of it, in the course of his explanations.—*Cabanis.*

P. 345, n., c. 1, l. 1.—We will not seek reasons of natural things from the end which God or nature proposed to himself in their creation (*i.e.*, final causes), for we ought not to presume so far as to think that we are sharers in the counsels of Deity. . . .

Considering this more attentively, the first thing that occurs to me is the reflection that I must not be surprised if I am not always capable of comprehending the reasons why God acts as he does; nor must I doubt of his existence because I find, perhaps, that there are several other things, besides the present, respecting which I understand neither why nor how they were created by him; for, knowing already that my nature is extremely weak and limited, and that the nature of God, on the other hand, is immense, incomprehensible, and infinite, I have no longer any difficulty in discerning that there is an infinity of things in his power, whose causes transcend the grasp of my mind; and this consideration alone is sufficient to convince me that the whole class of final causes is of no avail in physical [or natural] things, for it appears to me that I cannot, without exposing myself to the charge of temerity, seek to discover the [impenetrable] ends of Deity.—*Descartes* (Eng. Tr.)

P. 348, n. 1.—

> Study of things, the causes and the ends;
> Whence is our being, and to what it tends.
>
> *Persius* (Drummond)

P. 348, n. 1, l. 3.—But what do I seek? to learn perfectly what nature is, and to follow it.—*Epictetus.*

P. 348, n. 2, l. 1.—Those laws together constitute what is called *the law of nature.* All men and all human powers should be submitted to the control of those sovereign laws, instituted by the Supreme Being. They are immutable, irrefragable, and the best possible, and, consequently, the basis of the most perfect government, and the fundamental rule of all positive laws; for positive laws are only enactments for maintaining the natural order which is evidently the most advantageous to the human race.—*Quesnay.*

P. 352, n. 2.—Utility itself, to a great extent, the mother of right and equity.—*Horace.*

P. 355, n. 1.—If we inquire after what is absolutely right, this is clear; if we seek what is most expedient, this is obscure. If we be of opinion, as indeed we ought to be, that nothing is expedient but what is right and honourable, we shall be in no doubt as to our duty. —*Cicero.*

P. 356, l. 20.—The worst thing that can be said of a man is that he is ungrateful.—*Publius Syrus.*

P. 362, n., c. 2, l. 2.—See above, vol. ii. p. 422, n., c. 1, l. 6.

P. 364, n., c. 1, l. 2.—In things of more than ordinary difficulty, we must not expect that one person should both sow and reap; but there is need of preparation, that what is sown may grow up and ripen by degrees.—*Bacon.*

P. 364, n., c. 1, l. 11.—And being now at some pause, looking back into that I have passed through, this writing seemeth to me . . . not much better than that noise or sound which musicians make while they are tuning their instruments, which is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter afterwards: so have I been content to tune the instruments of the Muses, that they may play that have better hands.—*Bacon* (*Adv. of Learning*).

P. 369, n. A, l. 4.—In some manuscripts, axioms X. and XI. are reckoned among the postulates.—*David Gregory.*

P. 369, n. A, l. 25.—It is, therefore, the imperfection, perhaps inevitable, of our conceptions that has rendered it necessary to assign to axioms a place among the principles of the science of pure reasoning. They there discharge a twofold office. Some stand in the place of definitions, others in the place of propositions that admit of demonstration. I will give examples of these cases taken from the Elements of Euclid.

Axioms are sometimes used instead of definitions that are easily made, as in the case of the word *whole.* (El. ax. IX.) *Others supply the place of certain difficult definitions, which we thus avoid making, as those of the straight line and the angle.*

Some axioms occupy the place of theorems. I know not whether, on the principles of Euclid, axiom XI. can be demonstrated, as Proclus, and so many others, in ancient and modern times, have held.

If it can, that axiom, in all likelihood, saves a laborious process of demonstration.

Since axioms perform no office beyond supplying the place of definitions and theorems, we will perhaps be asked to dispense with them. Let us observe—1°. That they are frequently the means of avoiding unnecessary prolixity. 2°. That they cut short disputes at an epoch when the science is imperfect. 3°. That if there be a stage at which the science can dispense with them (a position I am not maintaining), it is at least wise and even indispensable to employ them, as long as any defect in the degree of perfection at which we aim interferes with an absolutely unimpeachable arrangement. Let us add, 4°. That in every science there is commonly a principle which we may call the dominant, and which, for that reason alone, and independently of the reasons I have just adduced, ought to be withdrawn, so to speak, from the sphere of definitions, and presented in the form of an axiom. Such, in geometry, appears to me to be the principle of coincidence contained in the 8th axiom of Euclid.—*Prévost.*

P. 374, n. D, l. 22.—

This may suffice the haughty youth to shame,
Whose swelling veins, if we may credit fame,
Burst almost with the vanity and pride
That their rich blood to Nero's is allied:
The rumour's likely, for we seldom find
Much sense with an exalted fortune joined.

Juvenal (Stepney).

P. 374, n. D, n. 2, l. 2.—

If any one of simple thoughtless kind
(Such as you oft your careless poet find),
Who life's politer manners never knew,
If while we read, or some fond scheme pursue,
He tease us with his mere impertinence,
We cry, the creature wants e'en common sense.

Horace (Francis).

P. 374, n. D, n. 2, c. 2, l. 6.—

A fox beheld a mask—'O rare
The head-piece, if but brains were there!'
This holds—whene'er the Fates dispense
Pomp, power, and everything but sense.

Phædrus (Smart).

P. 377, n. F, n. 1.—Magnitudes having the same ratio to the same magnitude are equal to one another.—*Euclid.*

P. 378, n. G, n. 2.—Those alone that have been mentioned are properly called quantities, all the rest are quantities only by accident: for looking to those, we call others also quantities [as we speak of great whiteness, because the white surface is greatly extended, and a long action and much motion, because these imply much time].—*Aristotle.*

P. 379, n. H, l. 5.—The truths which geometry demonstrates regarding extension are purely hypothetical. These truths, however, are not the less useful in respect to the practical consequences resulting from them. This it is easy to make manifest by a comparison drawn from geometry itself. In that science we are familiar with curved lines which must perpetually approach a straight line without ever meeting it, but which, nevertheless, when drawn on paper, are not distinguishable by the eye from the straight line after a very short space. It is the same with the propositions of geometry, they are *the intellectual limit of physical truths*, the term which these can approach as nearly as we desire, without ever exactly reaching it. But if mathematical theorems have strictly no place in nature, they serve at least to solve, with sufficient practical accuracy, the different questions that can be raised regarding extension. There is no perfect circle in the universe; but the nearer a circle approaches perfection, the nearer it approaches the strict properties of the perfect circle of geometry; and it can approach it to a degree sufficient for our practice. The same holds of other figures, the properties of which geometry enumerates. To demonstrate with perfect rigour the truths relative to the figure of bodies, we must ascribe to that figure an arbitrary perfection which it cannot possess. In truth, if the circle, for example, be not supposed perfect, there will be required as many different theorems regarding it, as we can imagine different figures approaching more or less nearly to the perfect circle; and even these figures might still be absolutely hypothetical, and have no model existing in nature. The lines we contemplate in common geometry are neither perfectly straight, nor perfectly curved; the surfaces are neither perfectly plane, nor perfectly curvilinear; but we must suppose them so in order to arrive at certain and determinate truths, by which we may afterwards make a more or less exact application to physical lines and surfaces.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 360, n. I, l. 19.—It is too obviously matter of experience that

God made machines to be destroyed. We are the work of his wisdom, and we perish. Why, therefore, should it be otherwise with the world? Leibnitz holds the world to be perfect; but if God only made it to last for a certain time, its perfection consists then in its remaining in existence only up to the moment fixed for its dissolution.—*Voltaire.*

P. 381, n. K, l. 7.—See above, vol. ii. p. 160, n. 1, c. 1, l. 4.

P. 382, n. 2, l. 6.—And children also at first call all men *father* and all women *mother*, but they afterwards distinguish both.—*Aristotle.*

P. 383, l. 37.—

Whither, good Mœris? For the city bent?—*Virgil.*

P. 385, n. M, l. 2.—*Fallacies in diction.—Liber*, Bacchus, and *liber*, free from servitude; *liber*, a book, and *liber*, bark; *crevi*, from *cerno*, and *crevi*, from *cresco*; *infractus*, a participle of *infringo*, and *infractus*, compounded of *in* and *fractus*, of a totally different sense. . .

If any one should argue *that a star barks, because a certain star is called a Dog*, it were easy to reply to the sophism by distinguishing the various meanings of the same word, and thereby showing that, looking to the sense, the syllogism has four terms, while in sound there are but three. . . .

Fallacy of accent.—Hortus (a garden), and *ortus* (sprung); *hara* (a coop), and *ara* (an altar); *malum* (bad) an adjective, and *malum* (an apple); *cervus* (a stag), and *servus* (a slave); *concilium* (an assembly), and *consilium* (counsel). . . .

The mode of solution is to distinguish the different meanings that are confounded, and thence to show that there is a plurality of terms. . . .

But these fallacies are too gross to impose on a skilful logician.—*Wallis.*

P. 386, l. 9.—Here, meanwhile, I think it right to remark that these fallacies, although of no argumentative weight, are nevertheless specially adapted for all that we usually call *ingenious*, as jokes, facetiæ, bon-mots, taunts, sarcasms, repartee; for all these are merely fallacies of one or other of the kinds specified. The allusion is sometimes made to the sound of words, sometimes to their ambiguous meaning, at another time to doubtful contruction. Then, again, something that is commonly used proverbially has its own proper meaning assigned to it, and *vice versa*. Again, one thing is openly said, while another is secretly insinuated, at least what must not be said directly is obliquely insinuated; again, words are sophisti-

cally interpreted, and twisted to a contrary sense; or the probable is insinuated as true, at least as suspected; or that is said of one, which, with a change of name, the speaker wishes to be understood of another; or one is disparaged by being ironically praised; or the arrows darted against one are turned aside by the reply, or even made to glance off in another direction, so as to wound the person who discharged them; and there is generally a sportive ambiguity. If these forms of fallacies, indeed, be frigid and gross, they meet with ridicule; if refined, they please; if acute, cause laughter; if pointed, sting.—*Wallis.*

P. 390, n. O, l. 24.—Between cause, properly so called, and effect, there must be a necessary connexion, so that, the action of the cause being given, the effect necessarily follows. When God wills to effect anything, it must necessarily come to pass. . . . But because we perceive no such connexion between created causes and their effects, some have denied that second or created causes act by their own power. They deny that bodies are moved by bodies, because no connexion can be observed between the motion of a body and the motion of that on which it falls, so as that the body A being moved, the body B, upon which it is thrown, must necessarily be moved. The same parties also deny that bodies are moved by spirits, because they discover no connexion between the will of spirits and the motion of bodies. We must admit that no connexion of this kind is discernible; and the two facts that, on the one hand, a body being in motion, that on which it falls is moved, and, on the other, that when the mind wills the body is moved, do not certainly warrant the conclusion that body and mind are the true causes of motion. It might be that these are only the occasions on which another cause acted. But, just as from bare possibility you have no ground to infer that the thing really is, on the other hand, because you do not comprehend a thing, it does not follow that the thing is not; unless you can independently prove that you have an adequate idea of the thing in question, or that it involves a contradiction. There may be in bodies in motion, and in spirits, unknown powers, regarding which we can form no judgment, affirmative or negative. Wherefore, it is equally erroneous to affirm that spirits and bodies undoubtedly possess powers of effecting things which we do not know can be effected by them, and to deny the existence in bodies and minds of aught but what we clearly comprehend.—*Le Clerc.*

P. 391, n. P, l. 4.—*Resolution* is the method by which we are led from the thing sought, as already granted, by means of the consequents resulting from it, to some conclusion by which *Composition* may be effected. For in Resolution, supposing what is required as already done, we consider the antecedent from which this follows as a consequent, and again seek the antecedent of this consequent, and so on in succession with each consequent, until, in the course of our regress, we fall upon something already known and regarded as a principle. And this process is called *Analysis*, as if an inverted solution. But in Composition, on the other hand, giving the first place to that proposition as already known, which is acquired last in the order of Resolution, and disposing in natural order here as antecedents what, in the other process, appeared as consequents, and comparing them with each other, we at length reach the construction of what is required. This we call *Synthesis*. Analysis is twofold; for it is either an investigator of truth, and is called *theoretical*, or an investigator of something proposed to be done, and is called *problematical*. In theoretical analysis we suppose that what is sought is really as we suppose it, and then arguing by means of the consequents that result from it as if they were true (as they are, according to the hypothesis), we arrive at some certain conclusion. Now, if this conclusion be true, the proposition also concerning which we inquire is true, and the demonstration reciprocally answers the analysis. But if we come upon a false conclusion, that also about which we inquire will be false. In problematical analysis, however, taking our stand upon what is proposed to be done as now known, we are led to some conclusion by means of consequents flowing from it, which we suppose true. But if that conclusion be possible and be furnished, which mathematicians call a *datum*, that which is proposed will also be possible; and here also the demonstration will reciprocally correspond with the analysis. But if we come upon an impossible conclusion, the problem will also be impossible. *Limitation*, or determination, is that by which we discover under what conditions, and in how many modes, a problem can be effected. Thus far of Resolution and Composition.—*Pappus Alexandrinus.*

P. 395, n. T, l. 1.—In some instances observation and experiment at once furnish us with the principles of which we are in quest, but sometimes also we have to call *hypotheses* to our aid; not, however, such as are entirely arbitrary, but conformable to what we observe, and which,

supplying the immediate lack of observation, pave the way for investigation, as if we were divining; so that if we find the consequences that follow from them to be in harmony with the reality, we retain them, and proceed to fresh inferences, but if not, we reject them. And indeed I consider this method as generally of all others the best fitted for physical inquiry, which is very frequently a sort of unriddling of a letter written in secret characters, and in which, after several fruitless attempts, and even numerous errors, by a slow and cautious course of procedure, we at length reach the true reading. Of this method a very clear specimen is afforded in my *Dissertation on Light*, when treating of its propagation in right lines, and in the first volume of Stay's *Philosophy*, when considering the general properties of bodies, and especially the *vis inertiæ;* also in volume second, on the constitution of the whole body of Astronomy.—*Boscovich.*

P. 396, n. Y, l. 3.—Prosecuting these, I came upon numerous other theorems equally elegant, which I think ought to be the more highly valued, since they either cannot be demonstrated, or follow from propositions that do not admit of demonstration. . . .

Of which indeed I have no demonstration, but of the truth of which I am nevertheless absolutely certain. . . .

For truths of this kind are generally so recondite, that to demonstrate them demands incredible circumspection as well as the highest powers of mind. . . .

But indeed I can show by numerous proofs how little is to be attributed to Induction in this matter.

For this reason, I hold that all the properties of numbers of this class, the only guarantee of which is Induction, must be considered doubtful, until the proof is fortified by apodictical demonstration, or shown wholly to fail. . . .

Meanwhile, however, those resolutions made by means of Induction alone have now been carried to so great a degree of certainty, that no room for doubt seems any longer to remain; since even Induction itself is possibly capable of corroboration by reasons so well-grounded, that it may be looked upon as amounting to perfect demonstration. . . .

This example, therefore, of illicit induction is the more deserving of notice, as I never before met with a specimen so plausible and yet fallacious.—*Euler.*

P. 397, n. Z, l. 6.—The forms of the electric fluid seem to increase throughout the universe with the diversity of the phenomena that are

presented; and we are so accustomed to its metamorphoses, that the very novelty of the form under which it presented itself in the infancy of galvanism, appeared to facilitate its recognition.—*Abbé Haüy.*

P. 397, n. 1, l. 2.—But I do not here avail myself of the authority of Polybius, who refers the Roman republic to the class of mixed governments, which at that time, if we look not to the *actual administration*, but to *the right of administering*, was purely popular: for the authority both of the senate, which he refers to the government of the nobles, and of the consuls, whom he wishes to be regarded as kinge, was under the control of the people. I wish the same to be said of other political writers, who think it to the purpose to regard rather the outward form and daily administration of a government than the right itself to the supreme power.—*Grotius.*

P. 396, n., c. 2, l. 2.—The author also classes Polybius with those who have fallen into error regarding forms of government, on the ground that he calls the Roman republic of his time a mixed government. But it should be carefully noted that Polybius is not speaking of the mixed nature of the *government*, but of its *administration*; for the form of the republic was purely popular, but its administration was divided between consuls, senate, and people.—*Henry de Cocceii.*

P. 399, n. A A, l. 6.—In England, the law of succession gives to the eldest son of noble families the fixed property, to the exclusion of the younger members, who have no share of it. The younger children being thus without means, seek to make up for the deficiency by engaging in business, which is an almost certain means of enriching them. Once rich, they abandon their profession, and even though they do not, their children assume all the rights of nobility belonging to their family; their eldest sons take the title of *lord*, if their birth and the possession of an estate with a peerage permit of it. It is withal remarkable, that whatever may be the pride of the English nobility, when the nobles become apprentices, which in accordance with the usual regulations is for seven full years, they never cover their heads before their masters, but speak to them and work uncovered, although the master is frequently a plebeian, and of the race of tradesmen, while the apprentices are of the highest nobility.—*Encyclop. Méthod. Commerce.*

P. 399, n. B B, l. 1.—The second part of Metaphysique is the inquiry of final causes, which I am moved to report not as omitted, but as misplaced [for it is commonly referred to Physics, not to Meta-

physics]. And yet if it were but a fault in order, I would not speak of it; for order is matter of illustration, but pertaineth not to the substance of sciences. But this misplacing hath caused a deficience, or at least a great improficience in the sciences themselves. For the handling of final causes, mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and physical causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery. For this I find done not only by Plato, who ever anchoreth upon that shore, but by Aristotle, Galen, and others, who do usually likewise fall upon these flats of discoursing causes. For to say that the hairs of the eye-lids are for a quickset and fence about the sight; or that the firmness of the skins and hides of living creatures is to defend them from the extremities of heat or cold; or that the bones are for the columns or beams, whereupon the frames of the bodies of living creatures are built; or that the leaves of trees are for protecting of the fruit; or that the clouds are for watering of the earth; or that the solidness of the earth is for the station and mansion of living creatures, and the like, is well inquired and collected in Metaphysique; but in Physic they are impertinent. Nay, they are indeed but remoras and hindrances to stay and slug the ship from further sailing; and hath brought this to pass, that the search of the physical causes hath been neglected, and passed in silence. And, therefore, the natural philosophy of Democritus and some others (who did not suppose a mind or reason in the frame of things, but attributed the form thereof able to maintain itself, to infinite essays or proofs of nature, which they term *fortune*), seemeth to me, as far as I can judge by the recital and fragments which remain unto us, in particularities of physical causes, more real and better inquired than that of Aristotle and Plato [for this reason alone, that the former bestowed no pains on final causes, while the latter were unceasing in their inculcation of them. In this respect Aristotle is more to be blamed than Plato, since he omitted the fountain of final causes, that is God, substituting nature in his room, and embraced final causes rather as a logician than a theologian]. Not because those final causes are not true, and worthy to be inquired, being kept within their own province; but because their excursions into the limits of physical causes hath bred a vastness and solitude in that track.—*Bacon* (*Advan. of Learning*).

P. 400, n. C C, l. 11.—With regard to your assertion that the class of final causes is to be thrown aside in physical inquiry as useless, it might perhaps on another occasion have been made with truth; but as the question is now regarding Deity, it is to be feared that you would thus reject the chief argument by which the wisdom, power, providence, and even the existence of God, can be established by the light of nature. For to say nothing of that convincing proof that may be drawn from the consideration of the universe, the heavens, and the other principal parts, whence can you obtain the strongest proof of a God, unless from the beautiful order, the use and economy of the parts in each species of creature, whether in plants, in animals, or, in fine, in that part of yourself which bears the image and character of God, or even in your very body? And, indeed, we have seen many great men whom the anatomical consideration of the human body has not only elevated to the knowledge of a God, but who felt themselves constrained to raise hymns in his praise, on contemplating the admirable wisdom and singular providence which are displayed in the conformation and collocation presented by each of its parts.—*Gassendi.*

P. 400, n. C C, l. 25.—It is allowable to form inferences with regard to purely natural functions, from the conformation of the parts of the human body.—*Gassendi.*

P. 404, n. E E, n. 1, l. 10.—1. There are other beings, and other men besides myself in the world. 2. There is in them something called truth, wisdom, prudence, &c.—*Buffier.*

P. 408, l. 3.—At the end of the section we have just read, the ingenious author refers to what he said at the commencement of it. He thinks he has fully proved, that the particular evidence accompanying mathematical reasoning is not resolvable into the perception of identity. Let us recur, then, to that proof. It is found to consist wholly in refutation.

I. The author commences by remarking, that by some the opinion which he rejects is made to rest upon the doctrine that axioms are first principles; and as he has combated this doctrine, he concludes that its consequence must be false. Such an argument is, indeed, of force against those who proceed upon a certain theory regarding axioms, with a view to deduce from it the point in dispute, but it is impotent against all others. The author of this article takes his place among these latter. He has said, and he is still of opinion,

that the mathematician proceeds from hypothesis to hypothesis; that it is by clothing his thought in different forms that he arrives at useful results; THAT IT IS THE RECOGNITION OF A CERTAIN IDENTITY WHICH FORMS THE WARRANT OF EACH OF HIS CONCLUSIONS; and, besides, he has said, and he continues to believe, that mathematical axioms are but made to hold the place either of definitions or theorems; and that definitions are the only principles of sciences of the nature of geometry. The following are his own expressions:—"I remark that good preliminary definitions are the only principles strictly sufficient in the science of pure reasoning. . . . In these definitions are really contained the hypotheses with which those sciences set out. . . . We could conceive (keeping always to those sciences) that the principles might be so exactly laid down, that we should find nothing in them beyond good definitions. From those definitions, turned on new sides, all subsequent propositions would result. WHAT ARE THE DIVERSE PROPERTIES OF THE CIRCLE, BUT DIFFERENT FACES OF THE PROPOSITION WHICH DEFINES THAT CURVE? It is, therefore, the imperfection, perhaps inevitable, of our conceptions, that has rendered it necessary to assign to axioms a place among the principles of the science of pure reasoning. And then they discharge a two-fold office. Some stand in the place of definitions, others in the place of propositions that admit of demonstration."

It is clear that one who always held this language, has not founded his opinion, be it true or false, relative to mathematical evidence, on a false doctrine in relation to axioms; or, at least, being so entirely at one with Mr. Dugald Stewart in what concerns the first principles of mathematics, it is not from that quarter that there arises the apparent disagreement between his expressions and those of his friend, on the subject of the principle of mathematical evidence in demonstrative deduction. It is thus manifest that the first argument of the author is impotent, so far as he is concerned.

II. Let us pass on to the second. This is also purely negative and *ad hominem*. It is directed against those who deduce from a principle peculiar to geometry, the assertion which the author combats. Because geometrical equality is demonstrated by coincidence, those philosophers rush to the conclusion that, throughout the whole of mathematics, truths rest on identity. Those, therefore, who never dreamt of founding the doctrine in dispute on such a ground, cannot surrender before an attack directed against that ground. It is pro-

bable that a very great number of the partisans of the principle of identity, considered as the basis of demonstration, are conscious (as the author can safely say of himself) of being altogether strangers to the mode of reasoning which the author refutes; and have not formed their opinion relative to mathematical evidence from the coincidence (*real* or *potential*) of two portions of space. This the author most positively affirms with regard to himself; and it thence follows that the argument *ad hominem*, directed against those who have been led by the one of those opinions to the other, does not reach him.

It is somewhat more difficult to establish this affirmation, than when the question referred to axioms, because these could not fail of presenting themselves to the inquiries of the logician, whereas he was not called upon to foresee the inconsiderate application of the principle of superposition to every species of demonstration. If, however, he shows that his doctrine of demonstration flows from universal principles, and these altogether different from the one in view, he will have done, I think, all which can be looked for at his hands.

The author may now be permitted to cast off the third person, and, for the sake of avoiding tediousness and some indirect expressions, lay down his doctrine with precision, and the mode he has adopted in expounding it.

In the opening of my *Logic*, I set out with the distinction that should be made between the two kinds of truths, *conditional* and *absolute*. I then add :—

THE ONLY MEANS BY WHICH WE CAN KNOW WHETHER A CONDITIONAL PROPOSITION IS TRUE, OR THE MARK OF SUCH A TRUTH, IS THE WELL-ESTABLISHED IDENTITY OF THE PRINCIPLE AND THE CONSEQUENCE [? CONSEQUENT]. THIS IDENTITY IS DOUBTLESS INCOMPLETE; BUT IT IS, IN SOME RESPECT, SUCH THAT THE CONSEQUENCE [? CONSEQUENT] MUST BE WHOLLY COMPRISED IN THE PRINCIPLE ?[1]

[1] The impartial reader will be pleased to recollect that the work from which this extract is taken, is only the outline of a very extensive course, in which are developed by examples and in every way, the simple statements of the text. It is hardly necessary to add here by way of explanation what I mean by the *complete* or *incomplete* identity of the principle and its consequence [? consequent]. When I conclude, for example, from the genus to the species, there is an incomplete identity; as when, after proving something to be true of every polygon, I affirm it of the triangle in particular. An equation affords an example of complete identity; and it is readily understood that the identity of which we speak is that of quantity (of the number of units) and not of any other. These two examples seem sufficient to obviate all ambiguity.

Treating next in order of the sciences, according to their kind, I designate such sciences as are occupied only with conditional truth—those of *pure reasoning*. I investigate, in a general and abstract way, the characters of those sciences. I then make application of these to the Mathematics, in their twofold division; and it is thus I have determined the nature of demonstration. I am careful besides to remark, that the nature of pure reasoning, properly so called, is in no degree dependent on the matter, and that it is peculiar to mathematics only in this sense, that these are exclusively occupied with reasoning, and mix up with it no propositions possessing absolute truth, as is done in the sciences of *fact* and *experience*. I have said enough, I think, to show that I did not rashly affirm, that I had in no way conceived the nature of demonstration from the limited point of view of superposition. I cannot, therefore, so far as I am concerned, allow the force of an argument which is directed only against those whose doctrine has that basis.

III. One is always lengthy in refuting a refutation. I should therefore do wrong were I to enlarge on anything that is not absolutely necessary to establish the exact state of the question. I will not discuss opinions that do not lie in my way, as those of Leibnitz, of the author of a Latin Dissertation printed at Berlin in 1764, of Barrow, Condillac, Destutt-Tracy. It is enough that I have replied, for myself and those who agree with me, to the only two arguments of our author, against the doctrine which I have long held.

I will, however, add a word on the subject of a remark, which our author introduces by the statement, *that it applies to all the attempts that have been made to establish the opinion in question*. "Granting," he says, "that all mathematical propositions may be represented by the formula $a = a$, it would not, therefore, follow that every step of the reasoning leading to these conclusions was a proposition of the same nature." I request the author of this objection to reflect for a moment on the sense of the word *step*, considered in its original as opposed to its figurative meaning. Undoubtedly a *step of reasoning* is nothing else than a proposition. If, therefore, it be granted that every proposition is represented by the formula $a = a$, every *step* must also be of the same nature.

With regard to the paper written in cipher, it certainly differs from what is not so written, as to the characters of each; just as the most bigoted partisans of the principle of identity would not deny,

that the expression *two plus two* is different from the expression *four*. In both cases the sign is different; the sense we have in view is the same.

IV. The preceding observations are designed to prove, that in all processes of reasoning (processes which the mathematics present free from all admixture), the conclusion is constantly deduced by virtue of THE PRINCIPLE OF IDENTITY. I should now say a word as to the ground on which I think it necessary to establish this principle on a solid basis, and place it beyond the reach of attack. The reason is, that, the moment we lose sight of it, we run the risk of confounding two kinds of truths, which we all know ought to be carefully distinguished. That which it is of importance to obviate, is the unconscious transition from the relative to the absolute; in other words, a faulty conclusion regularly deduced from an hypothesis, and rashly applied to what is independent of that hypothesis. This fallacy, apparently a gross one, has nevertheless been committed, more than once, and will be so again when the circumstances are fitted to give rise to the error, by such as have not fully analysed the process of reasoning.

In reasoning, undoubtedly, all that we have to do is to observe, that the conclusion is correctly deduced from the principle. But what is the mark by which we shall discover that the conclusion is correctly inferred? Those who reject the test of identity specify no other. And I own I cannot conceive any other which they could essay to place in its room. THAT TEST IS SIMPLE AND CLEAR. We can pause at each proposition, and consider whether it is but the development of a preceding; and if, through inadvertence, we step out of our proper field by mingling facts with hypotheses, we are forcibly brought back to the latter.

If John Bernouilli and Leibnitz had distinguished their hypotheses with as much precision as Euler did at a later period, they would not have differed in opinion on the nature of the logarithms of negative and imaginary numbers. If Huygens had seen that the work of the mathematician was but the turning over and over of his own hypotheses, he would not perhaps have used the expression which Leibnitz relates of him. Leibnitz, having shown him that a mixed quantity of imaginary numbers could be converted into a real quantity, "Huygens," says Leibnitz, "was so struck with it, that he

replied that there was something in it which is incomprehensible by us."[1]

I am acquainted with a professor of logic, who in his course of instruction makes it a point to puzzle his pupils by questions respecting the relations of negative and positive quantities. If a paradox arrest them, they consider themselves forewarned that there can be nothing in the conclusion which was not explicitly contained in the principle; and they take care to settle this thoroughly, in other words, to reduce it to terms perfectly clear; whereupon there is little trouble in getting quit of the difficulty. But unless we be beforehand fully possessed of this fundamental truth, we shall be at a loss for the source of the anomaly, or apparent contradiction between the conclusions.

No one has a more sincere admiration than myself of the genius of James Bernouilli, which he so successfully applied to the theory of Probabilities; and I am certainly doing no injury to his memory, when I adduce him as an example of the facility with which the mathematician, seduced by his beautiful discoveries, forgets for a moment the kind of truth that specially falls within his sphere. I have in view the concluding reflection of his *Art of Conjecturing*. From a formula (doubtless of great beauty, and showing much ingenuity), by which that profound thinker estimated the probability of coming near the proportion of causes by multiplying effects, he suddenly concludes for the regularity of the laws that govern the universe.

I shall not be open to the criticism that I have taken my examples from the writings of mediocre reasoners; and it will be readily believed that if I had wished to draw from such sources, I should have had no difficulty in multiplying instances.

Finally, I am accordingly of opinion, that the labourer in the sciences of pure reasoning should be made perfectly aware, that he does nothing but present his hypothesis in new aspects, and that to be alive to this fact is the only means of obviating dangerous errors.

[1] Whence finally this singular result seems to follow, that if observations on all events were continued through the whole of eternity (the last probability passing into perfect certainty), all things in the world would be found to happen according to fixed reasons and a constant law of change; so that, even in events the most casual, we are constrained to admit a kind of necessity, and, so to speak, fatality. I do not know whether Plato meant to maintain this, in his dogma of the universal restoration of things. —*Jas. Bernouilli.*

The doctrine I maintain, is not therefore, merely of speculative interest, which I could sacrifice without reluctance; it is a practical rule that ought to serve as the basis of that part of logic, which is occupied with the species of truth in question.

V. I will now state the ground on which, adhering firmly AS I DO TO THE PRINCIPLE OF IDENTITY, I still believe and hope that the difference between the excellent philosopher who rejects this principle and myself is only in appearance. The reason is, that we are agreed on the point, that definitions are the true principles of mathematics, and that the whole body of the science is founded upon them. That is, without doubt, the principal point. And I feel assured, that should this philosopher have to discuss (at greater length than his subject then demanded) the true character of legitimate deduction, he would conclude by admitting, if not the identical expressions, at least fundamentally the same principle that I employ.

I perceive, indeed, both from his work and his correspondence, that it is the expressions which he particularly censures; and so far as those are concerned, I should be very glad to adopt the change which he might be pleased to suggest, provided the new phrases adequately expressed my thought.

Thus after expounding to him, in a letter, my opinions on the subject of the principle of identity, I added,—"The whole of this amounts to the statement, that the conclusion is wholly contained in the principle. Might we not present all mathematical propositions in this form: *To say such a thing is to say such another thing.* Mr. Dugald Stewart on this replies:—I am entirely at one with you, as to the spirit and the substance of your remarks. He who admits the definition or *hypothesis*, cannot deny its different logical consequences, provided he is able to comprehend each step of the route by which the principle and the consequences are connected together. I am not sure, however, but that, for the majority of your readers, you present that proposition in a manner too concise and figurative, when you say that the conclusion is contained in the principle, or that to affirm the one is to affirm the other. I think, at least, that there is room for the apprehension, that those expressions would suggest erroneous notions to such as do not observe the special sense which you put upon the words you employ." I am, therefore, quite prepared to allow the word *contained* to be replaced by an equivalent expression. But that word appears to me to be here used in

a sense familiar to logicians; for it is exactly in this sense that the species is usually said to be comprised in the genus.[1]

Another phrase upon which Mr. Dugald Stewart animadverts is that of *identical* proposition.[2] He observes, that several good logicians have so distinguished those propositions that merely repeat the same word in two terms (*a* is *a*), and that they call them useless and nugatory. I will renounce without discussion, on the authority of those logicians, the expression I have adopted, although I could oppose authority to authority. But I am desirous of preserving a word which, in one way or another, expresses my thought. As Campbell says, the phrase "four is four," affords a useless and truly trifling proposition. But to say "twice two is four," is to present the same idea under two aspects, and such a process is, as we know, very useful. I had been accustomed to call the first kind of propositions *tautological*, and the second *identical*. I am quite willing to change this mode of speech, provided I am furnished with fresh terms capable of being used as substitutes.[3]

Finally, Mr. Dugald Stewart adds to these criticisms an observation, which shows that one of the grounds on which he has been led to oppose the principle of identity is the fear of its entailing certain false or even dangerous consequences. He thus expresses himself towards the close of the letter, from which I have just cited the preceding observations: "To all these propositions, *as you understand them*, I subscribe without difficulty. But is there not reason to apprehend, that they will give rise, in the minds of some readers, to ideas different from those you attach to them? And is not their tendency such as to give an air of paradox to a doctrine which, when it is put in a plain way, leaves no room for doubt or hesitation? How extraordinary is the conclusion which this use of the word *identity*

[1] If we are at liberty to say that the notion of the triangle is comprised in that of the polygon, we can say of certain propositions regarding triangles, that they are comprised in their analogues regarding polygons. When we have proved, for example, that in every rectilineal figure the exterior angles are equal to four right angles, we shall be able to draw a similar inference regarding triangles. And this consequence may, it would seem, be said to be *contained* in its principle.

[2] Mr. Dugald Stewart also censures the word *identity* as being borrowed from the schoolmen; but that, in my opinion, is no blot; for as Leibnitz said (in parody of a phrase of Virgil), there is gold on that dunghill. Further, in English we might, perhaps, dispense with the word, in French we cannot. Our language is timid, and is scared by the least neologism.

[3] N., c. 2, l. 4.—When the same term occupies the place of subject and attribute, occurring in precisely the same sense, the proposition is called *identical*, and is trifling.—*Cousin.*

N., c. 2, l. 10.—See above, vol. iii. p. 130, n. 2, c. 2. l. 2.

N., c. 2, l. 25.—See above, vol. iii. p. 121, l. 4.

has suggested to a philosopher like Diderot! "Interrogate," he says, "honest mathematicians, and they will admit that their propositions are all identical, and that so many volumes on the circle, for example, amount merely to the repetition, in a hundred thousand different ways, of the truth, that it is a figure of which all the lines drawn from the centre to the circumference are equal. We know, therefore, next to nothing."

This last conclusion at which Diderot arrives, is the more extraordinary, as he who quotes it remarks, since it is precisely because the mathematics are occupied with conditional truth that they possess perfect certainty, as I have elsewhere attempted to show, and it is, consequently, on that account, that they eminently merit the appellation of *science*. But because a philosopher, such as Diderot, has strayed into a conclusion, which doubtless suited the bent of his desires, I can see no good ground for inferring the necessity of changing a philosophical terminology that is conformable to truth. If the language appear paradoxical, which does not strike me, it is proper to make an effort to improve it, in which I will be happy to co-operate.

Throughout the whole of the volume from which I quote, there is no further reference to the point in dispute. I do not think, therefore, that I shall be called upon to recur to it. It was not without regret, and a species of reluctance that I entered upon it at all. I cannot conclude without once again recording the conviction, that the nature of the difference between us is more apparent than real, and mentioning that Mr. Dugald Stewart himself is of opinion that it regards words rather than things.—*Prévost.*

P. 414, Art. II. l. 7.—But there is another question upon which we differ, or at least do not express ourselves alike. I refer to the opinion laid down with definiteness, and couched in expressions highly flattering to me, in the footnote on p. 311 (233) of the second volume of the *Elements*, &c. It is somewhat singular that here also I should be led to think, that our difference is more in appearance than in reality, and that the controversy on this point is not less verbal than on the other, perhaps more, or at least more manifestly, so. The matter merits clearing up. And first of all, as I write at so great a distance from you, might I venture to ask you to read over again what I say on pages 8 and 9 of my preface to the translation of your first volume? You will see from it, that I make no difference between

us in relation to the nature of physical causes.[1] When quoting, on page 311 (233) of the second volume, the two expressions you give as containing my views on the point, it has escaped you that the first of those phrases was modified by that which followed it, and which you have omitted. That modification is absolutely essential. "If we analyse the word *force* or *energy*, keeping to natural causes, we shall see that its meaning is, that the effect constantly follows the cause by some law of nature." In my course of instruction I insist strongly on that definition, to which I do not think (so far as I know your opinions) you can have anything to object. It presents, in fact, the same characteristic of physical causes as Hume and yourself fix upon; and it affords the solution, at the same time, of a difficulty of Reid, which is well-founded, if the characteristic be advanced as extending to causes universally. You do not need details and illustrations. The fear, however, of being obscure makes me add one word. In the month of March, the Mahometans watch the rising of the new moon, and as soon as they see it they emit a cry. The cry is indeed a sign, but not a cause of the appearance, which I should have before my eyes when I turned them towards the sky. It precedes the phenomenon, but not in virtue of a law. On the other hand, when a body approaches another that is charged with electricity, I say indifferently, that the one of those bodies attracts the other, or that electricity is the cause of the movement. The facts in this case follow one another, in virtue of the laws of electricity. And we are understood to remount, as far as we can, from cause to cause. Thus, we might demand the cause of electricity, as we might seek that of fever, which is itself the cause of delirium, &c. &c. I say, therefore, that

[1] I must not, however, be understood as subscribing implicitly to all the opinions of our author. I have restricted myself in the translation to the exact rendering of his meaning, and I have not thought it proper always to place my own views in opposition to his, when, as rarely happens, I do not agree with him. Of this I will give a single illustration. The author looks upon the inquiry into the cause and mechanism of gravitation as contrary to the principles of sound philosophy. Those who are acquainted with the labours undertaken and executed by G. L. Le Sage in that direction, are aware that such an inquiry is compatible with the most rigorous philosophical method. I am perfectly at one with Mr. Stewart in regard to the general rule to which this particular maxim is referable. There is a limit which philosophy ought to recognise, and beyond which it must not push its researches. But I differ from our author with regard to the point at which that limit should be placed, while admitting, however, that the inquiry into the mechanism of gravitation has proved the source of a multitude of errors, and that it is, without question, a rock which should be carefully shunned by those entering, for the first time, on the career of philosophical pursuit. Although the question is highly interesting in physics, it is less so in metaphysics, or rather in logic; since in the latter science it is but one exemplification of a rule that has numerous applications. On this ground, I here abstain from entering on the discussion of that disputed point.—*Prévost.*

we are wholly at one on the nature of physical causes, provided you do not dispute (which I can hardly anticipate) the distinction I have laid down between cause and sign. The point on which we differ (and on which there are opposed to me, besides yourself, many high authorities), is a purely physical question, viz., Is the cause of gravitation of the number of those questions which ought to engage our attention? Let each of us on this point retain his own opinion. It is probable that that field of discussion will not involve us in a direct controversy, and I shall congratulate myself, if such be the case. I pass on to remark the difference between a *law* and a *cause*. A law is a relation, or still better, a relation of relations—a proportion. It is something theoretical—a generalisation; a law cannot act. It is necessary, accordingly, that there should be an agent—a cause, in order to realize a change. Example: "If the north pole of a magnet is approached by the south pole of another magnet, attraction ensues." That is a law. But that simple announcement *produces* nothing. I have now on my table two magnets. I place their opposite poles in antagonism; there is the cause; the attraction (or approach) will follow according to the law. I have ventured to suggest that the word *agent* should be more especially applied to impulsive causes, because they are such as produce common, well ascertained, and universal phenomena. I have made the suggestion with an expression of doubt, and I have nothing to say against those who disallow its propriety. To show more fully the necessity of the distinction of *law* and *cause* in physics, I will make use of an example. A man, come from I do not know whence, sees a horse pulling a chariot, but he does not see the traces; with each step of the horse, he sees the chariot advance.[1] He concludes from this that the horse is the cause of the motion of the chariot. He examines more closely and discovers the traces; he finds that the motion is to be attributed to impulse. All this supposes that he is acquainted with the laws of these facts. The horse is a cause, the trace is a more remote one. It is the latter I would call an agent. But for this last appellation I must not stand out too stoutly. With regard to the purely hypothetical fiction of Boscovich, I confess I do not see that it is of great weight in favour of those who censure the search after the cause of

[1] It is to be understood that the process is frequently repeated in a uniform manner on several similar chariots, and more than once on each.

gravitation. I should have said more on this subject, but as it is entirely a physical question, it seems to me that I may refrain from further remark.—*Prévost.*

VOL. IV.

(ELEMENTS, VOL. III.)

P. 3, l. 16.—My mind, which had always been employed in that kind of studies, now not being able to lie wholly idle, I thought I could find out no better way to get rid of those troubles which oppressed me than by returning again to the studies of philosophy.—*Cicero.*

P. 10, l. 13.—

> Catius, by friendship, by the powers divine,
> Take me to hear this learned sage of thine;
> For though his rules you faithfully express,
> This mere repeating makes the pleasure less,
> Besides, what joy to view his air and mien.
>
> *Horace* (Francis.)

P. 12, n. 1.—But his head tapered like a cone.—*Homer.*

P. 12, l. 33.—Who always, by night and day, is able to assume another's countenance, to throw kisses.—*Juvenal.*

P. 14, l. 31.—But at least, tell me, madam, by what spell your Clitander has the happiness so warmly to engage your affections; on what foundation of merit and sublime virtue in him, you ground the honour of your esteem. Is it by the long nail which he wears on his little finger, that he has acquired that esteem in your eyes which he now enjoys? or have you surrendered, with all the world of fashion, to the shining qualities of his blond perruque?—*Molière.*

P. 15, n., l. 5.—I remember hearing a member of the Institute, a counsellor of state, seriously say, that the nails of Bonaparte were perfect. Another cried out, "The hands of the First Consul are

charming." "Ah!" replied a youth belonging to the ancient noblesse, who was not yet a chamberlain, "Pray, do not talk politics."—*Madame de Staël.*

P. 19, n., c. 1, l. 5.—Nothing would be easier than to compose a grammar and dictionary of gesture. The monks of the order of Citeaux were well aware of this, who, towards the end of the sixteenth century, agreed on a certain number of signs to be used instead of words. It was their aim, as far as possible, to make them imitative. *Hearing* was indicated by a finger placed against the ear; *sight* by the same moved from above the eye; the opposite meanings were expressed by the act of closing these two organs. To close the hand was *to receive;* to open it, *to give. To bathe* was indicated by passing the hollow of the hand over the chest, as if it were full of water. The throat pressed by the hand denoted the cessation of life.—*Court de Gebelin.*

P. 25, n., c. 1, l. 19.—I lay it down as an axiom, *that all proper names were at first appellatives;* otherwise they would exist without a reason for their existence. Accordingly, whenever we do not understand the meaning of the name of a river, mountain, wood, nation, canton, town, villa, we ought to conclude that we have departed from the original language of the country.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 29, l. 9.—The qualifying adjective is nothing more than a substantive word placed adjectively.—*Wallis.*

P. 34, n. 3.—Before one could think of the future, or seek to recall the past, it would be necessary to provide for the present; for how could the mind recall the one or dream of the other, while it was harassed by the more pressing need of providing for the future? The first care of men was, therefore, to concentrate their efforts in procuring what was indispensable for their present subsistence; and such, accordingly, must have been the aim of their first discourse.

. . . . . .

Verbs, therefore, began with the *imperative*, or that tense which more than any other expresses in the briefest and readiest manner what must be done; for when affairs are pressing, and immediate performance is required, there cannot be much speaking; and when in want of anything, we do not occupy ourselves with oratory.

Thus the imperative is like the language of the dumb; not much raised above mere gesture. It resembles it in being isolated, loose, the affair of the moment, a simple sound, as the other is a simple

motion. It almost always consists of a single syllable. . . . . *Ama*, *aime* (love); *dic*, *dis* (say); *fer*, *porte* (bear), are shorter than any other tenses of those verbs.—*Court de Gebelin.*

P. 37, l. 15.—Grammarians supposed that we had in our language a great number of words of the form *que*, differing in signification from each other. Some they considered conjunctives, others comparatives, others interjections. They likewise admitted a relative *que* and *qui*, absolutely different from all those, since the former are indeclinable, while the latter are declined, especially in Latin.

But as the capacity of being declined is a simple accessory, it cannot form an adequate ground for regarding all these forms of *que*, even the relatives, as different words. Let us, therefore, say that there is but one word, which never varies in signification, bearing the definite import which attaches to the conjunction *que*. By thus reducing the whole of these forms of *que* to this single principle, we obtain an explication of what always seemed so embarrassing and unsatisfactory, that is both highly simple and clear.—*Court de Gebelin.*

P. 38, l. 3.—The book *which* you sent me is highly interesting.

The author *whom* you quote is an excellent judge of that matter.

. . .

You sent me a book, and I find *that* the book is highly interesting. You quote an author, and I find *that* the author is an excellent judge of the subject in question.—*Court de Gebelin.*

P. 45, n. 4, l. 6.—We are perhaps indebted to the Peripatetic philosophy, which realised all general and metaphysical entities, for not having in our language more of what in the ancient languages are called *inversions*. In fact, our old French authors have much more of it than we, and that philosophy prevailed while our language was being perfected under Louis XIII. and Louis XIV. The ancients, who generalised less, and studied nature more in detail and in the individual, possessed a language whose style was less monotonous, and the word *inversion* would doubtless have sounded strange to them. You will not here object, Sir, that the peripatetic philosophy is that of Aristotle, and consequently the work of the ancients; for you will doubtless inform your pupils that our peripateticism was very different from that of Aristotle.—*Diderot.*

P. 48, l. 12.—To conclude the sense with the verb is by far the best method, if the composition admit of it. For the force of speech

is in the verbs. Doubtless every verb that is not at the end causes a *hyperbaton.—Quintilian.*

P. 48, l. 26.—The thunderbolts of Demosthenes would not dart so swiftly, did not the rhythm lend to them force and speed.—*Cicero.*

P. 51, n. 1, l. 1.—For fools rather admire and delight in all things which they see lurking under inversions of words, and regard that as true which has power agreeably to affect the ear, and is disguised under a pleasing sound.—*Lucretius.*

P. 51, n. 3, c. 2, l. 14.—In giving to the construction of French, or to that of any other language, the epithet *analogous*, we suppose that it has more analogy, conformity, relation to nature, and that it is the most perfect construction; and in applying to the construction of Greek and Latin the name *transpositive*, we let it be understood that the latter inverts the natural arrangement of words, that it presents an order opposed to that of nature. It is thereby still further implied that there is a fixed order peculiar to nature, from which it can never swerve; that nature is under an infallible determination to follow the same route.

But have those questions been decided? Could they be so, at least at the time when those peremptory designations were first imposed? Was the judgment not precipitated by the difference that was observed between those two kinds of constructions? And might those names not lead into error, by insinuating that, in fact, the Latin reversed the order of nature, which our modern languages observed? —*Court de Gebelin.*

P. 59, l. 14.—It is, in general, much more simple, and consequently more useful, to employ in science current terms, accurately determining the ideas that should be attached to them, than to substitute for them new ones, especially in those sciences which hardly or in no degree possess any other language besides the common, or of which the terms are generally known, as Metaphysics, Morals, Logic, and Grammar. The mass of men more easily reform their ideas than change their language. It is at least necessary, if we are absolutely obliged to create new terms, to hazard only a very small number at a time, that we may avoid repelling, by the novelty of our language, those we seek to instruct. We ought to pursue the same course with respect to a change in the language of science as in regard to our orthography, which, although very faulty and full of inconsistencies

and contradictions, cannot nevertheless be reformed except by little and little, and as it were by insensible degrees. Changes too extensive and numerous, and effected at a blow, would but serve to perpetuate the evil they were meant to remedy. *Festina lente* (hasten slowly) should form the motto of almost all reformers.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 60, l. 13.—We resemble, much more frequently than we imagine, the person born blind, who said that he thought the colour *red* must somehow be like the sound of a *trumpet.* The ground of this fantastical and absurd opinion is, as appears to me, not far to seek. The blind man had frequently heard the sound of the trumpet (with which he was familiar), called a *striking* sound; he had also heard it said that the colour red (which he had never seen) was a *striking* colour. The same word (*éclatant*) being employed to express two things so different, had led him to suppose that they were analogous. We have in this a type of our judgments in a thousand instances, and a very marked example of the influence of language on the opinions of men.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 62, l. 30.—When the *origin of nations* is so remote as to transcend history, the *languages* supply the place of old monuments. The most ancient traces of languages survive in the names of rivers and woods, whose designations commonly remain the same notwithstanding the change of inhabitants. Next to these are the names of human habitations, for although many villas and towns are named after their founders, as is very common in Germany, which was more recently civilized, yet other places have received their appellations from their situation, produce, and other qualities, and the etymology of the older places is difficult to be determined. The old names of families also, in which no nation of Germany is richer than the Frisians (West Frieslanders), conduct us to the sacred repositories, so to speak, of the ancient tongue. For I lay it down as an axiom, *that all proper names were at first appellatives;* otherwise they would exist without a reason for their existence. Accordingly, whenever we do not understand the meaning of the name of a river, mountain, wood, nation, canton, town, villa, we ought to conclude that we have departed from the original language of the country.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 64, n., l. 4.—From the Celts, that is, the Germans and Gauls that had crossed over the Alps and Pyrenees, it is probable that Italy

and Spain received inhabitants, at a period long antecedent to those arrivals of the later Gauls that are mentioned by Livy. Those I understand to be the aborigines of Italy, that is, the inhabitants that were more ancient than the Greeks, Lydians, Phrygians, Phœnicians, and others that came by sea. For all the oldest migrations were made by land, and it was at a more recent period, and with difficulty, that a great multitude of people were transported by sea; although Tacitus is of the opposite opinion. Thereafter, numerous maritime colonies of Greeks were founded in Italy; hence the Latin tongue arose out of a mixture of Celtic and Greek. Afterwards the part of Italy on this side the Alps was called Gallia Cisalpina, the part beyond Magna Græcia; in the centre, the Latins and Tuscans, with their neighbours, were greatly modified by influences from both sides. We do not understand the ancient Etruscan, and the inscriptions remaining on its monuments we cannot even read.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 72, l. 11.—It should be observed, however, in the native words of our language, that there is for the most part a great harmony between the letters and the thing signified.

Thus thinner, shriller, deeper, duller, softer, stronger, clearer, fainter, and more creaking, sounds of letters not unfrequently indicate similar affections in the things signified, and even sometimes several in the same word, although a monosyllable. . . . And this indeed is so common, that hardly any language I know appears worthy of being put on a level in this respect with our own. So much is it the case, that not unfrequently in one monosyllabic word (of which class are almost all our words, if you take away flexion) forcible expression is given to what in other languages can hardly be expressed, or, if at all, only by composition or decomposition, or by a long periphrasis.—*Wallis.*

P. 73, n., l. 9.—Thus, words beginning with *str* indicate stronger power and effort in the thing signified, as *strong*, &c. It is no objection to this view of the matter, that in some of these examples there clearly appear traces of a Latin origin, for as the English are given to the formation of vocables with sounds corresponding to the meaning, they are the more disposed to appropriate from other languages words already formed on a similar principle.

St also indicates power, but a less degree of it, such as would be sufficient for the preservation of what one has acquired, rather than

for the addition of fresh acquisitions (as if from *sto, I stand*); as *to stand*, &c.[1]

Thr denotes a more violent movement, as to *throw*, &c.

Wr indicates a certain obliquity or distortion, as *wry*, &c.

Cr indicates something broken, at least bent or displaced, as *to crack*, &c. All these seem to insinuate a breaking, or a crash, or creaking.

Others in *cr*, as if from *crux*, a *cross*, denote a dividing cross-wise, as *to cross*, &c. Hence Richard, king of England, was called *crouch-backed, not because his spine was bent, but because he took a pride in wearing on his back the form of a cross.—Wallis.*

P. 73, n., c. 2, l. 24.—From the very nature of sound, the letter R denotes violent motion, and K the final obstacle by which it is arrested. Thus in *ruck* (*einen ruck thun, to cause a jerk*) there is a violent forward motion, but through steps where, by any change, the motion is checked. So also we employ *recken* (*to rack*), when, suddenly, with great force and some noise, a thread or any other thing is stretched out, so that without the thread breaking, the impetus is stopped. It is thus we obtain out of a curved line a straight one, distended like a cord. But where breaking takes place, instead of the letter K as an arrestive, S or Z follows, as the sign of the motion going on unchecked, and we have *riss*, *reissen*, *riz*. Such appear to be the prime sources of vocables, as soon as we penetrate to the root of word-making. In course of time it generally happens that the old and native meanings of words are changed or obscured by frequent translations. Languages, however, did not attain their present advancement in virtue of express regulations, nor were they founded, as it were, by law; they sprung up in virtue of a natural impulse leading men to adjust sounds to the affections and motions of the mind.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 80, l. 28.—But on the question as to how the arts of the Greeks were communicated to the East, I have indulged in conjecture. I desire to be pardoned if, on this subject, I have yielded to slight sur-

[1] We will here cite but a single example of this class. It is, however, in itself a legion, that is *st*. These letters designate the property of being fixed, staid, remaining in a place. They are the movement or cry of those who desire that one should halt, rest in a place. The mere pronunciation of *s* produces a sort of hissing sound, which excites the attention of one going before; and the intonation *t* following, as dry, brief, and definite, naturally indicates the fixedness of situation that is desired.

Be that as it may, there is no European language in which *st* is not the root of a multitude of words that are themselves regarded as primitives.—*Court de Gebelin.*

mises more than you think I ought to have done. To conjecture is often odious, yet, in my opinion, in its own time and place, both necessary and useful. For, as in the investigation of questions of very great obscurity, hypothesis holds the first place; so, should we make no advance beyond it, it is proper that our conjectures be held up to view and made known, in order that an opportunity may be afforded to others either of confirming our conjecture or of adopting a new and different route, and thus making the nearest possible approach to the truth.—*Bayer.*

P. 83, n., c. 2, l. 31.—This Butta or Budda appears to have been either the first, or among the first, to conjoin the dogmas of the Greeks with the ancient superstitions and mode of living of the Brahmins. . . .

To this conjecture of mine I add another, that, from the institutions of Budda and others who, about the same time, applied themselves to foreign studies, there doubtless arose numerous bands of disciples, by whose labour and united efforts that illustrious and widely-celebrated ancient language of the Brahmins was invented. For unless they were willing to employ always a foreign tongue, it was necessary they should bethink themselves of a new language by which they could designate new objects, and give expression to thoughts before unknown to them, and at the same time conceal from the other orders of India the opposition of their doctrines to the religion of their country. The invention, however, of a language of that nature appears to me to be a task of so much difficulty as to require many generations before it can be brought to perfection.—*Meiners.*

P. 87, n. 3.—I am of opinion that the basis of the Malay is monosyllabic. In fact, we discover in it a great number of words of Chinese origin. *Sanscrit words have been introduced in proportion as the Malays adopted Brahminism.—Langlès.*

P. 99, n. 1, l. 7.—The Reverend Benjamin Schultze, who gathered together a Christian congregation from the heathen at Madras, on the coast of Coromandel, thought the Brahmins had received those names of numbers from the Romans. I cannot indeed disguise the fact, that in certain of those names the form agrees more with the Latin than with the Greek; as, *sapta, septem; nova, novem.* We may further consider the principle regulating the progress of the cardinal numbers. In all the cardinal numbers that immediately precede the denary, the inhabitants of Hindostan use this mode of expression, *unawi, undeviginti,*

&c.; and, although the Greeks likewise follow a similar principle, I do not find that their form is the same, while between the Romans and Indians there is seemingly a common agreement in this respect. —*Bayer.*

P. 100, n., c. 1, l. 4.—But I do not find that there was any so great intercourse between the Romans and Indians. If some Plocamus, or any other Roman citizen, sojourned in India, that was not a sufficient reason why the Indians should, from a few strangers living among them for a short time for the purpose of trading, learn numbers of foreign sound and put them in the place of their own.—*Bayer.*

P. 101, n., c. 2, l. 8.—I have thought, however, that it was an undertaking deserving the attention of the learned, to investigate the routes of the arts and sciences, as it is quite manifest that these have travelled from race to race, going in different directions, and taking up their abode now with one people and then with another. The same nations were not always either civilised or barbarous. The credit of the one condition and the disgrace of the other have passed from one people to another. Nor did any one nation of itself find all truth, and make all discoveries. What a nation once discovered it did not even always bring to perfection, or constantly retain. The Greeks themselves form no exception to these general truths. If that nation, however, did not make the first and the most numerous discoveries, or refinements upon them, there is no other which can show more illustrious monuments, testifying to the greatness of their aims. On the testimony of the Greeks, we look upon the Chaldeans, Egyptians, and Indians as, in addition to themselves, learned nations. But I have never approved of the language of those who would refer all illustrious discoveries to those nations as their source, and who proclaim that they possessed in every age a boundless store of knowledge. The cause of this exaggerated estimate is disdain of what is well known. Under the influence of this feeling we are led, when once we think of praising what we do not perfectly know, to extol it the more highly in proportion to our ignorance. That the Greeks were indebted for some discoveries to those nations I freely indeed concede. Yet others also allow that the same people received from the Greeks some discoveries, both such as were new and imperfect, as well as others that had been nearly brought to perfection.—*Bayer.*

P. 102, n., c. 1, l. 16.—M. La Place, who had an interest in maintaining the great antiquity of the Indian astronomy, and who at first

spoke of the mediate motions and epochs of the Hindus in the most favourable way, came in the end, however, to hold and publish the opinion, that their tables do not ascend beyond the 13th century.—*Delambre.*

P. 102, n., c. 1, l. 37.—The ancient reputation of the Indians, however, does not permit us to doubt but that they cultivated astronomy from the earliest period. When the Greeks and Arabians began to devote themselves to science, it was in India they sought their elementary information. To India we are indebted for the ingenious method of expressing all numbers by tens, by assigning to them at once an absolute and a relative value; an important refinement which now appears to us so simple that we hardly appreciate its merit. But its very simplicity and the extreme facility with which it enables us to carry on calculation, place our system of arithmetic in the first rank of useful discoveries. We shall appreciate the difficulty there was in the discovery, if we consider that it escaped the genius of Archimedes and Apollonius, two of the greatest ornaments of antiquity.—*La Place.*

P. 102, n. 1, c. 2, l. 35.—Before the time of Alexander, the Hindus had neither literature nor true philosophy.—*Meiners.*

P. 104, n. 2, l. 6.—Such accordingly being their habit, and as Alexander did not think it becoming in him to go to them, and as he was unwilling to compel them to do anything that was contrary to the practices of their country; that he had been sent, he says, &c.—*Strabo.*

P. 117, n. 1. l. 22.—It is necessary, moreover, to distinguish two species of imitation, the one reflective and deliberate, the other *automatic* and undesigned; the former acquired, the latter, so to speak, innate. The one is merely the result of the common instinct, shared in by a whole species, and consists in the similarity of the movements and operations of each individual, all of which seem to be induced or constrained to act in the same way. The more stupid the individuals of a species are, the more perfect is the imitation which, as a species, they possess. A sheep does and will continue to do only what all other sheep have done before it. The first cell made by a bee is precisely similar to the last. The intelligence of the whole species does not surpass that of a single individual of it; and therein lies the difference between mind and instinct. The natural imitation possessed by every species is thus but a result of similarity, a necessity blinder

and less intelligent as it is more equally distributed. The other kind of imitation, which we ought to regard as artificial, can neither be communicated to, nor distributed over, the species. It belongs exclusively to the individual upon whom it is bestowed, and who possesses it without being able to impart it. The best instructed parrot will never transmit the talent of speech to its young.—*Buffon.*

P. 118, n. 1.—As the human countenance smiles with those that smile, so does it weep with those that weep.—*Horace.*

P. 124, n. 1.—Everything about them (women) is more expressive; they are more delicate in fibre; they possess more varying features, a more flexible accent, and a more artless air. Their whole appearance speaks more clearly to our look; all wears more markedly the impress of their characters, affections, and thoughts. Their mind, in a word, seems less invisible; and from what they appear to be, we judge better of what they are.—*Boufflers.*

P. 126, n., c. 2, l. 10.—I am extravagantly fond of seeing a good mimic. M. D'Alembert possessed that talent, and, for that reason, I regret the loss of his society.—*Madame du Deffand.*

P. 126, n., c. 2, l. 27.—His (Buckingham's) special talent was that of hitting on the absurdities and modes of speaking of people, and mimicking them in their presence without their being aware of it. In short, he could personate all kinds of characters so happily and pleasingly, that one could hardly give up his society when he chose to be agreeable.—*Count de Grammont.*

P. 143, n., c. 2, l. 19.—It emits empty words, sound without sense; and imitates the steps of one walking along.—*Virgil.*

P. 144, n., c. 1, l. 11.—When, by keeping company with a man, we enter into the affections that regulate his moral character, we repeat, at least summarily, the intellectual operations that gave them birth; we imitate him. The persons, also, in whom we discover, in the highest degree, the talent of imitation, are, at the same time, those whose imagination enables them to put themselves in the place of others most promptly, easily, and completely. They are such as form with most power and talent those delineations of the passions, and even those pictures of inanimate nature, that arrest and fascinate our regards, only in as far as they are inspired by a species of sympathy. —*Cabanis.*

P. 146, l. 17.—See *Works*, vol. iv. p. 8, n., c. 2, l. 1.

P. 147, n.—For quotations, see above, vol. i. p. 65, n. 2, l. 14, and n. 2, l. 30.

P. 149, n., l. 12.—Moreover, by imitation alone we do and learn many things. The yet unconscious infant imitates whatever it either sees or hears, and the adult spontaneously, though unconsciously, or, perhaps, against his will, is so far an imitator, that he acquires the manners and mode of speaking of those with whom he lives. The child learns all its speech by imitation, otherwise, as is the opinion of some philosophers, it would be no better than the dumb and base cattle.

There is a certain degree of affinity between this and that other kind of imitation, which, like madness, has sometimes seized upon and carried away not only individuals, but a whole people. In virtue of the latter kind, which acts like contagion, the various affections of the mind, whether sad, joyous, or ridiculous, are diffused from the countenance of one person over the breasts of all. Ardour for the fight, and a confident expectation of victory, will spread through the whole line of an army, quicken their speech, and inflame many thousands of breasts alike, at the sight of the animated countenance of a leader in whom the soldiers confide; yet the same men, when victory has been once gained, have been known dishonourably to turn their backs and take to flight, unrestrained either by authority or violence, struck with terror at the sight of a man who might even be unknown to them.

The furor also of certain fanatics is sometimes diffused in a similar manner, and men believing themselves sane, who despised and ridiculed such folly, have themselves become participants of the madness, at the mere sight and hearing of those under the influence of the furor.

The principle of certain *nervous affections* is similar, as yawning, *hysterics*, *epilepsy*, which are frequently propagated in a wonderful way by sight alone.—*Gregory.*

P. 158, n. 1, l. 1.—Because the greatest stage, as it were, for an orator appears to be that of a public assembly, he is naturally stimulated by it to a more adorned style of eloquence. For a multitude has such influence that, as the player on the flute cannot play without his flute, so the orator cannot rise to eloquence without a numerous audience.—*Cicero.*

P. 158, n. 2, c. 2, l. 3.—Why should I say anything more of action

(delivery) itself, which is to be regulated by motion of body, by gesture, by look, and by modulation and variation of the voice, and the great power of which, alone and by itself, the trivial art of actors and the stage prove?—*Cicero.*

P. 159, n. 1, l. 1.—Some are greatly moved by splendour of diction, and, with animated countenance and mind, pass over to the feeling of the speaker,—throwing themselves into such attitudes as the effeminate and those who are mad by command are wont to do, at the sound of the Phrygian pipe.—*Seneca.*

P. 159, n. 2.—But for the few of strong head, refined taste, and exquisite sense, and who, like you, gentlemen, reckon little upon tone, gesture, and the empty sound of words, there must be provided matter, thoughts, reasons, and these skilfully presented, happily blended and arranged. It is not enough to strike the ear and satisfy the eye; it is necessary to act on the soul and touch the heart by speaking to the mind.—*Buffon.*

P. 170, n., c. 1, l. 4.—Here also [may be mentioned] the comic poet (as if the light of truth were not wanting to the splendour of genius), who, in a dialogue between one old man and another, made the one ask,—*Hast thou so much leisure, apart from thine own affairs, as to concern thyself about matters that in no way belong to thee?* and the other says in reply,—*I am a man, I deem nothing human foreign from me;* at which the whole theatre, it is said, filled with the simple and unlearned, broke forth in applause. Thus the fellowship of human minds naturally so touched the feelings of all, that there was no man there who did not feel himself the brother of every other. —*Augustin.*

P. 171, l. 4.—Sometimes a play which is showy in common places, and in which the characters are well given, though it be devoid of elegance, force, and art, gives the people much higher pleasure, and more effectually arrests their attention than verses without matter, and harmonious trifles.—*Horace.*

P. 180, n. 1, l. 12.—Reclaiming against them from within, like the absurd [placeless] Eurycles.—*Plato.*

P. 180, n., c. 2, l. 12.—He is nowhere who is everywhere.—*Seneca.*

P. 186, l. 33.—The nature of the body in which the mind is placed is of great moment; for many things proceed from the body that have the power of sharpening the mind; many that blunt it.—*Cicero.*

P. 187, n. 2, l. 11.—Red-haired, black-mouthed, short-legged, one-eyed, it will be a wonderful thing, Zoilus, if thou art good.—*Martial.*

P. 187, l. 20.—We stopped close to the university to look at some advertisements of books, that had just been put up at the gate. There were several people reading them besides ourselves; and I observed among them a *little man* who was giving his opinion on the works advertised. I remarked that he was most attentively listened to, and I judged at the time that he thought himself deserving of a hearing. He appeared to be vain, and was decisive in his statements, *as most little men are.*—From *Gil Glas.*

P. 197, n., l. 11.—I must confess with shame that the impression I received from those masterpieces of art was feeble in comparison of what I saw was experienced by some true amateurs and by artists. At first view I am a little short-sighted, which is a very great disadvantage; but afterwards I was strongly inclined to the belief that the habit of thinking somewhat deeply, finding employment for all the faculties of the mind within one's-self, concentrating the mind, so to speak, on itself, is, up to a certain point, hostile to, or exclusive of, that sensibility which the arts of design demand. A metaphysician will hardly make a superior artist, or a superior artist a good metaphysician. The latter is an inward man, who sees but what is within himself, whose eyes, if I may so speak, are turned inwards. The artist and amateur are, on the contrary, all eyes and ears; their mind is spread outwards; colours, forms, situations, are what strike unceasingly, while the philosopher is occupied only with resemblances, differences, generalities, abstractions.

Whether this opposition of the spirit and taste for the fine arts, with the metaphysical and philosophical spirit, be general or not, I avouch that to a certain extent it exists at least in me. Paintings afford me but little pleasure.—*Morellet.*

P. 201, n., c. 2, l. 8.—It is, as you say, very difficult to correct the opinions of your analysts regarding the existence of God and his worship, not because there is any lack of solid reasons for insuring conviction, but because men of that class, while they think their genius is of a high order, are frequently less guided by reason than others; for that part of the mind, to wit, *the imagination*, which is most of all exercised in mathematics, is rather hurtful than helpful in metaphysical speculations.—*Descartes.*

P. 204, l. 3.—But we ought to confide more in the algebraic calculus than in our own judgment.—*Euler.*

P. 206, l. 5.—I doubt not but that I have solved the noble problem, which is, given a disease to discover the remedy. And now I have finished my work.—*Pitcairn.*

P. 223, l. 12.—The poet's mind is not easily moved to covetousness; fond of verses, he studies these alone; he laughs at losses, the abscondings of slaves, fires, &c.—*Horace.*

P. 224, n. *—Never does a love of poesy or poets fall to the share of a mean and low mind; it follows the most divine minds, and is their almost perpetual companion.—*Joseph Scaliger.*

P. 226, n. 1.—Sir, it is not because I am his father, but I may say that I have good grounds for being satisfied with him. He never had a lively imagination, nor that fire of spirit which we observe in some; but that I always looked upon as a happy presage of his judgment. That slowness of comprehension, that sluggishness of imagination, is the mark of a good judgment, to be developed by and by.—*Molière.*

P. 234, l. 12.—Of this society, the gayest, the most animated, the most pleasing in his gaiety, was D'Alembert. After spending the morning in algebraic calculations, and in solving dynamical and astronomical problems, he left his study, like a youth let loose from school, and sought any sort of amusement; and so lively and pleasant was the turn which that mind so luminous, profound, and solid then took, that you forgot the philosopher and savant in the man. This unaffected cheerfulness had its source in a mind at once pure, free from passion, self-contented, and daily experiencing the gratification flowing from the discovery of some new truth, the recompense and crown of his labour; a privilege belonging exclusively to the exact sciences, and which no other kind of study can fully secure.—*Marmontel.*

P. 238, n. 3, l. 3.—They (women) are admitted to possess all talents except invention. This is the opinion of Voltaire, one of those who have shown them most justice, and who knew them best. But this opinion appears to me to be very doubtful. If we compare the number of women who have received a careful and complete education, with the number of men who have had the same advantage, or if we examine the very small number of men of genius who have risen into eminence of themselves, we shall see that the constant

experience alleged in favour of that opinion cannot be regarded as a proof.—*Condorcet.*

P. 241, n., c. 2, l. 13.—Those preceptors deserve worst of youths, who either teach no rules, or at least immediately throw them aside, and boastfully promise that a knowledge of construction can be acquired by the practice of speaking. For they, who do not know the rule, even although they read the examples in the authors of the language, do not nevertheless venture to speak, because they have no certain rule in accordance with which they can arrange the composition of the words. *Wherefore there ought to be the public appointment of penalties against teachers who despise rules*, for care must be given by all means to detain youth in the study of the art itself, until they become perfect grammarians, master-builders in the art of composition, and finished masters.—*Melanchthon.*

P. 242, n., c. 2, l. 7.—The search after abstract and speculative truths, principles, axioms of science, everything of the nature of generalisation, lies beyond the province of women. Their studies should relate to practice; it is their part to make application of the principles which man has discovered, and to make observations that may lead men to the establishment of principles. The whole reflections of women, in as far as these do not immediately relate to their duties, should refer to the study of men or to the pleasures of taste; for works of genius exceed their capacity, nor have they sufficient precision of mind and patience to succeed in the exact sciences; and with regard to the physical sciences, it is for the sex that is most active, most progressive, that embraces at a glance the greatest number of objects, that possesses the highest energy and exercises it the most, to judge of the relations of sensible objects, and of the laws of nature. . . . . The art of thinking is not foreign from women, but they should merely glance at the sciences of reasoning. Sophie thinks, but does not retain much. She makes greatest progress in the science of morals and in matters of taste; as for physics, she but retains some idea of the general laws and of the system of the universe.—*Rousseau.*

P. 243, n., c. 2, l. 10.—Foreigners cannot acquire a perfect acquaintance with those Gallicisms, except by a profound study of the language, and by a continued habit of living among persons who speak with propriety. *The world of quality gave currency to those acceptations of words, and it is from the happy use of them that we discover those*

who have been in the habit of mixing in it. Madame de Sévigné abounds in such Gallicisms, which give to her letters an inexpressible charm.—*Suard.*

P. 224, l. 4.—A president came to see me, with whom I have some business, which I am endeavouring to settle, to hasten my return as much as I can. There was along with him a son of his wife, who was twenty years of age, and whose countenance struck me as being, without exception, among the most pleasing and handsome I had ever seen. I said that I had seen him when he was five or six years old, and that I was surprised how one could grow up, like M. de Montbason, in so short a time. With that there proceeds a frightful voice from that handsome face, which casts in my teeth with an absurd air, the saying, *Ill weeds grow apace.* Forthwith to my eyes he looked a monster. If he had struck me on the head with a club, he could not have given me greater pain. I swore I should never trust to physiognomy more.—*Madame de Sévigné.*

P. 249, l. 2.—A desire to know more than is necessary is a species of intemperance. Furthermore, the undue prosecution of liberal studies makes men intolerable, wordy, absurd, self-sufficient, and little disposed to acquire a knowledge of what is necessary, seeing they are furnished with what is superfluous.—*Seneca.*

P. 249, l. 8.—A great memory means a great power of embracing at once, and in rapid succession, many different ideas. This facility is unfavourable to the calm comparison of a small number of ideas, which the mind ought, so to speak, to contemplate without wavering. That, in my opinion, is the reason why judgment and a great memory are so rarely found together. A head stored with a vast number of things that are totally unlike, resembles a library of odd volumes. It is like one of those German compilations, bristling all over, without judgment or taste, with Hebrew, Arabic, Greek, and Latin, which, already of great bulk, are still being enlarged, will continue to increase, and thus go on from bad to worse; or one of those magazines filled with analyses and criticisms of works which the reviewer did not understand; warehouses of mixed goods, the list of which alone is properly his; or a commentary, where we often meet with what we do not seek, rarely with that of which we are in quest, the things we really need being almost always mislaid amid the heaps of trifles.—*Diderot.*

P. 250, motto.—The actions of the brutes form, perhaps, one of

the most profound abysses which our reason essays to fathom; and I feel surprised that so few are aware of this fact.—*Bayle.*

P. 254, n., l. 18.—But how does our will draw all those nerves? By means of an agent, in appearance the simplest, the least material, that can be, and which is, in some sort, intermediate between body and mind—a liquid with which the nerves are filled, and which we call *animal spirits.* We should look upon them as a very light ethereal liquid, composed of molecules, gathered together by their resemblance (or affinity), so as to attract each other, as the loadstone attracts iron; and so fine that the most powerful microscopes have as yet failed to render them visible. It is by a train of those spirits that the nerves become the seat of sensation and motion, as we have already said.

Those animal spirits are not contained in the nerves alone; they likewise occupy the cavities of the brain, the spinal marrow, and the muscular fibres. They are without doubt elastic, according to the opinions of the most eminent natural philosophers, and, consequently, susceptible of rarefication, and of filling a much larger space than in their ordinary state. But when the animal spirits contained in the nerves chance to expand, the nerves themselves must necessarily be enlarged; consequently, they must also contract. In contracting, they raise up the diaphragm and the other muscles to which they are attached; these latter elevate the chest, and thence arises the whole process of breathing on occasion of the will.

The reader will find more ample details as to the animal spirits, their existence, their different kinds, and the manner in which they move, in the *Anatomical Essays* of a celebrated man (M. Lieutaud), who is deserving of the elevated position he has recently reached.—*Court de Gebelin.*

P. 261, n., c. 1, l. 1.—The most remarkable thing of all is the sight of the hen, when having hatched ducklings from eggs placed under her, she, in the first place, is uncertain about the brood being her own; then anxiously calls together her doubtful progeny; and, lastly, is seen lamenting round the pond, where the ducklings, by natural impulse, are diving beneath the water.—*Pliny.*

P. 267, n., c. 1, l. 8.—There is something admirable in the ordinary means men take to prevent themselves from falling; for no sooner does the body tend to fall over on one side, than is the equilibrium re-established by an instantaneous counter-motion. This is

commonly attributed to a *natural instinct*, but it must necessarily be ascribed to *an art* perfected by practice.

Children in their earliest years know nothing of this art; they acquire by little and little a perfect mastery of it, because they are perpetually called on to practise it. So familiar does the practice become, that in course of time it is performed almost without thinking, just as a musician plies his fingers, according to the rules of his art, while he is hardly conscious of bestowing any attention on their movements.—*Gravesande.*

P. 271, n. 3, l. 6.—

What taught the parrot to cry, Hail?
What taught the chattering pie his tale?
Hunger, that sharpener of the wits,
Which gives ev'n fools some thinking fits.
Persius (Drummond.)

P. 271, n. 3, l. 12.—Nor are rewards of less importance in the management of animals; for a person proffering food to a hungry animal will obtain from it what otherwise he could never have extorted. Food is the great instrument to be given in abundance when the animal obeys, to be withheld when it refuses.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 272, n., c. 2, l. 4.—The mule of the philosopher Thales, being laden with salt, and having to cross a brook, plunged in with its load to lighten it, having once before fallen in by accident and found that such was the result. Afterwards, however, when laden with wool, it did not repeat the process. . . .

How can all those things be done without [mental] discourse and ratiocination, conjunction, and division? To fail of observing that is to show a lack of these qualities.—*Charron.*

P. 276, l. 7.—Imitations of human life.—*Aristotle.*

P. 279, n., c. 1, l. 7.—Finally, this doctrine of automata is the one which M. Pascal most esteemed in the philosophy of Descartes.—*Baillet.*

P. 279, n., c. 1, l. 20.—See above, vol. i. p. 375, l. 18.

P. 279, n., c. 2, l. 17.—They (the lower animals) have apparently eaten the forbidden hay.—*Malebranche.*

P. 279, n., c. 2, l. 26.—This opinion (Descartes') regarding animals is *a debauch of reasoning.*—*La Motte.*

P. 285, n., c. 1, l. 7.—There have been men without arms, in

whose case the defect of organisation was compensated for by a wonderful dexterity of feet, shoulders, &c. Ambroise Paré mentions a man of forty years of age, without arms, to be seen at Paris, and who, by means of his shoulders, head, and neck, performed the part of hands; he committed robbery and murder, and was hanged.—Notice of the Works of *Gaspar Schott*.

P. 285, n., c. 2, l. 6.—For when he had seated himself in a higher position, on a level with the surface of the table on which his food was placed, he took hold of a knife with his feet, cut a loaf and the rest of his food. Then, using his feet as hands, he reached drink to his mouth. After finishing his meal, he drew, with his feet, in our presence, Latin and German characters so uncommonly elegant, that we carried with us copies of them. At our request he made pens very well suited for writing with, which he gave us as presents.—*Camenarius*.

P. 290, n., c. 2, l. 4.—Analogy is founded on the probability that like things have causes of the same kind, and produce the same effects. The more perfect the similarity, the greater the probability. Thus we judge with perfect assurance, that beings provided with similar organs, executing similar functions and communicating with each other, experience similar sensations, and are actuated by like desires. The probability that those animals whose organs approach in likeness to our own, experience analogous sensations, though somewhat inferior to that relative to individuals of our own species, is still extremely great; and it has required all the influence of religious prejudice to lead some philosophers to think that animals are pure automata. The probability of the existence of sensation decreases in proportion as the similarity of the organs with ours diminishes; but it is always very strong, even as regards insects. When we see insects of the same species perform highly complex operations, in precisely the same manner, from generation to generation, and that without instruction, we are induced to believe that they act by a species of affinity analogous to that which unites the molecules of crystals, but which, being fused with the sensation attached to every animal organisation, produces, with the regularity of chemical combinations, combinations much more wonderful. This mingling of elective affinities with sensation might perhaps be named *animal affinity*. Although there subsists a great analogy between the organization of plants and animals, it does not appear to me to be sufficient to warrant us in extending to vege-

tables the faculty of sensation; while, on the other hand, there is nothing to authorise the denial of it.—*Laplace.*

P. 295, n., c. 1, l. 12.—The brutes conclude from singulars to universals, from the sight of one man they know all men, &c.—*Charron.*

P. 295, n., c. 2, l. 21.—M. Fred. Cuvier, who examined with great care the young orang-outang that was brought to Europe alive, establishes the point that he is capable of generalising and abstracting by the power of reasoning.—*Chev. de Lamarck.*

P. 296, l. 19.—Although the difficulties that encompass all these questions should leave some field of dispute as to the difference between man and the animals, there is another specific quality which distinguishes man, and concerning which there can be no room for controversy, that is, the power of progressing towards perfection; a faculty which, with the help of circumstances, develops in succession all the others, and is found among us both in the species and in the individual; while, on the other hand, an animal is, at the end of a certain number of months, that which it will be all its lifetime; and its species, at the end of a thousand years, what it was the first year of the thousand.—*Rousseau.*

P. 297, l. 3.—We must distinguish two kinds of perfectibility, the one barren and limited to the education of the individual, and the other productive, extending over the entire species, and as far as it is cultivated by the institutions of society. None of the animals is susceptible of the latter kind of perfectibility, they are to-day what they have been, what they always will be, and nothing more; because, as their education is purely individual, they can but transmit to their offspring what they themselves inherited from their parents. Man, on the other hand, receives instruction from all ages, he gathers together all the instructions of other men, and is able, by a judicious employment of his time, to take advantage of every moment of the education of his race, in order daily to advance its perfection. What regret, then, ought we not to feel when we recall those disastrous ages in which barbarism not only arrested our progress, but drove us back to the state of imperfection from which we had emerged! Without these unfortunate vicissitudes the human race might have marched on, and would still be constantly progressing towards that glorious perfection, which is the most splendid mark of its superiority, and which alone can constitute its happiness.—*Buffon.*

P. 299, n., c. 1, l. 21.—It cannot, then, be denied that the brutes

possess perception, memory, judgment, and habit; and habit itself is nothing else than a judgment that comes to us so readily from having been frequently repeated, that we act upon it before we are aware that it has been formed in the mind. It appears to us even that the same faculties we perceive in children are observable in brutes; the only difference being that the child improves his condition, and improves it in proportion as he learns to speak; that is, as he forms general ideas from individual sensations, and as he learns to express abstract ideas by conventional signs. It is, besides, only at this epoch that his remembrance of facts becomes distinct. Historical memory and reasoning have the same origin and instrument; that instrument is abstract language.

How is it that the animal is not susceptible of the same advancement as the child? How is it that it never attains to abstract terms, nor reflection, nor a detailed remembrance of facts, nor a series of complex reasoning, nor the transmission of acquired experience? or, which is the same thing, why does each individual find its intelligence enclosed in limits so narrow, and why is it compelled to keep turning round in precisely the same circle as the individuals of its species that have gone before it? We shall see in the article *Animal* that the grand differences which distinguish the species, are quite sufficient to explain the differences of their faculties; but is there any difference of that sort which can explain the vast distance existing, as far as concerns intelligence, between man and the most perfect of the animals, whilst their organisations correspond so nearly?—*Cuvier.*

P. 304, l. 28.—To prepare for examination, and interrogate one born blind, would have been an occupation not unworthy of the united talents of Newton, Descartes, Locke, and Leibnitz.—*Diderot.*

P. 338, l. 30.—Others of the deaf I did not endeavour to teach to speak, but only to enable them moderately to understand what is written, and, to some extent, to express their own thoughts in writing,—attainments which they speedily made, besides acquiring an acquaintance with numerous objects, much beyond what was to be looked for in persons placed in their circumstances, and giving plain proofs of a capacity which, if more fully cultivated, always by writing, would have made still higher acquirements.—*Wallis.*

P. 373, n. A, l. 12.—When one sees a man, it behoves him immediately to imagine himself with nose, hair, countenance, forehead, and accent like the person, and then whatever affections and thoughts in that state of consciousness occur to him, he concludes that they are proper to that man, whom he thus contemplates by imagination. This process is not without ground in reason and experience; for the mind forms the body, and forms it according to the innate affections, and by it gives expression to them.—*Campanella.*

P. 374, l. 20.—This curious book (Gaffarel's) was thrice issued from the press within six months; twice at Paris, and once in another unnamed city of France.—*Leo Allatius.*

P. 375, n. C, l. 18.—See above, vol. i. p. 592, l. 20.

P. 378, n. D, l. 6.—Nature, which has given the capacity of tears, confesses that she has bestowed the tenderest heart on man. This is the best part of our power of feeling.—*Juvenal.*

P. 378, n. D, l. 11.—I do not think that *facetus* means merely that which excites laughter; for, in that case, Horace would not have said that the kind of poetry called *facetum* was given by nature to Virgil. I consider the term to refer more to grace and refined elegance.—*Quintilian.*

P. 378, n. D, l. 26.—I am of opinion that, for irony and dissimulation, Socrates far excelled all others in the wit and genius which he showed. *This kind of humour is very refined.—Cicero.*

P. 378, n., c. 1, l. 5.—And this too should be observed, that everything that is ridiculous is not *facetum* (witty). For what can be so ridiculous as a buffoon? &c.—*Cicero.*

P. 379, l. 1.—Now and then that of a graceful rallier who curbs the force of his pleasantry, and weakens it on purpose.—*Horace.*

P. 379, n. E, l. 1.—There can be no doubt that it is by touch we obtain our notions of distance; when the blind patient of Cheselden recovered his sight, all objects appeared to him to be in his eyes, at least so it is said. But the perceptions that may arise from touch, so far as they relate to the forms of bodies, depend not only on the sensibility of the organs, but also on their structure, on their mechanism. In this respect, the superiority of man over the majority of the animals is immense. It is easy to explain how experience enables man to observe and distinguish the forms of bodies; he has the power of feeling them by all his senses, and he can in infancy, without danger, owing to the surveillance and protection of his parents, inform him-

self regarding them by repeated trials. The animals whose claws are enveloped in horn, and whose bodies are clothed with thick teguments, and who are almost entirely left to themselves from the first moment of their existence, do not come under this theory; and we find numerous mammiferous animals, as well as many birds in that condition, which yet perceive distances with at least as much accuracy as ourselves. It was, therefore, important to investigate the origin of those perceptions. *With that design I have joined together a variety of observations, which demonstrate that, in a great many instances, the phenomenon is* INSTINCTIVE; *for many animals, on first opening their eyes to the light, see in succession objects out of their eyes, and even at their real distance; they flee from them, shun them, and conduct themselves in regard to them, precisely as if their experience had been perfected by prolonged usage.* The nature of this memoir does not permit my entering in detail on those observations, which I will make public some time hence in a work specially devoted to the investigation of the origin of the actions of animals.—*Frederic Cuvier.*

P. 381, n. F, l. 28.—Of all those insects, the bee is the one whose instinct is the most perfect, the only one which has no carnivorous propensities, and whose existence is a blessing to nature; the others are born for destruction. It appears, on the contrary, to be formed to secure the fecundation of vegetables, by transporting from one to another the pollen of their flowers, which the winds of themselves would not have scattered with equal certainty. . . .

Although the instinct of those insects is subjected to a uniform law, there are, nevertheless, extraordinary cases in which, for the safety of their race, they vary their procedure. The Author of nature foresaw those particular circumstances, and has permitted the instinct to be modified by them, as far as that was necessary to the permanence of the societies which it had formed. It is thus that, in order to repair the loss of female bees, the only hope of their societies, it teaches the neuter bees to transform the larva of an individual of their species, which is not more than three days old, into a larva of a queen or female; it is thus, also, that the species of solitary bee (*osmie du pavot*), which clothes the interior of the habitation of its offspring with a hanging formed of rounded bits of the petals of the wild poppy, employs for the same purpose, when deprived of the poppy, the petals of the flower rapeseed. On those occasions, it is manifest that the in-

ternal feeling which guides the insect consciously adapts itself to the necessity.

The societies of which we have as yet spoken are all of them composed of individuals of the same species; but two sorts of ants, called by the names *ruddy* and *sanguine*, present, in this aspect, a very extraordinary fact, the observation of which is due to M. Huber, the son. The societies of those insects are mixed; we find among them, besides the three ordinary classes of individuals, neuters sprung from one or even two other species of ants, carried off from their homes in the larva or chrysalis state. The neuters of the ruddy species constitute a nation of warriors, and hence the names of Amazons, Legionaries, under which M. Huber has designated them. As soon as the heat of the day begins to decline, if the weather is favourable, and regularly at the same hour, at least during several consecutive days, those ants leave their nests, advance in close column, and in greater and less numbers, according to the population, direct their march towards the ant-hill which they mean to invade, force an entrance in face of the resistance of the occupiers, seize with their jaws the larvæ or nymphæ of the neuter ants of the place, and transport them, in the same order as they advanced, to their own domicile. Other neuter ants of the conquered race, born among those warriors, and sometimes also carried forcibly off in the state of larvæ from their native soil, take charge of the larvæ newly imported, as well as of the posterity of their spoilers. Those foreign ants, which M. Huber compares to negro slaves and helots, belong to the two species which, in my history of those insects, I have called *the dark ash-coloured* and *the miners*.

The amazons lay hold indifferently of either of those species. I witnessed one of their military excursions in the year 1802. The army traversed one of our great routes, occupying the breadth of the way with a front of about two feet. I attributed these movements to a forced emigration. Meanwhile, from the form of the species, I had already suspected, before M. Huber published his narrative, that its habits were peculiar. I have since discovered this ant in the woods around Paris, and all the facts alleged by that naturalist have been verified. I will now endeavour to give an explanation of them, and to show that they are in harmony with the other laws already known. The neuter ants carried off by the warriors of the tribe of amazons are merely expatriated, and their condition is in no way changed.

Always free, always destined for the same employment, they find in another family the objects that would have attached them to their own, and even young of their own species, which they rear as well as those of their victors. Do not several of our domestic birds afford us examples of similar adoptions, and do we not see them mistaken in the object of their maternal affection? The neuter ants are neither slaves nor helots. In order to diminish certain races and propagate others, nature, always faithful to the principle of action and reaction, intended that numerous animals should live at the expense of certain others. The multiplied species of insects furnish us with abundant proof of this position. It is thus that among bees, those that form the nomad class deposit their eggs in the cells which the other bees have prepared for their young, and the provision which the latter class had amassed becomes the prey of the posterity of the nomads. These sorts of thefts would have proved insufficient for insects which, like the amazonian ants, are united in great corporations; the provisions would speedily have become exhausted. The only sure protection against this was to appropriate for themselves the individuals that gather the harvest, and so to profit not merely by the labours of a day, but of a lifetime. Moreover, it was physically impossible for the amazonian ants, from the construction of their jaws and the accessory parts of their mouth, to prepare habitations for their family, to procure food for it, and to bring it up. Their large jaws, of a hook-like form, announce that they are destined only for the fight. Their societies are not numerous, whereas those of the dark ash-coloured ants and the miners are very abundant in our climate. By their parasitical habits, those amazonian ants throw an obstacle in the way of the too wide spread of the latter, and re-establish the equilibrium.

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From all that I have now laid down, I experience gratification in inferring that the laws which regulate the societies of insects, those even that appear to be most anomalous, constitute a system connected by the profoundest wisdom, and established from the first. My mind is elevated in religious awe to that Eternal Reason, who, by bestowing existence on so many diverse beings, designed to perpetuate their generations, by means certain and invariable in their execution, concealed from our feeble intelligence, but always admirable.—*Latreille.*

P. 384, l. 41.—See *Works*, vol. iv. p. 288, l. 2.

P. 386, n. H, l. 36.—We must wholly steer clear of the vulgar error, that a rational soul cannot inhabit a body which is unlike our own. This belief has led almost all nations, and also some philosophers, to ascribe the human form to the gods. But who does not see that it arises from weakness and prejudice? Nor is the other conviction better founded, which attributes pre-eminent beauty to the human body, since this depends entirely on opinion and custom, and that affection which a provident nature has implanted in all animals, whereby they are most attached to their own kind. Those convictions, however, prevail so far that, I am persuaded, we could not look without a feeling of disgust on any animal which should be very unlike man, and should, at the same time, manifest the powers of reason and speech. For if we but imagine or picture to ourselves a creature which, in other respects like a man, has a neck of four times the usual length, and circular eyes, and double the usual space between, we shall have a form which we cannot look upon without aversion, though no reason can be given why we think it deformed.—*Huygens.*

P. 387, l. 4.—The ape, the vilest beast, how like to us!—*Ennius.*

P. 387, n. I, l. 9.—There is a part of our body the sound state of which is a condition of thought; we think but with that organ, as we see but with the eye. Let it be observed that that is simply a fact of natural history, which has nothing in common with the metaphysical system named Materialism,—a system the flimsiness of which is increased by the circumstance that we have as yet much less knowledge of the essence of matter than of the conscious subject, and which, consequently, throws light on none of the difficulties attending that profound mystery.

The nature of the sensitive and intellectual principle does not lie within the province of natural history; but the inquiries as to the point of the body at which the physical agents that are the occasion of sensation come into contact with it, and as to the point at which those agents that produce voluntary movements take their rise, in order that those sensations and movements may take place, are questions of pure anatomy. It is this common point, the term of our passive relations, and the source of our active relations with external objects, which is denominated the seat of the soul, or *sensorium commune.*

. . . . . .

The conclusion is obvious that the *sensorium* of which we are in

quest must lie in the brain. But it is not so easy to determine the part of the brain which is specially set apart for this important function. That organ, the activity of which is totally suspended on the slightest compression, may lose considerable portions of its substance without any observable enfeebling of its functions. It is not, therefore, the entire brain which constitutes the *sensorium commune*, but only certain of its parts. The question is, Which are those?

Here experience can conduct us but a little way. Wounds that penetrate deeply into the substance of the brain, produce disorders of the animal economy, both too violent and too sudden to allow us to discriminate with precision the effects proper to each.

It has been believed, indeed, that injuries of the cerebellum arrested the vital and involuntary motions, such as those of the heart, and that injuries received by the brain exercised their principal influence on the animal and voluntary movements; but this observation is not confirmed. Recourse has thus been necessarily had to reasoning, and hence the diversity of opinions.

It was natural at first to seek this central point in some place at which the nerves seemed to meet together; but as there is no such point, and as the eye can trace the nerves only up to points still remote from each other, imagination has traced the remainder of their course. Some accordingly have supposed that they all reached the cerebellum; others have fixed their termination point in the pineal gland, and others in the *corpus callosum*.

Descartes took the side of the pineal gland, and has rendered that little body celebrated; but there is little probability that it should discharge functions so high, because it is subject to frequent changes, and almost always contains stony concretions. Bontekoe (?), Lancisi, and Lapeyronie are advocates of the *corpus callosum;* but that part is wanting in all non-mammiferous animals, and we must suppose the *sensorium commune* to be an essential part, and the last to disappear or change its form.

The same objection holds against the *septum lucidum* of Digby.

Lastly, with regard to the cerebellum, the claims of which have been upheld by Drelincourt, there is this grand difficulty, that it is almost the only part of the brain to which we do not clearly see any nerve pass.

Nor can we regard with more favour any double part as the seat of the mind, such as the *corpora striata*, for which Willis has declared;

and the two grand hemispheres, or rather their medullary part, called the oval centre, and defended by Vieussens. *Furthermore, Sœmmering appears to us to have perfectly established the position, that no solid part is fitted for this important function.* It would appear, in fact, that the nerves must act by conducting some fluid towards the brain or muscles, and that the corporeal subject affected by the arrival or departure of the fluids of the different nerves, must itself be a fluid in order to be susceptible of mechanical or chemical modifications, as rapid and varied as are the different states which the modifications occasion in the mind. *It is from this point of view that Sœmmering regards the humour contained in the ventricles of the brain, as the real organ of the mind.—Cuvier.*

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P. 23, l. 22.—If, however, in anything my belief has been misplaced, or if I have fallen asleep when I should have been watching, and shown remissness of attention, or if I have failed by the way, and prematurely broken off the process of investigation, nevertheless, *by the modes of research I have adopted, I so present things naked and open*, that my errors can be observed and distinguished from the truth, and the continuation also of my labours rendered easy from the clearing away of hindrances.—*Bacon.*

P. 26, n., c. 1, l. 11.—The empire of man consists in knowledge alone; *for his power extends no farther than he knows:* nor can any power of his break through the chain of natural causes, for nature can only be subdued by being obeyed.—*Bacon.*

P. 26, n., c. 1, l. 19.—Man, as the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands as much as he has observed of the order of nature, whether in the ordinary course of things, or by the application to them of his mind; nor does he know, nor is he capable of more. For no power of his can loosen or break through the chain of causes, nor can nature be subdued otherwise than by being obeyed. Wherefore those double ends of man, *Science and Power, are in reality identical;* and the frustration of labour is chiefly due to an ignorance of causes.—*Bacon.*

P. 38, l. 9.—It will not be foreign from our purpose to distinguish the three kinds, and, as it were, grades of ambition. The first is that of those who seek to enlarge their own power in their country, which is a vulgar and ignoble kind. The second is that of men who strive to increase and extend the power and empire of their country over mankind,—a more dignified, indeed, but not less grasping passion than the other. But if any one should seek to restore and enlarge the power and dominion of the human race over the universe, that doubtless were a healthier and nobler ambition, if indeed such a desire be not in its nature too elevated to receive the name. Now the dominion of man over things is founded on the arts and sciences alone, FOR NATURE CAN ONLY BE COMMANDED BY BEING OBEYED.

Besides, if the utility of any particular invention has so impressed men as to lead them to consider him greater than man, who has thus laid the whole race under obligation, how much more elevated will that discovery appear, which opens the way to all other discoveries? —*Bacon.*

P. 38, n. 1, l. 5.—Everything here is going on well, except that the dog-days are coming at full speed, and there is no escaping their hurtful effects; wretched beings that we are, we can but observe, not subdue nature.—*Napoleon Bonaparte.*

P. 40, l. 15.—But it should be borne in mind, that in this our Organum we treat of logic, not of philosophy. As our logic, however, teaches and instructs the intellect, not how it may catch at and seize abstractions, by the small hooks of the mind as it were, like the popular kind, but how it may truly penetrate nature and discover the properties and acts of bodies, and the fixed laws of their substance (so that our science has its source not only *in the constitution of the mind, but in the nature of things*); it is not wonderful if it have been throughout interspersed and illustrated with natural observations and experiments, in exemplification of our method.—*Bacon.*

P. 40, l. 34.—Another error is that, after the distribution of particular arts and sciences, men have abandoned universality, or *philosophia prima*, which cannot but cease and stop all progression, for no perfect discoveries can be made upon a flat or a level; neither is it possible to discover the more remote and deeper parts of any science, if you stand but upon the level of the same science, and ascend not [as it were the watch-tower of] a higher science.—*Bacon* (*Adv. of Learning*).

P. 42, l. 22.—Again, some, without meaning to object, may be in doubt as to whether we speak of perfecting natural philosophy by one method, or the other sciences also, as logic, ethics, politics. We undoubtedly mean to apply what we have said to the whole. Precisely as common logic, the end of which is the regulation of matter by the syllogism, extends not only to the natural sciences, but to all others, so does our logic, whose ruling principle is induction, comprehend them all. For we prepare a history and tables of invention for *anger*, *fear*, and *shame*, and the like, as also for examples in civil affairs, and the mental operations of *memory*, *composition*, and *division*, *judgment*, and the rest, just as we do for *heat* and *cold*, *light*, *vegetation*, and the like.—*Bacon.*

P. 43, n., c. 1, l. 10.—Reflection, setting out from immediate ideas, may pursue two different routes; it may either compare the qualities of bodies, and then proceeding from abstraction to abstraction, it may reach the simplest notions, those of *quantity;* or it may trace back those operations that were concerned in the formation of ideas, and thus remount to the elements of *metaphysics.* These two sciences, *geometry* and *metaphysics*, although analogous, are thus the two extreme and opposite terms of our knowledge. Between them lies a vast field, *the abyss of uncertainty, and the theatre of discoveries.* —*D'Alembert.*

P. 46, l. 21.—Almost all that is contained in precepts is due to ingenious men; but this more in the way of chance than of science. And, therefore, we must provide instruction and observation, that those things we sometimes meet with by chance may be always in our power, and designedly applied by us as often as occasion demands. —*Aquila Romanus.*

P. 50, l. 17.—See above, vol. ii. p. 82, l. 10.

P. 56, l. 9.—It is the part of great genius to withdraw the mind from the impressions of sense, and to conduct its course of thought out of the beaten track of custom.—*Cicero.*

P. 56, n. 1, c. 2, l. 4.—*Consciousness* is an English word, with which I confess I find nothing synonymous in our language. It is the power of apprehending what passes on in our mind. I have substituted for it in one place the term *sentiment*, or *sentiment intime*, in another *conscience*, or *conscience psychologique*, according as the accessory determination best served to obviate ambiguity.—*Prévost.*

P. 66, n., c. 1, l. 13.—Besides, the author of the *Essay on the*

Origin of Human Knowledge (Condillac), judiciously remarks, whether we elevate our minds to the skies, or descend into the depths, we never go out of ourselves, and it is but our own thought we apprehend; now, such is the conclusion of the first dialogue of Berkeley, and the foundation of his whole system.—*Diderot.*

P. 66, n., c. 2, l. 6.—Extravagant system that could, as appears to me, be the work only of the blind; a system which, to the disgrace of human reason and philosophy, is the most difficult to refute, although the most absurd of all.—*Diderot.*

P. 69, n. 1, l. 1.—According to Leibnitz, the soul is a concentration, a living mirror of the whole universe, having within itself confused ideas of the whole modifications of the world, present, past, and future, &c. &c.—*Voltaire.*

P. 78, n., c. 1, l. 8.—*Innate ideas* are a chimæra which experience disowns; but the manner in which we acquire sensations and the ideas of reflection, although a fact vouched for by the same experience, is not less incomprehensible.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 88, n. 1.—What proof one might be able to adduce, if it should be asked now at the present moment, whether we are asleep, and all our thoughts are but dreams, or whether we are awake and in reality discuss with each other.—*Plato.*

P. 105, n. 2, l. 8.—Would it not be natural to suppose that children imagine that what they cease to see has ceased to exist, the more so as their pleasure appears mixed with surprise when objects of which they have lost sight chance to reappear? Nurses assist them in acquiring the notion of the continued existence of absent individuals, by the little game of covering and suddenly revealing the face. They have thus, a hundred times in a quarter of an hour, the experience that what ceases to be seen does not cease to exist. Whence it follows, that it is to experience we owe the belief of the continued existence of objects.—*Voltaire.*

P. 107, l. 3.—Material objects in themselves are merely well-regulated phenomena. . . . . If bodies were mere phenomena, the senses would not, therefore, be deceived; for neither do the senses pronounce aught regarding metaphysical matters. The veracity of the senses lies in this, that phenomena be mutually harmonious, and we not deceived by the events, when we fairly follow reasons founded on experiments.—*Leibnitz.*

P. 107, n. *, l. 5.—Although this whole life were said to be but a

dream, and the visible world a phantasm, I should call it, be it dream or phantasm, real, if, etc. . . . . Wherefore we have no absolute proof of the existence of bodies, nor is there aught to prevent the supposition *that certain well-ordered visions* are presented to our mind. —*Leibnitz.*

P. 107, n. *, l. 21.—All bodies, with all their qualities, might be nothing more than *well-grounded phenomena*, as the rainbow or the image in a mirror, in a word, *connected dreams in perfect harmony with each other.—Leibnitz.*

P. 118, n. 1, c. 2, l. 15.—Nor is that a recent fault, as I find from Livy that there was a certain teacher in his day who bid his pupils *darken* what they said, employing the Greek σκότισον; from whom, I should suppose, proceeded that extraordinary eulogy,—*So much the better; even I myself cannot understand it.—Quintilian.*

P. 118, n. 1, c. 2, l. 23.—In writing, I have always endeavoured to understand myself.—*Fontenelle.*

P. 120, n.—All the philosophers of France of this age have gloried in ranking themselves among the disciples of Locke, and in acknowledging his principles.—*Degerando.*

P. 122, n. 4, l. 5.—Deceived by the novelty of an expression that seems to have a secret charm for him, comprehending all the operations of the mind under the common designation *transformed sensation*, Condillac thinks he has restored to facts a simplicity which he but gave to terms. . . . . This remark has been made by M. Prévost, in the notes of his memoir on *signs;* by M. Maine-Biran, in his treatise on *Habit*, &c. The abuse of words implied in it is so apparent, that one is astonished to find it repeated since by very well informed writers.—*Degerando.*

P. 123, n., c. 2, l. 6.—In sensible images is the intelligible.—*Aristotle.*

P. 128, n. 1, c. 2, l. 1.—To think is always to feel (*sentir*), and it is nothing but to feel. . . . We do nothing but *feel* and *conclude*, which latter is still *feeling.—Destutt-Tracy.*

P. 130, n., l. 1.—The ideas of *God*, *existence*, and *thought* resemble, it is said, no sensation. Nevertheless they are undoubtedly in the mind; they must, therefore, come from another source than the senses, and consequently *must be placed immediately in the mind.* This doctrine was taught in the schools of France almost up to the end of last century.—*Degerando.*

P. 131, n., c. 2, l. 4.—See above, vol. i. p. 146, l. 3.

P. 139, n. 1, l. 15.—I have, as I think, discovered the solution of all those problems in the association of ideas, whether with signs or with each other.—*Condillac.*

P. 147, n. 1, l. 9.—Zeno the Stoic thought the mind was fire. . . . The most recent is Aristoxenus, both musician and philosopher. He holds a certain intension of the body itself, like what is called *harmony* in music, to be the soul. Thus, from the nature and figure of the body, various motions are excited after the manner of sounds from an instrument. He carried his art into philosophy.—*Cicero.*

P. 160, n., c. 1, l. 7.—That is to say, to be able to distinguish a right line from a curve.—*Horace.*

P. 163, l. 21.—*Anima* is from *animus*. . . . *Animus*, again, is from the Greek Ἄνεμος, said to be for Ἄεμος, from Ἄω or Ἄημι, the same as Πνέω, *I breathe;* . . . and with the Latins, from *spirando, spiritus*. . . . Ψυχὴ also is from Ψύχω, which Hesychius explains by Πνέω.—*Vossius.*

P. 163, n. 2, l. 10.—See above, vol. i. p. 459, n., c. 2, l. 20.

P. 164, l. 22.—Whether the mind be air or fire I know not, nor am I ashamed when ignorant to confess that I am so. If in any other obscure matter I were able positively to assert anything, I should swear that the mind, be it air or fire, is divine.—*Cicero.*

P. 165, n., c. 1, l. 5.—

Know, first, that heaven, and earth's compacted frame,
And flowing waters, and the starry frame,
And both the radiant lights, one common soul
Inspires and feeds and animates the whole.
This active mind, infused through all the space,
Unites and mingles with the mighty mass.
Hence men and beasts the breath of life obtain,
And birds of air, and monsters of the main.
Th' ethereal vigour is in all the same;
And every soul is filled with equal flame.—*Virgil* (Dryden).

P. 165, n., c. 1, l. 19.—

All have their manes, and those manes bear:
The few, so cleansed, to these abodes repair,
And breathe, in ample fields, the soft Elysian air.
Then are they happy, when by length of time
The scurf is worn away of each committed crime;

No speck is left of their habitual stains;
But the pure ether of the soul remains.

Virgil (Dryden).

P. 166, l. 9.—Quintessence of atom, extract of light.—*La Fontaine.*

P. 172, l. 10.—See *Works*, vol. i. p. 67, l. 19.

P. 173, n. 2.—A philosophical grammarian would desire to see the abandonment, in metaphysical and didactic discussions, of figurative expressions, as far as that is possible; such phrases, for example, as that one idea *encloses* another, the *union* and *separation* of ideas, and the like. There can be no doubt that when we purpose to render sensible ideas that are purely intellectual, frequently imperfect, obscure, fugitive, and, so to speak, half-hatched, we are but too painfully conscious of the inadequacy of the terms we are obliged to employ for that end, and often of their tendency to suggest false notions. Nothing, therefore, could be more reasonable than to banish, as much as possible, figurative expressions from metaphysical discussions. But in order entirely to dispense with them, it would be necessary to create a special language, which no one would understand. The shortest way is to adhere to the language in common use, taking care not to suffer its modes of speech to pervert our judgments.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 178, n., l. 3.—(Usage) in whose power is the decision, the right and standard of language.—*Horace.*

P. 181, n., c. 1, l. 1.—So rarely does the etymology of a word coincide with its true acceptation, that we cannot vindicate those researches by the pretext that we thereby more accurately determine the meaning of words. The best linguists are the writers who commit the most improprieties. Too much taken up with the old significance of a term, they forget its present meaning, and are insensible to the shades in which lie the grace and force of composition.—*De Rivarol.*

P. 188, n., c. 1, l. 2.—When once a mode of speaking has come to be habitually employed by good authors, we should not busy ourselves in dissecting it, or in cavilling over it, as is the custom with many, but should allow ourselves to be carried along with the stream, and speak, like the rest, without condescending to listen to the pickers of phrases.—*Vaugelas.*

P. 193, l. 1.—Taste, in general, consists in the perception of rela-

tions. A beautiful picture, poem, or piece of music give pleasure only by the relations which we observe in them.—*Diderot.*

P. 199, n. 1.—Into the midst of the field, into the dust and clamour, into the camp, and military array of the forum.—*Cicero.*

P. 199, l. 19.—That since we are separated by an *interval* of space and time, I may hold intercourse with you as often as I can by letter.—*Cicero.*

P. 199, n. 2, l. 4.—We can take note of the number of drops as they fall, seeing they are separated by *intervals*.—*Cicero.*

Grief, if long, is light: for it allows *intervals*, and relaxes.

Behold what an *interval* is interposed between the counsels of our ancestors and the folly of those parties.—*Cicero.*

No one ever filled up the *intervals* of business by a more elegant leisure than this Scipio.—*Paterculus.*

P. 206, l. 12.—

More beautiful than the pale ivy—
O beautiful boy, trust not too much to complexion.—*Virgil.*

P. 206, l. 22.—

Begin: since here the turf supplies our seat,
And the soft mead strews flowers beneath our feet,
And forest glades their greenest livery wear,
And nature's freshest beauties deck the year.

Virgil (Wrangham).

P. 206, n.—See how many colours the beautiful earth sends up.—*Propertius.*

P. 207, l. 11.—

Whatever she does, whithersoever she goes,
Grace unseen attends her, and arranges her attire.

A secret grace her every act improves,
And pleasing follows wheresoe'er she moves.

Tibullus (Grainger.)

P. 215, n., c. 1, l. 5.—To this is added, that the liquids of honey and milk are moved about in the mouth, the tongue experiencing a pleasant sensation; but, on the contrary, the bitter substance of wormwood and wild centaury convulse the palate with a revolting taste; so that you may easily perceive that those things which are agreeable to the senses consist of smooth and round elements; but that, on the other hand, whatever things are experienced to be

bitter and rough are held together by particles more hacked; and that from this cause they are wont to tear open their way to the seat of sensation, and wound the body by their entrance.—*Lucretius.*

P. 227, l. 18.—Nothing can be richer in uses, nothing more beautiful in appearance than a highly dressed field.—*Cicero.*

P. 234, n., c. 2, l. 8.—Seliane, when young, had been pretty (jolie) and fine-looking (belle). She was still fine-looking, but she was losing her prettiness.—*Marmontel.*

A woman can hardly be handsome (belle) except in one way, but she is pretty (jolie) in a hundred thousand.—*Montesquieu.*

P. 235, l. 26.—He veiled his head, and left every one to form his own picture of the features.—*Quintilian.*

P. 235, l. 28.—In all his works much more is left to be supplied by the imagination than is painted.—*Pliny.*

P. 237, n., c. 1, l. 4.—

Hence, my poor goats, once happy creatures, hence,
No more shall I, in rustic indolence,
From some green cave your frolic sports survey,
As on the mountain's briery crags ye play:
No more with joyous pipe your footsteps lead;
Their boughs where cytisus and willows spread.

Virgil (Wrangham).

P. 239, l. 28.—How many things do painters see in shadows and in projections which we do not see!—*Cicero.*

P. 241, l. 10.—In fine, the effect of the whole was such as to arrest the eye of the connoisseur, and delight those unskilled in the art.—*Pliny.*

P. 248, n. 1, l. 6.—Therefore no other animal perceives and is pleased with the beauty, grace, and harmony of the parts of objects of sight. Nature and reason lead us to transfer this analogy from the eye to the mind, and to judge that still greater beauty, consistency, and order should be observed in purposes and deeds. . . . Marcus, my son, you see in truth the very form, and, as it were, the face of virtue; which, if it could be discerned by mortal eye, would attract to itself, as Plato says, wonderful love.—*Cicero.*

P. 248, n. 2.—Whether, then, do you think it more pleasing to look upon him on whose countenance the characters of the honourable, the good, and the lovely are impressed? or him who shows the marks of the base, the wicked, and the hateful?—*Xenophon.*

P. 254, n. 1.—The love of character is enduring; time will ravage beauty; and the pleasing countenance will be furrowed with wrinkles. —*Ovid.*

P. 271, n. 1.—The true may sometimes appear improbable.—*Boileau.*

P. 281, l. 20.—To have explored the celestial regions, and traversed the circular heavens in thought.—*Horace.*

P. 281, l. 30.—Blessed spirits were they to whom first it was a care to know these things, and to ascend to the mansions above. We must believe that they raised their heads alike above the vices and the habitations of mortals. Neither lust nor wine, nor the duty of the forum, nor the labour of warfare, impaired their lofty minds. Neither did giddy ambition, nor glory overspread with false glare, nor the thirst after vast wealth, disquiet them. They have brought the distant stars to our eyes, and have subjected the heavens to their intellect. Thus is heaven won.—*Ovid.*

P. 282, l. 6.—

[But to return, and view the cheerful skies,
In this the task and mighty labour lies.]
To few great Jupiter imparts this grace,
And those of shining worth and heavenly race.

Virgil (Dryden).

P. 282, l. 9.—

To him, who not deserves to die,
She shows the path which heroes trod,
Then bids him boldly tempt the sky,
Spurn off his mortal clay, and rise a god.

Horace (Francis).

P. 284, n. 1, l. 5.—If I must fall, I should choose to fall from heaven.

P. 285, n. 1, l. 6.—The pass of Tempe is of such a kind, that, although no opposition is offered by an enemy, the passage through it is difficult; for besides the narrow pass of five miles, through which there runs but a small pathway for a loaded beast of burden, the rocks on both sides have been so sundered as to render it hardly possible to look down from them without a certain giddiness both of eyes and mind; while the noise and the depth of the river Peneus, flowing through the midst of the valley, add to the horror of the scene.—*Livy.*

P. 288, l. 7.—But we ought not to advance before we deter-

mine whether there be any art in the sublime or the pathetic.—*Longinus.*

P. 291, n., c. 1, l. 4.—Behold this *starry sublime* which all invoke as *Jupiter.—Ennius.*

P. 295, l. 1.—

For, O ye powers divine! whose tranquil lives
Flow free from care, with ceaseless sunshine blest,—
Who the vast whole could guide, 'midst all your ranks?
Who grasp the reins that curb the entire of things?
Turn the broad heavens, and pour, through countless worlds,
Th' ethereal fire that feeds their vital throngs?—
Felt every moment, felt in every place.
Who form the low'ring clouds? the lightning dart,
And roll the clamorous thunder, oft in twain
Rending the concave?—or, full deep retired,
Who point in secret the mysterious shaft
That, while the guilty triumphs, prostrates stern
The fairest forms of innocence and worth?

Lucretius (Good).

P. 295, l. 15.—We are conscious that God is nearer to us in the midst of pathless rocks, rugged slopes, amid rushing waters and the gloom of woods, than if, enshrined under a roof of citron, He shone in gold and Phidian art.—*Gray.*

P. 297, l. 13.—

From dense, dark clouds rear'd mass o'er mass sublime,
Spring, then, these missile fires: for when the cope
Smiles all serene, or but o'ershadow'd light,
Such ne'er we mark.—*Lucretius* (Good).

P. 297, l. 16.— Sable night involves the skies;
And heaven itself is ravish'd from their eyes.
Loud peals of thunder from the poles ensue;
[Then flashing fires the transient light renew.]

Virgil (Dryden).

P. 298, n. 1, l. 1.—

[Thine is the potent art to tame
The lightning's everlasting flame.
Jove's thundering eagle on his sceptre laid,]
Rests with swift plume on either side display'd.

Pindar (Wheelwright).

P. 299, l. 7.—That there is a supreme and eternal being, whom the human race ought to look up to and admire, the beauty of the world and the order of celestial phenomena constrain us to confess. . . . . Eloquence which we should look up to and admire.—*Cicero.*

P. 299, n. 3.—

'Tis here, in different paths, the way divides:
The right to Pluto's golden palace guides:
The left to that unhappy region tends
Which to the depth of Tartarus descends.

. . . . .

The rivals of the gods, the Titan race,
Here, struck with lightning, roll within the unfathom'd space.

Virgil (Dryden).

P. 301, l. 19.—

As when a river, swollen by sudden showers,
O'er its known banks from some steep mountain pours;
So in profound immeasurable song,
The deep-mouth'd Pindar, foaming, rolls along.

Horace (Francis).

P. 302, l. 7.—The forcible style, which sweeps down rocks, disdains a bridge, and makes banks for itself, full and roaring like a torrent, will bear away the judge, even though he strive against it, and constrain him to go whithersoever it hurries him.—*Quintilian.*

P. 305, l. 12.—I do not see what more sublime spectacle Jupiter could have on earth than Cato, his party not once but often broken, *standing, nevertheless, erect amid the ruins of the commonwealth.*—*Seneca.*

P. 305, n. *.—The victorious cause was pleasing to the gods, but the vanquished to Cato.—[*Lucan.*]

P. 308, n. 1.—Behold the world with its convex weight nodding to thee.—*Virgil.*

P. 312, n. 2.—The Assyrians at first, as, *on account of the even surface and extent of the regions which they inhabited, they beheld on all sides a free and open sky*, made observations on meteors and the motions of the stars. In this nation the Chaldeans are supposed to have formed, by prolonged observation, the science of astronomy, &c. —*Cicero.*

P. 313, l. 23.—

Heir to heir, as wave to wave, succeeds.—*Horace.*

P. 314, l. 5.—See above, vol. ii. p. 80, n., l. 1.

P. 317, l. 16.—There is a certain natural food, if I may so speak, for intellect and genius,—the consideration and contemplation of nature. We are elevated by it, *we seem to rise above the things around us*, we look down on what is human, and by thinking of what is above and celestial, we contemn these our affairs as mean and paltry.—*Cicero.*

P. 319, n. 1, c. 1.—It becomes all men, who seek to assert their superiority to the other animals, to endeavour, as far as in them lies, to avoid passing their lives in silence, like cattle, which nature has formed to look towards the earth, and to be swayed by the lusts of the belly.—*Sallust.*

P. 319, n. 1, c. 1, l. 7.—

Yes! while for things divine receptive powers,
And wide dominion o'er all arts are ours,
In human veins compassion was infused,
To tribes of earth regarding brutes refused.

Juvenal (Badham).

P. 324, l. 15.—See above, vol. iv. p. 48, l. 26.

P. 326, l. 5.—The sacred awe with which those religious books (the Orphic Hymns) inspired me, is quite incredible. The time I was compelled to set apart for their perusal was during the night, which of itself is sufficient to impress the mind with dread; for the attractions of the city, and the visits I had to pay to its numerous learned men, occupied me wholly during the day. When, with the world in silence around me, and but the moon and stars looking on, I took into my hands those lofty hymns, I seemed to descend into an abyss of the mysteries of a venerable antiquity.—*Eschenbach.*

P. 328, n. 1.—While he avoids the earth, affects the clouds and empty sounds.—*Horace.*

P. 334, n., c. 1, l. 5.—He (Eumenes) surpassed all in painstaking, vigilance, patience, practical sagacity, and readiness of mind.—[*Nepos.*]

P. 334, n., c. 1, l. 13.—Rare and pre-eminent excellence in a frivolous accomplishment is not suitable to the character of a man of honour.—*Montaigne.*

P. 335, l. 26.—Philopœmen was possessed of an admirable degree

of skill and experience in conducting a march and choosing his station, having made these points his principal study, not only in times of war, but likewise during peace. Whenever he was taking a journey to any place, and came to a defile where the passage was difficult, it was his practice, first, to examine the nature of the ground on every side. When journeying alone, he meditated within himself; if he had company, he asked them, "If an enemy should appear in that place, what course ought he to adopt if they should attack him in front; what, if on this flank, or on that; what, if on the rear; for he might happen to meet them while his men were formed with a regular front, or when they were in the loose order of march, fit only for the road." He would proceed to examine, either in his own mind, or by asking questions, "What ground he himself would choose, what number of soldiers, or what kind of arms (which was a very material point) he ought to employ; where he should deposit the baggage, where the soldiers' necessaries, where the unarmed multitude; with what number and what kind of troops he should guard them, and whether it would be better to prosecute his march as intended, or to return back by the way he came; what spot, also, he should choose for his camp; how large a space he should enclose within the lines; where he could be conveniently supplied with water; where a sufficiency of forage and wood could be had; which would be his safest road on decamping next day, and in what form the army should march?" In such studies and inquiries he had, from his early years, so frequently exercised his thoughts, that, on anything of the kind occurring, no expedient that could be devised was new to him.—*Livy* (Edmonds).

P. 344, n., c. 1, l. 11.—The word *goût* (taste) is not employed by Despréaux and Molière without a qualifying epithet.

The depraved taste of the age makes me dread that, says the misanthrope; and with regard to Despréaux himself, who was the oracle of taste, the word occurs only twice in his works.

He laughs at the bad taste of so many men of diverse parts. . . .

The fair one wages war with the bad public taste. . . .

It is since the time of Voltaire especially that the word *taste* has been so frequently employed in an absolute sense. . . . This word, used abstractly, has no precise synonyme, no equivalent in the ancient languages. In Greek and Latin, *taste* could hardly be translated but by *judgment*.—*La Harpe.*

P. 345, n. 1, l. 2.—

"You have not the style of speech that is in accordance with the public taste,"

that is, according to Gesner, not a style that would be pleasing to the vulgar, but to the educated. The reference is to *the common sense and intelligence.*—From *Petronius.*

P. 345, n. 3, l. 3.—

In short, the race of various men admire
As various numbers: thee the softer lyre
Delights: This man approves the tragic strain;
That joys in Bion's keen, satiric vein.
I have three guests invited to a feast,
And all appear to have a different taste.
What shall I give them? What shall I refuse?
What one dislikes the other two shall choose;
And even the very dish you like the best
Is acid and insipid to the rest.

Horace (Francis).

P. 345, n. 3, l. 17.—I do not give a reason, but state my taste.—*Pliny.*

P. 345, n. 3, l. 19.—There are several circumstances attending the little villa, which (supposing he has no objection to the price) are extremely suitable to my friend's taste: the convenient distance from Rome, the goodness of the roads, the smallness of the building, and the very few acres of land around it, which is just enough to amuse but not to employ him. To a man of the studious turn that Tranquillus is, it is sufficient if he has but a small spot to relieve the mind and divert the eye, where he may saunter round his grounds, traverse his single walk, grow familiar with his two or three vines, and count his little plantations.—*Pliny* (Melmoth).

P. 345, n. 3, c. 2, l. 16.—Long custom has now rendered my taste insensible.—*Cicero.*

P. 345, n. 3, c. 2, l. 20.—The taste is destroyed whenever it is habitually exposed to unnatural seasoning.

P. 374, l. 33.—When what you read lends elevation to your mind, and fills you with noble and magnanimous sentiments, you need seek no other rule by which to judge of the work; it is good, and comes from the hand of a master.—*La Bruyère.*

P. 379, l. 16.—For he burns with his own splendour, who by his

own superiority presses down the arts beneath him; after his death he shall be loved and honoured.—[*Horace.*]

P. 379, l. 23.—Before that a few feet of earth, granted to his petition, had for ever entombed Molière, thousands of his beautiful scenes, which are now so highly lauded, were before our eyes rejected as worthless by dull fools. Ignorance and error, in the habits of Marquises and the robes of Countesses, came to each new masterpiece to cry it down, and the most beautiful passages were those they disapproved. . . .

But no sooner had a shaft from the fatal hand of Destiny struck him out of the number of the living, than men began to recognise the priceless value of his eclipsed muse. Lovely comedy, that with him was prostrated on the earth, in vain hoped to regain its standing after so rude a blow, and was no more able to lay hold of the sock.—*Boileau.*

P. 379, n., c. 2, l. 1.—When a beautiful woman allows that another woman is beautiful, you may safely conclude that the beauty she praises is inferior to her own. When a poet praises the verses of another poet, ten to one they are poor and trifling.—*La Bruyère.*

P. 383, n. 1.—Our judgments are regulated by our knowledge; the nearer an author is to perfection, the fewer true judges has he: in one word, after talent, nothing is rarer than taste.—*La Harpe.*

P. 394, l. 4.—My soft heart is violable by light darts, and there is ever a reason why I am ever in love.—*Ovid.*

P. 395, n. 1.—If then, we come to be less affected by verses as we grow older, it is not from any slighting of poetry, but, on the contrary, because our taste has become more cultivated and fastidious. It is because we have felt on reflection, and learned from experience, the vast distance which separates mediocrity from excellence, that we can no longer tolerate the former. But what is really excellent gains by the comparison; the fewer verses we can bear to read, the greater is our relish of what is the fruit of real talent. It is only writing that falls short of genius that loses by this decay of ardour, and that is no great misfortune.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 410, n. A, l. 16.—What time is, if no one asks me, I know; if interrogated, I am ignorant.—*St. Augustine.*

P. 410, n. B, l. 25.—I do not here explain several other terms which I have used, or design to use in the sequel, because their meaning seems to me sufficiently self-evident. And I frequently remarked, that philosophers erred in attempting to explain, by logical

definitions, such truths as are most simple and self-evident; for they thus only rendered them more obscure.—*Descartes* (Eng. Tran.)

P. 411, l. 11.—It is necessary that there be some terms so clear as to be incapable of being elucidated by clearer, otherwise the explication of terms would proceed to infinity, and there would thus be no clear cognition, nor could any one know with certainty another's meaning.

Such terms are *thought* (consciousness), *motion*, than which we have no clearer concepts and terms; the futility of the attempts of Aristotle and Descartes to define *motion* will shortly appear.—*Lord Stair.*

P. 413, n. C, l. 10.—Where it must be observed that I speak of the idea which is never out of the understanding, and in respect of which, *to be objectively* (representatively), signifies nothing more than to be in the understanding in the way in which objects usually are there.—*Descartes.*

P. 413, l. 19.—We think it useless to expound and refute the recently exploded dogma of species, which are supposed to proceed from things and to be impressed on the mind.—*Gravesande.*

P. 415, n. D, l. 10.—

This cause more efficacious is,
More powerful far than that which doth
Admit the characters impressed
Like passive matter; yet the sense
Which in the living body doth remain,
Doth go before, and doth excite
And move the powers of the mind:
As when the light doth strike the eye,
Or as the voice doth strike the ear:
Then is the power of the mind aroused,
Calls out the species which it holds within
Itself, to corresponding movements,
Applies them to the outward notes,
Mingling and joining all the images
With the forms within itself conceal'd.

Boethius (altered from Viscount Preston).

P. 417, n. E, l. 3.—The term *sentiment*, derived from the original Latin *sentire*, has passed into the modern languages with shades of meaning peculiar to each of them. In Italian *sentimento* expresses

two different ideas:—1. An opinion regarding a matter or question; 2. The capacity of feeling. In English, *sentiment* has but the first of those two senses. The Spanish *sentimiento* denotes *suffering*, a signification which the Latin root sometimes has.

In French, *sentiment* has the two acceptations of the Italian, but with this difference, that in the latter sense it has a wide application. Not only does it designate generally in French all the affections of the soul, but it more particularly expresses the passion of love. Thus, for example, we say, *his affection (sentiment) is so deep, that nothing on earth can move it from the objects that nourish it.* We should commit a Gallicism if, in translating this phrase into any other language, we retained the term *sentiment.* We should be equally open to this charge, if we were to employ the word in the translation of the following phrases: *c'est un homme à* SENTIMENT; *voilà du* SENTIMENT; *il y a du* SENTIMENT *dans cette pièce; il est tout âme, tout* SENTIMENT; because it is taken in a vague sense for all that relates to the capacity of feeling. Sterne also was guilty of this fault, when he gave to his journey the title *sentimental*, a word which the French did not fail to claim as their own, and employ in their language, as perfectly analogous to the acceptation in which they use the term *sentiment.*—*Suard.*

P. 417, l. 38.—Modern philosophers make colour a sensation (*sentiment*) of the mind.—*Suard.*

P. 429, n. K, l. 14.—See above, vol. iv. p. 267, n., c. 1, l. 1.

P. 434, l. 19.—The imperfection of languages, in that they express almost all intellectual ideas by figurative terms, in other words, by terms designed, according to their proper signification, to convey ideas of sensible objects; and observe, in passing, that this inconvenience, which is common to all languages, would perhaps suffice to show that we really owe all our ideas to our sensations, had this truth, established besides by a thousand indisputable arguments, needed any further proof.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 434, n. Q, l. 7.—

Yet the fleeting trace of objects
Would escape us like an airy shadow
Had Heaven not created that precious repository
Where Taste, Smell, Hearing, and Sight
Come to lay the images of those objects—
Memory to wit. That name discomposes all our sages:

What hand hollowed out those secret chambers?
What Deity skilfully ranges those countless drawers,
Empties or fills them, shuts or opens them?
The nerves are her subjects, and the head is her palace.
But how, ever obedient to her will,
Do they operate to subdue the senses to her rule?
How do they hearken as soon as she commands?
How is it that a reminiscence which she calls for in vain,
Promptly coming up at a more favourable season,
Reappears when I was not dreaming of it?
So retentive sometimes of an older deposit,
How is it that she fails me in regard to a recent one?
Wherefore, this memory, this so marvellous agent,
Does it depend on times, on chance, and on places?
By cares, by years, by ills enfeebled,
Does it not resemble wax that is grown old,
Which, faithful to the seal it once took on,
Refuses a new impression, and resists my fingers.
Finally, if images are traced in the brain,
How can thought imprint itself in a corporeal substance?

"*There ends thy knowledge, daring mortal,*
Go measure the earth, question the heavens,
Determine the supreme order of the boundless universe:
But pretend not ever to know thyself,
There, beneath thine eyes, opens an abyss without bottom."

De Lille.

P. 437, n. S, l. 7.—There is neither the *beautiful* nor the *ugly* for the senses of smell and taste. The Père Andre, Jesuit, in his *Essay on the Beautiful*, places the sense of touch on the same level in this respect with those two senses; but I think that on this point his theory may be disproved. It seems to me that a blind man has ideas of relation, order, symmetry, and that these notions, less perfect perhaps, and less exact than those we receive by sight, found their way into his mind through the sense of touch; and thus at most it can only be held that the blind are less impressed by the *beautiful* than ourselves, who have the advantage of clear eye-sight. In a word, it appears to me to be a very bold thing to assert that the blind statuary who made busts resembling their originals, had withal no idea of *beauty.—Diderot.*

P. 438, n. U., l. 6.—By picturesque composition, I mean the arrangement of the objects that should enter into a painting, considered in relation to the general effect. A good picturesque composition is one from which the eye takes in at a glance the grand effect which the painter meant to convey. In order to this, the painting must not be encumbered by figures, although these should be sufficiently numerous to fill the canvas. The objects must admit of being easily distinguished. The figures must not cripple each other, one concealing half of the head of another, or some part of the body, which the nature of the subject requires to be seen. In fine, the groups should be well composed, the light judiciously distributed, and the colours so disposed as that, instead of nullifying the effect of each other by their relative positions, there may result from the whole a harmony in itself agreeable to the eye.—*Abbé du Bos.*

P. 441, n. Y, l. 1.—A painter, who, of all the qualifications necessary to constitute the great artist, possesses only the power of *good colouring*, pronounces a painting excellent, or that it is worth nothing as a whole, according to the skill in colouring, or the want of it which the work displays. The composition (poesy) of the painting goes for little or nothing in his judgment. He comes to a decision without any regard to those qualifications for the art of which he himself is devoid.—*Abbé du Bos.*

P. 444, n. C C, l. 3.—In the Greek, *an art of the sublime or the profound.* All the commentators have understood these two terms as synonymous. I can hardly think that Longinus designed to employ them as such. This is the only passage in which they occur with the disjunctive particle; everywhere else they are united in the same phrase by the conjunction. I think, therefore, that by the sublime and the profound our rhetorician designed to convey two different ideas. And, in truth, these two different ideas are equally suitable to the subject on hand. *Depth* is not less necessary than *sublimity* to great eloquence.—*St. Marc.*

P. 447, l. 16.—This favour is accorded to antiquity that, by mingling the human with the divine, it may cause the beginnings of cities to appear more sacred.

P. 447, n. G G, l. 4.—You perceive that the mind is led to generalise on account of its weakness. . . . . With man there is a

need of simplifying his ideas, in proportion as they increase in number; and those generalisations, in which specific and individual differences are sunk, and which combine together a multitude of past presentations through a single point of resemblance, are merely modes in which the mind seeks to lessen the labour of viewing objects;—the mind thus takes up an advantageous position, whence it can command a greater number of objects; and, placed on this sort of eminence, its true action consists in redescending the ladder of ideas, by restoring to each the differences characteristic of its object, its distinctive properties, and recomposing by *synthesis* what by *analysis* it had simplified.—*Marmontel.*

P. 448, n. H H, l. 25.—When men reached that point, they were arrested by a species of fear and sacred dread. . . . . The infinite was regarded as a mystery, which it was proper to respect, and which it was not permitted them to fathom.—*Fontenelle.*

P. 449, n. K K, l. 3.—The sublime is in truth that which constitutes the excellence and supreme perfection of composition. . . . The original is more easily understood than the French rendering. Ακρότης means *the summit or highest part* of anything, *what is most elevated in that which is elevated.* The term ἐξοχὴ has nearly the same signification, viz., *eminence, what is raised above the rest.* It is on these two terms, which are used superlatively, and understood in a figurative sense, that I have taken my stand in maintaining that the desire of Longinus is to treat of *the sublime of eloquence in its highest point of perfection.—Boileau.*

P. 450, l. 25.—Virtue (*virtus*) has been so called from *vir* (a man). The special property of a man is fortitude, which has two chief functions,—contempt of death and pain.—*Cicero.*

P. 450, l. 27.—*Virtus* signified originally *strength*, then *courage*, then *moral greatness.* With the Italians, *virtù* hardly denotes more than practical skill in the fine arts; and the term that originally expressed the eminently distinguishing quality of man, is now applied to creatures who have no such quality. A *soprano* is the *virtuoso par excellence.—Suard.*

P. 451, n. M M, l. 2.—But the sublime opportunely let loose, with the rapid force of lightning, has borne down all before it, and shown, in one stroke, the compacted might of the orator.—*Longinus.*

. . . . *When the sublime has burst forth*, &c.—*Boileau.* . . . .

Our language has no term except *éclater* to express ἐξενεχθὲν, which is descriptive of a storm, and is strongly impressive, almost amounting to the force of the phrase of Virgil, *abruptis nubibus ignes*. Longinus here means to present a picture of the thunderbolt, which seems to fall rather than come forth.—*Dacier*.

P. 452, l. 3.—No man ever spoke of God with such dignity. In his discourses on the universe, the Divinity is everywhere the moving, actuating principle. In the course of his lofty eloquence he places himself between God and man, addressing each by turns. . . . . Who ever discoursed with greater impressiveness of life, death, eternity, time? These thoughts of themselves inspire in the imagination a feeling of dread that approaches the sublime. . . . . Amid the concourse of feelings by which he is hurried along, Bossuet merely pronounces from time to time certain words; and these utterances make one shudder; like broken cries that sometimes strike on the ear of the traveller at night, amid the silence of forests, forewarning him of some danger, he knows not what. . . . . But his most striking peculiarity is the impetuosity of his movements, the thorough intermingling of the soul with all he utters. Raised to an elevation far above the rest of mankind, he seems thence to take note of great events that pass before his vision, and recount them to the multitude below.—*Thomas*.

P. 452, n. O O, l. 10.—It is the general impression that the *coup d'œil* does not depend upon our own efforts toward attaining it, but is a gift of nature, that the experience of campaigns does not bestow it, and that, in a word, unless we are born with it, the most piercing eyes do not see at all, and continue in the grossest darkness. This is a mistake; we all possess the *coup d'œil* according to the proportion of intelligence and good sense which Providence has been pleased to bestow upon us. It has its source in both these qualities, but it is refined and perfected by exercise, and experience confirms the possession of it.

. . . "Philopœmen possessed a wonderful *coup d'œil*. In him it ought to be regarded not as the gift of nature, but as the fruit of study, application, and his extreme passion for war. Plutarch apprises us of the method he pursued to enable himself to look with an eye quite different from that of other people, and altogether his own, on the conduct of an army, &c. &c. &c.—*Folard*.

P. 452, n. P P, l. 1.—Those who live habitually in the most extensive society are of very narrow capacity, if they do not readily acquire a fine and delicate *tact*, and attain to an acquaintance with the workings of the human heart.—*Madame de Sillery.*

P. 453, l. 1.—Where will he acquire that *sense* called *common*, when he has separated himself from society, which is natural not only to men but also to many animals?—*Quintilian.* . . . By *common sense*, he means a certain practical skill and experience, which is gradually acquired by intercourse with men, and is called by Cicero *common prudence.*—*Turnebus.*

P. 453, l. 17.—We are able, we think, after these reflections, to give an answer, in two words, to the question often raised, as to whether feeling or analysis is the better judge of a work of *taste*. Impression is the natural judge in the first instant, analysis in the second. In minds that unite refinement and promptitude of *tact* with precision and accuracy of judgment, the decision of the second judge will usually ratify the sentence of the first, &c. &c.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 453, n. Q Q, l. 6.—It is *unity* that constitutes, so to speak, the form and essence of the *beautiful* in all its kinds. *Every beautiful form is a unity.—French Encyclopédie.*

P. 465, l. 15.—These two constituents of the sublime [grandeur of conception and vehement affection] are pre-eminently the gifts of nature; but those which follow depend in part on art [to wit, the third], a certain power of forming figures, which are twofold, of thought and of diction; [the fourth,] besides these, a noble and graceful manner of expression, the parts of which again are the choice of words, and a style full of tropes and highly embellished; the fifth source of sublimity, and that which completes all the preceding, is the composition of the periods with dignity and grandeur.—*Longinus.*

VOL. VI.

P. 5, n.—In order that they may have a higher consciousness of existence.—*Tacitus.*

P. 6, l. 19.—See above, vol. v. p. 317, l. 16.

P. 7, n.—If any one could ascend to the sky, and survey the structure of the universe and the beauty of the stars, such admiration would be without relish to him; and yet had he any one to whom he might communicate his impressions, the contemplation would be most delightful. Thus nature loves nothing solitary, and always reaches out to something as a support, which in the most attached friend is ever most charming.—*Cicero.* . . . There is nothing, however rare and advantageous it may be, that can yield me satisfying pleasure, if I am to know it only for myself alone. If wisdom itself were proffered me, on condition that I should conceal it and never divulge it, I would refuse the same. The possession of no benefit is satisfying without a companion to share it.—*Seneca.*

P. 9, l. 25.—Many, however, there are, and have been, who, courting that tranquillity of which I here speak, have withdrawn themselves from public affairs and taken refuge in retirement. . . . Their aim was the same as that which the powerful seek; to enjoy their freedom without needing aught or being subject to any one, it being the essence of freedom to live as one chooses. Wherefore, since the aim of those who are ambitious of power, and of those who do not meddle with public affairs, is the same, it would seem that the one class believe they can attain it by the possession of ample resources, the other, if they can rest satisfied with their own, and with little.—*Cicero.*

P. 10, n. 1.—What is liberty? The power of living as you please. Who, therefore, can be said to live in this manner, if it is not one who follows the right, who takes pleasure in duty, and whose mode of living is regulated according to a plan that is the result of reflection; who obeys the laws themselves not through fear, but willingly, and out of respect for them, as one impressed with the conviction that such a course of conduct is eminently advantageous; who says nothing, does nothing, in a word, thinks nothing, unless spontane-

ously and freely; all whose deliberations and undertakings proceed from and terminate in himself, and with whom there is no influence so powerful as his own will and judgment.—*Cicero.*

P. 11, l. 14.—Emulation is a certain feeling of pain arising, not from the circumstance that another possesses goods, but from this, that we do not also possess them. The emulous man sets himself to acquire goods for himself; the envious desires that even his nearest friend should be deprived of them. The young and magnanimous are prone to emulation. . . . Envy is a restless feeling of pain from seeing goods possessed, not by one who does not deserve them, but by one who is our equal. Men envy those who approach themselves in time, place, age, and esteem. The man who takes pleasure in the misfortunes of another is also envious.—*Aristotle.*

P. 35, l. 11.—The right is the royal law.—*Plato.*

P. 37, l. 23.—To me, indeed, everything seems the more praiseworthy, as it is done without ostentation and people to witness it. Not that you should avoid the public, for every generous action loves the public view; but yet there is no theatre for virtue equal to a consciousness of it.—*Cicero.*

P. 40, n.—Fools are here below for our trifling pleasures.—*Gresset.*

P. 45, l. 14.—The first service of the gods is to believe that they are; then to acknowledge their majesty, and their goodness, without which their majesty were nothing.—*Seneca.*

P. 45, l. 34.—See above, *Works*, vol. i. p. 291, n. 1.

P. 46, l. 22.—See above, vol. i. p. 295, n. 1, l. 1.

P. 55, n. 1.—See above, vol. i. p. 39, n., c. 1, l. 23.

P. 66, n.—Consider all the nations that lie beyond the limits of the peaceful and civilised Roman empire; I mean the Germans, and all those wandering peoples that are to be met with in the neighbourhood of the Danube. Perpetual winter and a gloomy atmosphere oppress them; they draw a niggardly subsistence from a sterile soil; their sole protection against rain is a thatch roof or the branches of trees; they range over frozen swamps, and capture wild beasts for sustenance. Do you think these people miserable? nothing is miserable which custom has changed into nature; for what is at first undergone because it cannot be helped, becomes by degrees positively pleasurable. . . . What you deem an unmitigated calamity is the daily life of numerous tribes.—*Seneca.*

P. 87, n. 1, l. 6.—There is a certain kind which, by its own inherent power, allures us to itself, not captivating us by any prospect of advantage, but charming us by its own worth; of which class are virtue, science, and truth.—*Cicero.*

P. 96, l. 5.—The Stoics are at issue with the Peripatetics. The one sect denies that anything is good which is not also honourable; the other, while affirming that it allows great, indeed, by far the greatest, prominence to what is honourable, still maintains that there are in, and beyond, the body certain positive goods. It is an honourable contest and a grand discussion.—*Cicero.*

P. 102, l. 8.—The way to lead an honourable and happy life is short and simple. For nature has formed us with the best dispositions, and so easy is it for the well-inclined to learn what is good, that one, who duly considers the matter, cannot help being surprised that the number of the wicked is so great. As water is the natural and proper element of fishes, as the dry land is suited for terrestrial animals, and the air for birds, so, indeed, it ought to be easier [for man] to live in harmony with nature than in opposition to her dictates.—*Quintilian.*

P. 105, l. 13.—The habit of rectitude.—*Pythagorean Maxim.*

P. 115, l. 9.—Betrayed by its conclusions and its peculiar method, the philosophy of Condillac was called in question by a certain number of distinguished thinkers, and finally subjected to public discussion by M. Royer Collard. In the three years of his teaching, that learned professor, whom France now possesses simply as one of her great citizens, demonstrated, against the doctrine of Condillac, what Reid had established in opposition to Locke; and, by following out the method of experience of the sensational school, proved that that school had been unfaithful to its method. M. Cousin accomplished what M. Royer Collard had begun. . . . The instruction of these two illustrious professors ought to have borne fruit, and it has done so. On the minds of those who attended the lectures, there rests no doubt as to the direction which philosophical inquiry must needs follow.—*Jouffroy.*

P. 121, l. 14.—See above, vol. iii. p. 348, n. 1.

P. 133, l. 2.—See above, vol. v. p. 317, l. 16.

P. 134, l. 3.—See above, vol. vi. p. 7, n.

P. 138, l. 31.—

> Then the poor babe, too, like a seaman wrecked,
> Thrown from the waves, lies naked o'er the ground,

Weakly and void of every vital aid.
When nature first amid his mother's pangs,
Casts the young burden on the realms of light;
And leaves to pine full sore, as well he may,
That e'er the suffering lot of life were his.

Lucretius (Good).

P. 142, n., c. 1, l. 41.—Utility (self-interest) appears to some to have great influence in constituting and keeping together the society of mankind. But there is, if I am not mistaken, a cause that operates long previously to that principle, and constitutes a much more sacred bond of alliance. Otherwise, were each individual desirous merely of his private advantage, consider whether that very self-interest would not rather dissolve than conjoin human society.

There is a certain natural tendency implanted not only in man but also in the gentler of the other animals, so strong as to lead, even in the absence of those inducements of self-interest, to a spontaneous association among creatures of one kind. We are not meanwhile concerned to discuss the question in its bearing on the other animals. So deeply, however, is this principle impressed on man by nature, that, though he abounded in all that is fitted to secure his safety and minister to his mental gratification and delight, but were at the same time shut out from intercourse with his kind, life would appear to him insipid. Moreover, those men even who, in their eager desire of knowledge, and zeal for the discovery of truth, have withdrawn from the crowd, and shut themselves up in retirement, have found it impossible for any great length of time to sustain the constant strain on their mental powers, and, when they relaxed the effort, could not continue in solitude. Their secret studies, too, they freely divulge, and, as if they but laboured for the common good, collect and publish the fruit of their toil. If there be any one who is entirely captivated by solitude, and wholly abandons human society, he is more, as I think, influenced by disease of mind, than guided by the promptings of nature, of which the Athenian Timon and the Corinthian Bellerophon are instances:

Who, wretched, wandered a solitary in the Elæan lands,
Himself preying on his own heart, shunning the footsteps of men.

Buchanan.

P. 153, n. 1.—For glory is something real and distinct, and not a mere shadow. It is the unanimous praise of the good, the uncorrupted

voice of those who judge aright of pre-eminent virtue. Glory is, as it were, the echo of virtue, and, as the general attendant of good actions, ought not to be disdained by good men.—*Cicero.*

P. 154, l. 31.—See above, vol. vi. p. 37, l. 23.

P. 155, n. 1, c. 1, l. 7.—

Know—when I write, if chance some happier strain
(And chance it needs must be) rewards my pain,
Know, I can relish praise with genuine zest;
Not mine the torpid, mine the unfeeling breast:
But that I merely toil for this acclaim,
And make these eulogies my end and aim,
I must not, cannot grant.—*Persius* (Gifford).

P. 155, c. 2, l. 11.—

Nor should my friend, though still, as fashion sways,
The purblind town conspire to sink or raise,
Determine as her wavering beam prevails,
And trust his judgment to her coarser scales.
O not abroad for vague opinion roam;
The wise man's bosom is his proper home.

Persius (Gifford).

P. 157, l. 16.—

But on a fiery courser through the vales
Exults the young Ascanius, and in speed
Now these, now those outstrips. He longs to see
Among the feeble flocks a foaming boar
Or tawny lion from the heights descend.

Virgil (Kennedy).

P. 159, l. 9.—See above, vol. vi. p. 9, l. 25.

P. 162, l. 10.—Emulation is a good, and is becoming in good men, but envy is base and the feature of bad men; for the emulous strives to prepare himself for obtaining the goods themselves, but the envious seeks to deprive another of what he possesses.—*Aristotle.*

P. 170, n. 1, c. 2.—She (Cornelia) drew a mourning-veil over her head, and resolved to endure the darkness, and lay concealed in the hold of the ship; and closely embracing cruel grief, she sought the solace of tears, and cherished mourning in room of her husband.—*Lucan.*

P. 175, l. 4.— Euryalus
Thus answered: Me may conduct ever prove,

In good or adverse fortune, still the same.
Of thee one only kindness do I ask :
I have a mother of old Priam's line,
Who Ilium's land and King Acestes' town
Gave up to follow me ; whom, unapprised
Of this my peril, whatsoe'er it be,
I leave without farewell. Night and thy hand
Be witnesses, her tears I could not bear.
Console her then, support her age forlorn :
Give me this hope, and bolder shall I go
To meet all danger. Smitten by his words
The Dardans wept, Iulus more than all,
Touch'd by the sight of filial piety.

Virgil (Kennedy).

P. 184, l. 12.—*Nostalgy* is a kind of sadness well known to the citizens of my native republic, that springs from regret for the absence of home and friends. It gradually consumes and destroys those affected by it; at one time issuing in rigidity and madness, at another in slow fever. Hope is its cure. Animals, even when deprived of their accustomed society, not unfrequently pine and die, and the otters of the Kamschatkan sea sometimes die of grief for the loss of their young. In the same way slow and incurable consumption (called by the English *a broken heart*) follows upon disappointed affection.—*Haller.*

P. 187, l. 19.—Be that as it may, it will nevertheless be a source of satisfaction to have done my utmost to preserve the memory of the achievements of the first people of the world; and if, amid so great a crowd of historians, my name should not emerge from obscurity, I may console myself with reflecting on the celebrity and greatness of those who stand in my way in the pursuit of fame. The history of this state, besides, is a work of immense labour, since it must be traced back for more than seven hundred years, during which time it has increased so widely from small beginnings, as to be in danger of falling to pieces from its very magnitude. I doubt not but that the majority of my readers will derive less pleasure from the history of its origin and the ages immediately succeeding, than from the record of these later times to which they will hasten on, and in which the power of this mighty people has, for a considerable time past, been working its own destruction.—*Livy.*

P. 188, l. 8.—Nature, which gave the power to weep, confesses

that she implanted the softest heart in the human race. This is the best part of our sentient nature. It separates us from the herd of dumb creatures.—*Juvenal.*

P. 191, n. 1, c. 2, l. 9.—Old men often weep for love and joy. Children rarely weep for joy, more frequently from sadness, even when unaccompanied by love.—*Descartes.*

P. 193, n. 1, l. 3.—Those who are conscious of great weakness and of being much exposed to adversity, appear to be more prone than others to compassion, because they think of the misfortune of another as that which may also happen to themselves, and are thus moved to compassion more from self-love than from a regard for others.—*Descartes.*

P. 199, n. 2, l. 8.—See above, vol. iv. p. 267, n., c. 1, l. 8.

P. 205, l. 35.—Every species of satisfaction that involves the punishment of the delinquent, naturally produces the pleasure of revenge in the party injured. This pleasure is a gain. It recalls the parable of Samson. It is the honey gathered from the jaws of the lion. Produced without charge, the result purely of an act necessary on other grounds, it is a kind of enjoyment to be cherished like any other; for the pleasure of revenge, considered abstractly, is like every other pleasure, a good in itself. It is innocent so long as it is restrained within legal bounds; it becomes criminal only when it overleaps these bounds. Useful to the individual, this motive of action is advantageous even to the public, or, to speak more accurately, is necessary to it. It is this vindictive satisfaction that gives free play to the tongue of the witness; it animates the accuser, and engages him in the service of justice in spite of the difficulties, expense, and enmity which he has to encounter. It is the same principle that overcomes public compassion in the punishment of criminals. . . .

I am well aware that the ordinary moralists, who are always the dupes of terms, cannot apprehend the force of this truth. The spirit of revenge is hateful; all satisfaction drawn from that source is vicious; the forgiveness of injuries is the most beautiful of virtues. Without doubt, implacable characters, whom no satisfaction can appease, are hateful, and ought to be hated. The forgetting injuries is a virtue necessary to man, but it is a virtue only when justice has had its work, when it has provided or refused a satisfaction. Before that, to forget injuries, is to invite to their commission; it is to be the enemy, not the friend, of society. What could wickedness desire more than

an arrangement by which offences should be regularly followed by pardon?—*Dumont's Bentham.*

P. 208, l. 11.—To the animals, instead of reason there is instinct; to man, instead of instinct there is reason.—*Seneca.*

P. 210, l. 17.—By how much the more constant he was in his vice, by so much the less wretched was he than the former person, who at one time is in distress from the looseness, at another from the tightness of his rein.—*Horace.*

P. 210, l. 25.—He (Catiline) was familiar with many profligate fellows, and yet affected to be devoted to men of the greatest worth. His house furnished out several temptations to lewdness, and, at the same time, several incentives to labour and industry; it was a scene of vicious pleasures, and, at the same time, a school of martial exercises. Nor do I believe there was ever such a monster on earth, compounded of inclinations and passions so very different, and so repugnant to each other. Who was ever more agreeable at one time to the most illustrious citizens? Who more intimate at another with the most infamous? At one time, what citizen had better principles? and yet who a fouler enemy to Rome? Who more intemperate in pleasure? Who more patient in labour? Who more rapacious in plundering? Who more extravagant in squandering?—*Cicero* (Duncan).

P. 212, l. 28.—But between man and beast there is this special difference, that the latter applies itself to what alone is near and present, only as it is moved to this by sensation, while it has almost no consciousness either of the past or of the future. Man, on the other hand, is endowed with reason by which he discerns consequences, apprehends the causes of things, and is made aware of their progressive advances towards completeness, and, as it were, their antecedent causes. He joins in thought things that resemble each other, and links the present with the future. He surveys with facility the whole course of life, and makes the requisite preparation for spending it.—*Cicero.*

P. 214, l. 28.—Original sin is therefore that proneness to sinning which arises from self-love.—*Zuingle.*

P. 215, l. 21.—It behoves the good man to be a lover of himself. . . . Such a one would seem to be rather a lover of himself.—*Aristotle.*

P. 219, n., l. 10.—I have not lost a moment before reading this excellent memoir, and I can assure your majesty that I am wholly of

your opinion in regard to the principles that should form the basis of morality. If your majesty will take the trouble to glance at my *Elémens de Philosophie*, your majesty will observe that I there indicate, on the ground of morality and happiness, the intimate connexion between our true interest and the realisation of our duties, and that I regard enlightened self-love as the principle of all moral sacrifice.—*D'Alembert.*

P. 220, l. 15.—The honourable, we truly say, is naturally praiseworthy, although it be praised by none.—*Cicero.*

P. 220, l. 24.—They call that a mean duty (medium officium), for the performance of which a probable reason can be assigned.—*Cicero.*

P. 239, n., l. 8.—They may tell us that larceny was enjoined at Lacedæmon; that is simply an abuse of words. The same thing which we call *larceny* was not commanded at Lacedæmon; but in a city where everything was common, the permission that was given to carry off with dexterity what private individuals had appropriated to themselves contrary to law, was a mode of punishing the spirit of property, which was prohibited among that people. *Thine* and *mine* was a crime, of which that we call *theft* was the punishment.—*Voltaire.*

P. 242, n., c. 2, l. 8.—What I say regarding interest is from a political point of view, and has no reference to the respectable maxims of theology on that point.—*Necker.*

P. 249, l. 19.—First honour God, and after him thy parents. Give to each his due, nor pervert judgment through favour. Cast not off the poor, judge no one unjustly: because if thou judge ill, God will afterwards judge thee. Give at once to the beggar, nor bid him return to-morrow. Receive the exile into thy home, and lead the blind in the way. Compassionate the shipwrecked, for navigation is uncertain. Misfortune is the lot of all; life is a wheel; happiness is unstable. Let strangers be in equal honour with the citizens; for all experience shifting poverty, and no region has a permanent abode for men. He who, of his will, acts unjustly, is a bad man; but him who does so of necessity, I do not call wholly bad; but consider the motive of every one. Lay not violent hands on tender infants. Let not a woman seek to procure abortion, nor, after delivery, cast forth her child to be torn by dogs or vultures. Let no one lay his hand on his pregnant wife.—*Phocylides.*

P. 250, l. 6.—Love thy spouse; for what is more pleasant or ad-

mirable than that husband and wife should live together in harmony and mutual affection even to old age? Reverence grey hairs on the temples, and yield a seat and all honours to the old; indeed, to an older man than thyself, and contemporary with thy father, accord a father's honour. Do not injure a slave by speaking of him abusively to his master. Accept counsel even from a slave, if he be competent to give it.—*Phocylides.*

P. 259, n., c. 1, l. 9.—Not only does that work sadden and scandalise the mind, it labours under a great defect in morals in exhibiting the human heart only in an unfavourable light. It would have manifested as great sagacity, and certainly much greater justice, to analyse besides what in man is noble and virtuous. Is it to be supposed that virtue does not frequently guard its secret as closely as self-love, and that there is not as great merit in discovering it?—*La Harpe.*

P. 260, n. 1, c. 2, l. 2.—He (La Rochefoucauld) was never actually a warrior, although he was very much of a soldier.—*De Retz.*

P. 260, n. 1, c. 2, l. 5.—He (La Rochefoucauld) was fond of joking; he said *that personal courage appeared to him to be folly;* and yet he was very brave.—*Madame de Maintenon.*

P. 266, l. 18.—Whom does false honour delight, and lying calumny terrify, but the vicious and deceiving?—*Horace.*

P. 283, l. 7.—You ought also to consider, that many of the Greek states have frequently decreed to make use of your laws, which you, with reason, consider as something to your praise. For I think there is truth in what one of your number is reported to have said, that all judicious men are of opinion that the laws are simply the morals of a state. We ought, therefore, to seek to make them appear the best possible.—*Demosthenes.*

P. 302, l. 10.—Nor, indeed, is that power of nature and reason slight, since this one animal perceives order, what is allowable and becoming, what constitutes moderation in word and deed. It is thus that no other animal perceives and is pleased with the beauty, grace, and harmony of the parts of those objects that are submitted to the sense of sight. Nature and reason lead us to transfer this analogy from the eye to the mind, and to judge that we ought to maintain still greater beauty, consistency, and order in our purposes and actions; and, therefore, enjoin that nothing be done that is unbecoming or effeminate in action, and forbid aught that is licen-

tious in thought or deed. Thus is constituted the *honourable* of which we are in quest, and which, even were it not widely held in esteem, would not cease to be the honourable, and though praised by none, would still be naturally praiseworthy. You see, Marcus, my son, the very form and, as it were, the face of virtue, which, could it be seen with mortal eye, would attract to itself, as Plato says, the marvellous love due to wisdom.—*Cicero.*

P. 303, l. 4.—Behold a spectacle worthy of God, which Jove, while intent on his own pursuits, might even deign to regard,—a brave man retaining his composure in the midst of evil fortune.—*Seneca.*

P. 311, n., c. 2, l. 1.—Brutus having slain Cæsar, immediately thereupon raising on high the bloody dagger, called aloud on the name of Cicero, and congratulated him on the recovery of his country's liberty.—*Cicero.*

P. 312, l. 10.—Youth pursuing their studies in the midst of living illustrations, and at the period of the great crises themselves, enjoyed great advantages, and acquired much firmness and vast discernment.

P. 319, l. 15.—See above, vol. vi. p. 35, l. 11.

P. 322, l. 20.—For the power of the nature and the mind of man is twofold. One part consists of the capacity of desire (in Greek called ὁρμὴ), which carries man hither and thither; the other is reason, which shows and explains what is to be done, what avoided. Thus it is that reason ought to rule, while it is the part of desire to obey. . . .

There is indeed a true law, right reason, agreeable to nature, universal, uniform, eternal, whose injunction calls us to duty, and whose prohibition deters from crime. . . . Nor shall there be one law at Rome, another at Athens; one now, another hereafter; but the one eternal and imperishable law shall embrace all peoples and times, and there shall be one God, as it were, the common master and ruler of all. He is the author, judge, and promulgator of this law. He who fails to obey it shall be a fugitive from himself, and shall cast off from him human nature, thereby paying the highest possible penalty, even although he should escape what are regarded as the other punishments.—*Cicero.*

P. 359, l. 1.—It would, in truth, be singular, that all nature, all the stars should obey eternal laws, and there should yet be, within

the bounds of creation, one little animal of the height of five feet, who, in contempt of those laws, can act always as he pleases, at the mere prompting of his caprice.—*Voltaire.*

P. 359, n. *, l. 3.—Such is the greatness of man, that it appears even in his knowing himself to be miserable. A tree is not conscious of misery. It is true that to know one's misery is itself misery; but there is still a greatness in the consciousness of misery. Thus all his miseries prove man's greatness. They are the calamities of a grand potentate, of a king dethroned.

Man is but a reed, the feeblest in nature; but he is a reed that thinks. There needs not that all the universe should arm, to crush him. A vapour, a drop of water, is sufficient to destroy him. But though the whole universe should overwhelm him, man would still be nobler than that by which he falls, for he knows that he dies, while the universe is unconscious of its victory. In thought thus lies the whole dignity of man. In this we are to seek the means of our elevation, not in space and duration. Let us strive, then, to think well; herein lies the principle of morals.—*Pascal.*

P. 360, l. 13.—(Freedom), the power of doing what one pleases, whatever be the determination of the will.—*S'Gravesande.*

P. 361, l. 13.—Allowing no action to take place without a motive, as he says there is no effect without a cause, Bonnet defines *Moral Liberty* as the power of the mind to follow without constraint the motives whose impulse it experiences. He thus solves the difficulties arising from the foresight of God; but his definition would seem perhaps to exclude the ordinary notion of liberty. In spite of these opinions, which border on materialism and fatalism, Bonnet was a highly religious man.—*Cuvier.*

P. 366, n., l. 6.—See above, vol. i. p. 270, n. 2, l. 4.

P. 371, l. 6.—In the same way, without any reason which we may be able to discover, God would choose from among things absolutely similar some rather than others, and place one here and another there; for example, he might place in the sun an atom in every respect similar to another in Sirius; and yet the Leibnitians deny, that it is absolutely impossible there can exist in the universe two points of matter perfectly similar, because such are indistinguishable from each other, and there can be no sufficient reason why the first did not occupy the place of the second, and the second that of the first. God will also be able to distinguish things that are perfectly alike, if he

sees that internal nature of each, which we call *individuation*, through which a thing is this and not that. Will it be affirmed, that this internal nature of things escapes the eye of Divine wisdom, or is discerned by it as the same in all? Moreover, there is always a certain physical reason why this thing is placed here rather than elsewhere, in the Divine action itself by which it is placed. There can be no moral reason for its being placed in one part of space rather than in another, beyond the Divine liberty and will. Thus also, when we choose anything, the physical reason of the election is our will itself producing the volition, and there is always some moral reason, since the will is not influenced by the unknown, nor acts without a motive; but there is no reason why the will chooses this rather than that, for, all motives or moral reasons being weighed, the will still retains the power of self-inclination, even in the direction in which the reasons have less weight; and thus it has been said with absolute truth, *I see and approve better things* (so also *more pleasant, useful*) *and follow worse.—Boscovich.*

P. 380, n. 3, c. 2, l. 8.—See above, vol. i. p. 412, n., c. 1, l. 4.

P. 384, l. 17.—If all things take place in accordance with an eternal and immutable law, there is an antecedent cause of everything, and if desire be thus caused, then also those effects that follow desire; wherefore, likewise, our assent. But if the cause of desire do not depend upon us, not even desire itself is in our power. If so, neither do the effects which desire brings about depend upon us. Neither our assent nor our actions, accordingly, are in our power; whence it follows, that there is no justice either in praise or blame, in honours or punishments. As this inference, however, is faulty, it may with probability be concluded, that all events are not subjected to an eternal and immutable law.—*Cicero.*

P. 385, n., c. 1, l. 8.—See above, vol. iii. p. 232, l. 3.

P. 387, n. 1, l. 6.—The axiom known under the name of *the principle of sufficient reason* extends even to actions which we consider as indifferent. The most free will cannot give rise to them without a determining motive, &c.,—the opposite doctrine is an illusion of the mind, which, losing sight of the fugitive reasons for the choice of the will in things indifferent, persuades itself that it is determined by itself and apart from the influence of motives.—*La Place.*

P. 391, n., c. 1, l. 3.—See above, vol. i. p. 573, l. 42.

P. 391, n., c. 1, l. 31.—

Hence firm maintain we primal seeds some cause
Must feel of rising motion unbestowed
By weight or blow reactive, whence alone
Upsprings this secret power by man possess'd:
Nought forming nought, as reason proves precise.
For weight forbids the credence that alone
Things by reaction move; yet, lest the mind
Bend to a stern necessity within,
And, like a slave, determine but by force,—
Though urged by weight, in time, in place, unfix'd,
Each primal atom trivial still declines.

Lucretius (Good).

P. 391, n., c. 2, l. 13.—See above, vol. i. p. 574, l. 16.

P. 394, l. 12.—From all this judge whether I have good ground for believing a doctrine so detrimental to human society. Certainly, when I consider that it is chiefly the Mahometans who are tainted by it, and among whom it is maintained and cherished at the present day, I am almost led to suspect that it was an invention of some one of the despots of Asia, of the class of Mahomet, Tamerlane, and Bajazet, or of some one of the other scourges of the earth, who, in order to gratify their ambition, required of their soldiers, whom a belief in predestination thoroughly possessed, an absolute surrender of themselves as so many cattle, even to the extent, when occasion demanded it, of cheerfully precipitating themselves, head foremost, into the moat of a besieged city, in order to serve as a bridge to the rest of the army.

I am well aware that it might be said that this doctrine is misapprehended by the Mahometans; but, howsoever that may be, what should we reasonably think of a doctrine that is so open to misconstruction, and that leads, rightly or otherwise, to consequences so monstrous?—*Bernier.*

P. 399, n., c. 1, l. 13.—There is a vast difference between the destiny of the orientals, especially since Mahomet converted a doctrine widely spread before his time into an article of faith, and the destiny of Greek polytheism. . . . The Greek struggles against destiny, and at the moment of succumbing to its power, gives proof of his freedom: the Mahometan blindly resigns himself before the issue; even when he strives, he acts as one to whom activity is of no avail. The first

murmurs against the power, and bears it impatiently; the second congratulates himself that it dispenses with action. The Greeks placed the blind force in destiny, and the purpose that opposes and combats it in man. According to the Mahometans, the blind force is in man; his power is merely passive, and the thought is in destiny. —*Frederic Ancillon.*

P. 401, l. 2.—Each has his appointed hour; a brief and irretrievable time is the life of all; but to extend our fame by our deeds, this is the office of virtue.—*Virgil.*

P. 401, n., c. 1, l. 3.—Brutus, I confess that civil war is grossly wicked; but whither the fates lead, virtue secure will follow. It shall be the crime of the gods to have made even me guilty.—*Lucan.*

P. 401, n., c. 2, l. 1.—

Since she died, not doom'd by heaven's decree,
Or her own crime, but human casualty.—*Virgil* (Dryden).

P. 405, l. 26.—Men are ridiculous; they cannot escape death, and yet they seek to rob it of two or three syllables that pertain to them. A fine cheat they think of practising upon it! Would it not be better to consent to die with a good grace, themselves and their names? . . . At least, all that their names can escape is, so to speak, but a grammatical death; the change of a letter makes them serviceable for nothing more beyond the embarrassment of the learned.—*Fontenelle.*

P. 407, l. 37.—

When the chaste Arria gave the reeking sword,
Drawn from her bowels, to her honoured lord:
Pœtus! she cried, for this I do not grieve,
But for the wound which Pœtus must receive.

Martial (Scott).

P. 414, l. 13.—What in another causes you anger, do not do to others.—*Isocrates.*

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P. 7, n., l. 4.—Man knows so little what God is, that he does not know what he himself is; . . . but as the essence of a God is to me incomprehensible, so his existence is inwardly manifest. The proof

is in myself; and, like me, each man carries the evidence within himself.—*Pascal.*

P. 8, l. 4.—See *Works*, vol. i. p. 291, n. 1, l. 2.

P. 10, n. 1, l. 3.—There inheres in our minds, I know not how, a certain presentiment, as it were, of future times; and it is found especially, and appears most clearly, in men of the greatest genius and loftiest souls.—*Cicero.*

P. 13, l. 4.—By what necessary laws each of the heavenly bodies is upheld in being. . . . But he showed that those who speculated on such matters acted foolishly. . . . He was surprised that it did not appear clear to them, that it is impossible for man to discover those laws.—*Xenophon.*

P. 17, n., l. 5.—See above, vol. i. p. 386, n. 1, l. 1.

P. 32, l. 10.—See above, vol. v. p. 295, l. 1.

P. 33, n. 1, c. 1, l. 10.—

A fugitive from heaven and prayer,
I mock'd at all religious fear,
Deep scienced in the mazy lore
Of mad philosophy; but now
Hoist sail, and back my voyage plough
To that bless'd harbour, which I left before.

For lo! that awful heavenly sire,
Who frequent cleaves the clouds with fire,
Parent of day, immortal Jove!
Late through the floating fields of air,
The face of heaven serene and fair,
His thund'ring steeds, and winged chariot drove;

When, at the bursting of his flames,
The ponderous earth, and vagrant streams,
Infernal Styx, [the dire abode
Of hateful Tænarus profound,
And Atlas to his utmost bound,
Trembled beneath the terrors of the god.

The hand of Jove can crush the proud
Down to the meanest of the crowd,
And raise the lowest in his stead;

But rapid fortune pulls him down,
And snatches his imperial crown,
To place, not fix it, on another's head.]

Horace (Francis).

P. 33, n. 1, c. 2, l. 4.—Remarkable for ardent sincerity of mind, and the most exalted piety towards God.—*Coplestone.*

P. 35, n., c. 1, l. 3.—Is the seat of God aught but the earth, and the sea, and the air, and the heavens, and virtue? Why seek the deities beyond? Jupiter is whatever you see, wherever you go.—[*Lucan.*]

P. 36, n.—I do not know that there is any metaphysical proof more striking, and that speaks more powerfully to the mind of man, than that founded on the admirable order that reigns in the universe; or that there is to be found a finer argument than the verse, *The heavens declare the glory of God.* It is thus that Newton, at the end of his *Optics* and *Principia*, brings forward no other proof. He discovered no reasoning in favour of Deity more convincing or beautiful than that which Plato puts into the mouth of one of the speakers in the dialogue, "You conclude that I possess an intelligent mind, because you apprehend order in my words and actions; on the same principle, from the order that is manifest in the universe, infer the existence of a supreme intelligence."—*Voltaire.*

P. 42, n. 1, l. 3.—Aristotle holds that cause is threefold. The first cause, he says, is the Matter itself, without which nothing can be made; the second is the Maker of the work; the third is the Form that is given to each work, as, for example, to a statue, for Aristotle calls this the Εἶδος. A fourth also, he says, is to be added to these, viz., the End of the whole work.

I shall explain these distinctions. The brass is the first cause of the statue, for it would never have been made, without that (material) of which it is founded or cast. The second cause is the artist, for the brass could not have been formed into a statue without the application of skilful hands. The third cause is the form, for the statue could not be called a doryphoros (a life-guardsman), or diadumenos (a prince wearing a diadem), unless the appropriate appearance had been impressed upon it. The fourth cause is the end proposed in the making of the thing, for, without some design, nothing would have been made. What is an end? That which induced the artist to make what he did make. This was money, if

he fabricated the statue with a view to sale; or glory, if he laboured for a name; or piety, if he intended it as a gift to a temple. Hence this also on account of which a thing is done, is a cause. Do you not think, that, among the causes of a work done, must be reckoned that without which it would not have been done?—*Seneca.*

P. 45, l. 22.—Can I but wonder, here, that any one can persuade himself, that certain solid and individual bodies move by their natural force and gravitation, and that a world so beautifully adorned was made by their fortuitous concourse? He who believes this possible, may as well believe, that if a great quantity of the one-and-twenty letters, composed either of gold or any other matter, were thrown upon the ground, they would fall into such order as legibly to form the *Annals* of Ennius. I doubt whether chance could make a single verse of them. How, therefore, can these people assert that the world was made by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, which have no colour, no quality (which the Greeks call ποιότης, *suchness*), no sense? Or that there are innumerable worlds, some rising, and some perishing, in every point of time? But if a concourse of atoms can make a world, why not a porch, a temple, a house, a city; which are works of less labour and difficulty? But really they prate so inconsiderately concerning the universe, that they seem to me never to have contemplated the wonderful magnificence of the heavens, which comes next under my consideration.—*Cicero* (Francklin).

P. 55, l. 14.—See above, vol. iii. p. 344, l. 5.

P. 61, l. 23.—Our minds become accustomed to objects that are our daily attendants, and constantly before our eyes; nor do we regard with wonder, or inquire into the reasons of things which we are in the habit of seeing; as if it were intended that novelty rather than magnitude should stimulate us to the investigation of causes.—*Cicero.*

P. 61, n. 1, l. 7.—See above, vol. i. p. 586, l. 34.

P. 62, l. 1.—There are some who view this sun, and the stars, and the seasons taking their departure at fixed periods, without feeling any awe.—*Horace.*

P. 62, l. 9.—Aristotle finely says, "Let us suppose a race of beings who had never as yet been upon the surface of the earth, but had constantly lived below ground in good dwellings, lighted up, adorned with statues and paintings, and furnished with all those appliances that are to be found in abundance among people whom we consider as in good circumstances. Suppose, further, that those beings had heard a

report of some forth-putting of will and power on the part of the gods. Thereupon the jaws of the earth are opened, and they emerge from their hidden abode, and come forth on the localities which we inhabit. When they see all of a sudden earth, sea, and sky; when they become aware of the size and number of the clouds, the force of the winds; when they contemplate the magnitude and beauty of the sun, and discover its function and influence in causing day by the diffusion of light through the entire heavens; and when, after night has darkened the earth, they behold the whole sky studded and adorned with stars, and become acquainted with the changes of light in the moon, according as it is new or on the wane, the risings and settings of all those orbs, and their eternally established and unchangeable courses,—seeing all these things, they will assuredly believe that there are gods, and that these are their works!"—*Cicero.*

P. 65, l. 25.—

> Why formed not nature man, with ample powers
> To fathom, with his feet, the unbottom'd main?
> To root up mountains with his mighty hands?
>
> *Lucretius* (Good).

P. 73, l. 33.—See above, vol. iii. p. 294, l. 16.

P. 76, l. 35.—See above, vol. v. p. 295, l. 15.

P. 80, l. 21.—Scattering some gods on the earth, others on the moon, and others on the remaining parts of the universe, as if Deity sowed them.—*Cicero.*

P. 80, l. 27.—The supreme Deity, who governs all the world, as the human mind the body over which it is placed.

Nor, in fact, can God himself be thought of in any other mode than as an intelligence independent and free, severed from all perishable concretion, conscious of and moving all things.

That there is some pre-eminent and eternal substance, and that this being is to be honoured and admired of mankind, the beauty of the world and the order of the heavenly bodies constrain us to acknowledge.

One law, eternal and imperishable, will restrain all nations; and there will be one God, as it were, the master and ruler of all.—*Cicero.*

P. 81, l. 7.—What is nature but God and the Divine Reason knit into the whole world and its parts? You may, as often as you will, sometimes call him the author of our affairs, and sometimes with

propriety speak of him as Jupiter, the best and the greatest, the thunderer and the stayer. Nor would you err were you to call the same being fate, for as fate is nothing more than the interwoven series of causes, he is the first cause of all upon which the others depend. You will fitly apply to him all names that indicate any power and operation of heavenly objects; his appellations are as diversified as his gifts to his creatures. . . . (The ancients) did not even believe that the Jupiter we worship in the Capitol and in the other temples, discharged thunderbolts from his hand; their Jupiter was the same as ours (the Stoics), the guardian and ruler of the universe, the mind and soul, the lord and maker of this world, to whom every name is appropriate.—*Seneca.*

P. 82, l. 34.—Hear, therefore, and impress these my sayings on your minds; what the omnipotent father foretold to Apollo, and Apollo to me, I, the eldest of the furies, disclose to you.—*Virgil.*

P. 83, l. 7.—We have heard how he who governs the immovable earth and the stormy sea; who himself alone, with righteous sway, rules over the cities also, and the mournful kingdoms of the shades, and the gods and the multitudes of men,—how he cut off the impious Titans and the monstrous band by his falling thunderbolts.—*Horace.*

P. 83, l. 15.—

Claims not the eternal sire his wonted praise?
Awful who reigns o'er gods and men supreme,
Who sea and earth—this universal globe
With grateful change of seasons guides;
From whom no being of superior power,
Nothing of equal, second glory, springs,
Yet first of all his progeny divine
Immortal honours Pallas claims.

Horace (Francis.)

P. 83, l. 28.—

From God derived, to God by nature join'd,
We act the dictates of his mighty mind:
And though the priests are mute, and temples still,
God never wants a voice to speak his will.
When first we from the teeming womb were brought,
With inborn precepts then our souls were fraught,
And then the Maker his new creatures taught.

Canst thou believe, the vast eternal Mind
Was e'er to Syrtes and Libyan sands confined?
That he would chuse this waste, this barren ground,
To teach the thin inhabitants around,
And leave his truth in wilds and deserts drown'd?
Is there a place that God would choose to love
Beyond this earth, the seas, yon heaven above,
And virtuous minds, the noblest throne for Jove?
Why seek we farther then? Behold around,
How all thou seest does with the God abound,
Jove is alike in all, and always to be found.

Lucan (Rowe).

P. 84, l. 6.—See above, vol. v. p. 295, l. 1.

P. 85, l. 16.—The testimony of peoples and nations at harmony on this one point.—*Lactantius.*

P. 85, l. 36.—We are accustomed to lay much weight on universal presumption. With us it is a token of truth,—*that something appears to all.* We thus infer, among other truths, the existence of the gods, on the ground that a belief in them is by nature implanted in all; and that there is nowhere to be found a nation cast so far beyond the pale of laws and morals as not to recognise some gods.—*Seneca.*

P. 86, l. 6.—This seems to be the most powerful argument adduced in favour of our belief in the existence of the gods, that there is no nation so barbarous, no person so savage, whose mind is not impressed with a belief in gods. Many form debased conceptions regarding them, for that is the ordinary effect of bad customs; all, nevertheless, hold as real a Divine power and nature. The consent, moreover, of all nations in one thing is to be regarded as a law of nature.—*Cicero.*

P. 92, n., c. 1, l. 6.—

. . . . .
My friend, what pleasure can you find
To live this mountain's back behind?
Would you prefer the town, and men,
To this wild wood and dreary den?
No longer moping, loiter here,
But go with me to better cheer.
Since animals but draw their breath,
And have no being after death;

Since nor the little nor the great
Can shun the rigour of their fate;
At least be merry while you may
The life of mice is but a day.

Horace (Francis.)

P. 92, n., c. 2, l. 6.—It is indeed amusing to hear the city mouse contend for the doctrine of Epicurus regarding the mortality of the soul. Is the depravity of cities, therefore, so great that even the mice in them profess atheism?

P. 106, l. 33.—These laws together constitute what is called the law of nature. All men and all human powers ought to be regulated by these sovereign laws, instituted by the Supreme Being. They are immutable and irrefragable, and the best possible, and, consequently, the basis of the most perfect government, and the fundamental rule of all positive laws; for positive laws are simply laws directed to the maintenance of the natural order of things, which is manifestly the most advantageous for the human race.—*Quesnai.*

P. 109, l. 1.—

For never, doubtless, from result of thought,
Or mutual compact, could primordial seeds
First harmonise, or move with powers precise.
But ever changing, ever changed, and vext,
From earliest time, through ever-during space,
With ceaseless repercussion, every mode
Of motion, magnitude, and shape essayed;
At length th' unwieldy mass the form assumed
Of things created.

. . . . .

For if thou weigh th' eternal tract of time
Evolved already, and the countless modes
In which all matter moves, thou canst not doubt
That oft its atoms have the form assumed
We bear ourselves this moment.—*Lucretius* (Good.)

P. 109, l. 19.—See above, vol. i. p. 586, l. 34.

P. 110, l. 13.—See above, vol. i. p. 586, l. 3.

P. 110, n., c. 1, l. 2.—See above, vol. ii. p. 586, n. 1.

P. 111, l. 6.—See above, vol. i. p. 611, l. 17.

P. 116, l. 14.—See above, vol. i. p. 609, n. E E E, l. 18.

P. 116, l. 26.—See above, vol. i. p. 609, l. 41.

P. 137, l. 25.—(The infant) a crying animal that will command the others.—*Pliny.*

P. 138, l. 15.—

Hence various arts: stern labour all subdues,
And ceaseless toil that urging want pursues.

Virgil (Sotheby.)

P. 138, l. 19.—

Not to dull indolence and transient toil
Great Jove resign'd the conquest of the soil:
He bade sharp care make keen the heart, nor deign'd
That sloth should linger where his godhead reign'd.
Ere Jove bore rule, no labour tamed the ground.

Virgil (Sotheby.)

P. 143, n., c. 1, l. 12.—What is life but a continual desire of new perceptions? It is passed in desire, and the whole interval between the rise and gratification of our longings we should like annihilated.

The whole amusements of men prove the misery of their condition. It is simply in order to escape disagreeable impressions that one man has recourse to chess, another to hunting. All seek, whether in serious or frivolous occupations, self-forgetfulness. . . .

We should find very few willing again to commence life and pass through those states of existence which they before experienced.—*Maupertuis.*

P. 162, l. 9.—And since the nature of the mind is simple, and since it contains nothing mixed up with it different from or unlike itself, it is not divisible, and, as indivisible, it is imperishable.—*Cicero.*

P. 166, n.—The *Metaphysical Meditations* of Descartes appeared in 1641. It was the one of all his works which its author most esteemed. The special characteristics of this work are its containing his celebrated demonstration of the existence of God, a proof so frequently repeated since his time, adopted by some and rejected by others; *and its being the first treatise in which the distinction of mind and matter is perfectly developed:* for, before Descartes, there was no adequate analysis of the philosophical proofs of the spirituality of the soul.—*Thomas.*

P. 168, n.—For my own part, when I contemplate the nature of the mind, I find indeed that it is much more difficult clearly to conceive

its character as it is in the body, a place, as it were, not its own, than to conceive it when it has left the body and come into the free heaven, which is, if I may so speak, its proper home.—*Cicero.*

P. 169, l. 32.—Think, I beseech you; can you suppose this wonderful faculty of Memory to be sown in, or to be a part of the composition of the earth, or of this dark and gloomy atmosphere?—*Cicero.*

P. 171, l. 24.—We do not even now discern with the eyes the things that we see; for there is no power of perception in the body; but, as we learn not only from natural philosophers but from anatomists who have opened our bodies and examined the parts, there are certain *pathways*, as it were, penetrating from the seat of the mind to the eyes, ears, and nostrils. And thus, hindered either by other thoughts or by the violence of some bodily disease, we frequently neither see nor hear, although our eyes are meanwhile open and sound; so that it is clearly the mind which both sees and hears, and not those organs that stand, as it were, in the relation of windows to it, and by means of which, however, the mind can perceive nothing, unless it be present to the object and act upon it. How is it that by the same mind we perceive things dissimilar, as colour, taste, heat, odour, sound? Of these the mind would know nothing by means of its five messengers, unless everything were conveyed to it, and it were itself the sole judge of all. And the objects of its perception will, indeed, be then much more truthfully and clearly discerned, when the mind shall have reached the condition of disengagement from the body, towards which nature impels it. For, in the present state, though nature has most skilfully constructed those open pathways that reach from the corporeal frame to the mind, they are yet, to some degree, closed up by earthy and concrete bodies; when, however, the mind shall be free from the body, there will be nothing in the way to prevent its perceiving every object as it is.—*Cicero.*

P. 181, l. 36.—

Did nature me unkindly treat;
Distorted both my hands and feet;
A hump unnatural on my back;
My loosen'd teeth of jetty black;
Or was I tortured with sharp pain,
In every muscle, every vein;

All this and more I would endure,
Of life's possession still secure.

Seneca (Morell).

P. 183, n., c. 2, l. 6.—Oh! happy I, if a kind fate should suffer me, falling under a similar fortune, to slip quietly away, even should I never rise again. Ah! how little should I envy the god widely flaming and girt with the full splendour of his rays, when mid heaven feels his burning four-horse team.—*Gray.*

P. 184, n., c. 1, l. 2.—To him who is conscious of having done no wrong is always present pleasing hope, the best nurse of old age, as Pindar says; for he has finely sung;—"Whosoever spends a just and holy life has for his companion sweet hope, cherishing his heart and fostering his old age, which most of all guides the course of the changing mind of man."—*Plato.*

P. 191, l. 17.—Is this that point which is divided among so many nations by fire and sword? . . . When thou hast raised thyself to those things that are truly great, as often as thou shalt see whole armies marching with banners displayed . . . thou mayest freely say:—

"The black squadron marches through the plain."

All this is but a business of ants that labour in a mole-hill.—*Seneca.*

P. 191, l. 23.—Oh shame! Oh headlong madness of brutish desire! How small the space in which glory vaunts itself, anger rages, fear paralyses, grief consumes, poverty scrapes together riches; by sword, stratagem, flame, and poison is it marked, and human affairs boil in restless tumult.—*Buchanan.*

P. 195, n.—See above, vol. i. p. 65, n. 1, l. 1.

P. 197, n., c. 1, l. 36.—M. de Sacy died the 26th October 1727, aged seventy-three, after a life of labours and virtue, leaving to his friends a memory to be highly cherished, to men of letters an example worthy of all imitation, and affording to the virtuous occasion of the greatest regret. Madame de Lambert, who was his senior by seven years, and whose pure and faithful friendship had formed the happiness of his life, survived to preserve and honour his memory. Though one for whom it well became him to mourn, he had not to shed tears over her departure. Thus nature, which had done so much for the prosperity of M. de Sacy, completed the measure of it by bestowing upon him a happy and peaceful old age, free from that painful feeling which leaves at the bottom of the heart the sense of an eternal and ir-

reparable loss; a feeling the impression of which is the greater that the soul is in some sort enticed to surrender itself to it, and experiences a species of pleasure in tasting its bitterness; a feeling the very sadness of which renders it in some measure desirable, since it leads us to regard death as a blessing conferred by nature, not because it puts an end to the tears which are dear to us, but because that misfortune of humanity, if to cease from suffering be a misfortune, is at least common to us with those we have tenderly loved, and affords us the consoling hope of very soon following them into that peaceful and eternal asylum, whither their shade has gone before us, and whither their voice calls us. Madame de Lambert, who survived M. de Sacy six years, continued always to cherish this feeling so dear to her heart. With this she joined a hope still more consoling, which a beneficent divinity permits virtuous minds to entertain, of being one day re-united, with the prospect of never having to lament over a separation; an expectation so well fitted to alleviate the grief of feeling hearts, and of which unhappy man was so pressingly in need, that he, so to speak, fled to it by anticipation, before the period when the Supreme and Eternal Goodness was willing fully to reveal it. A deep-seated and lively affection, deprived of a cherished object which it will never recover on earth again, and unable at the same time to bear the crushing thought of the object being for ever annihilated, inspired, interested, and enlightened the reason, so as to lead it to embrace with transport this precious trust in an immortal existence, the first desire of which must needs have sprung up, not in a cold and philosophic head, but in a heart that had loved [and lost].—*D'Alembert.*

P. 198, n., c. 2, l. 3.—The Éloges of Massillon, the Archbishop of Cambray, and of Flechier, are interesting and agreeable; but none of them contains marks of truer or more amiable sensibility than that of M. de Sacy. Its author there delineates friendship, like one who has felt it in all its charm and power. M. D'Alembert composed that éloge immediately after the loss of Mademoiselle de Lespinasse; we might suppose that this touching picture was traced on the tomb of his friend.—*Grimm.*

P. 208, l. 7.—They (the inhabitants of the Ladrones Isles) believe in the immortality of the soul. They even acknowledge a paradise and a hell, of which their ideas are odd enough. They hold that it is neither virtue nor vice that leads to the one or the other; good and bad actions are alike inefficacious.—*Le Gobien.*

P. 209, l. 11.—

Let me give that, which from their golden pot
Messala's proud and blear-eyed race could not:
To the just gods let me present a mind,
Which civil and religious duties bind,
A guileless heart, which no dark secret knows,
But with the generous love of virtue glows.
Such be the presents, such the gifts I make,
With them I sacrifice a wheaten cake.

Persius (Drummond.)

P. 221, l. 28.—That the abandoned might be placed under some kind of fear in this life, the ancients maintained that certain punishments of that sort were appointed for the wicked in the infernal regions; because they clearly perceived that, if a belief in these future punishments were taken away, death itself would not be greatly dreaded.—*Cicero.*

P. 225, l. 9.—In the community itself there are grades of duties, from which may be learned what obligation a man has to discharge to every one; that the first duties are owing to the immortal gods, the second to one's native country, the third to parents, and so on to others in their order.—*Cicero.*

P. 226, l. 20.—That neglect of the gods, which is prevalent in this age, had not then arisen, nor was any one at that time in the habit of wresting the laws to his own purpose by putting his private interpretation on an oath, but rather adapted his practice to them.—*Livy.*

P. 226, l. 28.—See above, vol. i. p. 302, n., c. 2, l. 33.

P. 227, l. 1.—See above, vol. i. p. 302, n., c. 2, l. 33.

P. 274, l. 16.—There is a certain subtler *sense*, which is the companion and governor of this faculty or speech, sufficiently strengthened even by the natural desire of knowing the truth, by which (sense) we approve all that is true, simple, trustworthy, and hate what is false, feigned, and fallacious.—For that mode of using speech which common utility demands, is *immediately* commended by the *sense* of every one. . . . Both the sense of the mind *per se*, and the common principle of utility, approve the unwavering resolution to make only such a use of speech as shall be in harmony with the thought of the speaker, and shall not mislead others.—*Hutcheson.*

P. 274, n. 2, l. 3.—The false is of itself base and blameworthy; the true honourable and to be praised.—*Aristotle.*

P. 290, l. 12.—

Vain as vanity are we!
Swift life's transient flames decay!
What this is, we soon shall be;
Then be merry whilst you may.—*Petronius.*

P. 303, l. 22.—

These were the stricter manners of the man,
And this the stubborn course in which they ran;
The golden mean unchanging to pursue,
Constant to keep the purposed end in view;
Religiously to follow nature's laws,
And die with pleasure in his country's cause;
To think he was not for himself design'd,
But born to be of use to all mankind.—*Lucan* (Rowe).

P. 305, l. 9.—See above, vol. vi. p. 96, l. 5.

P. 308, n., c. 2, l. 2.—The best men are often of an irritable temperament, but they are, at the same time, easily pacified; and this flexibility, so to speak, and sensitiveness of character, is usually the mark of a naturally good disposition.—*Cicero.*

P. 327, l. 8.—The right regulation of the fancy.—*Epictetus.*

P. 353, l. 17.—The habit of rectitude. (*Maxim.*)

P. 360, l. 6.—Virtuous actions are honourable, and for the sake of the honourable.—*Aristotle.*

P. 371, l. 22.—The terms *attraction, impulse, inclination to a centre*, I employ without distinction as convertible. I understand those powers not in a physical, but simply in a mathematical, sense. The reader is therefore cautioned against supposing, that by terms of this kind I anywhere designate a species or mode of action, or a physical cause or reason, or that I attribute to centres real physical powers (these being, in fact, merely mathematical points), should I be found to say that centres draw, or to speak of the powers of centres.—*Newton.*

P. 374, l. 44.—The Egyptians made gods of them (the stars), and among the Greeks the Stoics attributed to them divine souls. Anaxagoras was condemned for impiety, because he denied the soul of the sun. Cleanthes and Plato were more orthodox on that point. Philo ascribes to the stars, not merely souls, but very pure souls. Origen was of the same opinion; he held that the souls of those bodies had not always belonged to them, and that a separation would one day take place.

Avicenna ascribed to the stars an intellectual and sensitive soul. Simplicius believed them to be endowed with sight, hearing, and touch. Tycho and Kepler admit the existence of souls in the stars and planets. Baranzanus, a religious Barnabite, astronomer and theologian, attributes to them a species of soul intermediate between the intellectual and that of brutes. St. Thomas, indeed, who, in various passages of his works, had been sufficiently liberal in according to them intellectual souls, seems, in his seventh chapter *Contra Gentes*, to retract this opinion, and to be disposed to allow to them only sensitive souls.—*Maupertuis.*

P. 375, l. 16.—The stars also are correctly said both to be animated and to perceive and understand.

It is probable that there is a pre-eminent intelligence in the stars.—*Cicero.*

P. 375, l. 20.—The wild beasts were let loose in the woods, the stars in the sky.—*Virgil.*

P. 375, l. 22.—Nor will there be any region void of its living inhabitants,—the stars and the forms of the gods occupy the celestial soil; the earth received the wild animals.—*Ovid.*

P. 375, l. 26.—

> Now Sol's fair sister, viewing from afar
> His coursers yoked, and ready for the car
> (While Ocean roar'd beneath the rushing day,
> And redden'd with Aurora's orient ray),
> Collects her beams, recalls her scatter'd light,
> And with her whip compels the stars to flight.
>
> *Statius* (Lewis).

P. 375, l. 32.—A principle of intelligence, similar to that we denominate desire, aversion, memory.—*Maupertuis.*

P. 376, l. 3.—A sensation similar to *a blunted or dull power of touch.—Diderot.* . . . . Is M. Diderot in earnest when he makes this distinction?—*Maupertuis.*

P. 376, l. 17.—See above, vol. iii. p. 238, l. 5.

P. 376, l. 25.—We may, therefore, believe, that if these *movers* are endowed with any power of observing this diameter, it is so much acuter than our eye-sight as its operation and perennial motion is more constant than our disturbed and confused affairs.

Would you, therefore, O Kepler, attribute two eyes to each of the planets? By no means; that is not at all necessary, any more than to

ascribe to them feet and wings, in order to their movements.—*Kepler.*

P. 376, l. 46.—Some have supposed the existence of plastic natures, which, immaterial and unintelligent, execute in the universe all that matter and intelligence could accomplish. Experience informs us, that beings material and endowed with intelligence can act on body, though we are unable to comprehend how the action takes effect; but experience does not tell us, nor can we ever conceive, how immaterial substances, without the immediate concurrence of the all-powerful Being, can accomplish this. The matter will be still less comprehensible if we understand that those immaterial substances are, besides, devoid of intelligence; for in that case we not only no longer attach any idea to them which may serve to explain their operations, but we have no longer any idea whereby we may conceive their existence.—*Maupertuis.*

P. 382, n. D., l. 4.—*He who marries*, says Bacon, *gives pledges to fortune.* The man of letters who is a member of, or aspires to, the Academy, gives pledges to decorum. . . . Had there been an academy at Rome, prosperous and honoured, Horace would have felt flattered to sit beside his friend the sage Virgil. And what would such an honour have cost him? The effacing from his poetry certain impurities that disfigure it, by which the poet would have lost nothing, and the citizen would have done his duty. For the same reason, Lucretius, solicitous of the honour of calling Cicero his associate, would have retained of his poem only those sublime passages in which he appears as so great a painter, and suppressed the prosaic verses in which he inculcates atheism, that is, makes efforts as feeble as they are blameworthy, *to remove a check from powerful vice, and deprive unfortunate virtue of a source of consolation.*—*D'Alembert.*

P. 383, l. 6.—They who inquire of what opinion I myself am upon every point, are actuated by a principle of needless curiosity. For in discussion, the grounds of determination are to be sought for not so much in authority as in reason. But, besides, the authority of those who profess to teach, commonly proves a hindrance in the way of those who seek to learn; for these cease to exercise their own judgment, holding as established what they see already determined by him of whom they approve.—*Cicero.*

VOL. VIII.

P. 10, l. 13.—See above, vol. i. p. 22, l. 25.

P. 19, l. 28.—

The gods above send better things to those
Who fear them, and that error to their foes!

P. 70, l. 21.—For there was a time when men wandered about in the fields after the manner of the beasts, and lived on wild food. Everything was governed less by intelligence than by physical strength. Religion as yet had no existence; the law of human duty was not cultivated; the solemn tie of marriage was unknown; no child was certain of his parentage.—*Cicero.*

P. 79, l. 31.—

They began to fortify towns, and to lay down laws,
To guard against theft, or robbery, or adultery.

Horace.

P. 92, n. 2, l. 1.—We observe, in the speech concerning manners, delivered to the people by P. Scipio as censor, that, among the violations of ancestral institutions which he reprehended, was this, that a son who was adopted gave to the father who adopted him the legal rights of a natural father.—*Aulus Gellius.*

P. 103, n., l. 2.—Mendicity is an evil which ere long kills its man. —*Vauban.*

P. 144, l. 35.—By way of joke, he asked him, "Whether he was in the habit of walking on his hands?"—*Val. Maximus.*

P. 147, l. 31.—

More fell than arms, came luxury, and avenged
A conquered world.—*Juvenal.*

P. 182, l. 29.—Our ancestors, when they praised a good man, called him "*a good farmer, and a good husbandman.*" That was regarded as the highest expression of commendation. The merchant, however, I regard as a person who is active and zealous in the pursuit of wealth; but (as I have said above) exposed to hazard and loss. Of the husbandmen, on the other hand, are produced the bravest of men and the best of soldiers; their occupation is in the highest degree honourable and stable, the freest possible from hate. Those also

who are engaged in that pursuit are the least of all given to evil thoughts.—*M. Cato.*

P. 191, n. †, c. 2, l. 15.—

Spare now the grinding hand, ye mill-women; sleep on full soundly,
Even though chanticleer's voice herald the dawning of day.
Lo, Ceres hath bidden her Nymphs to take up the toil of your hands;
Now, on the rim of the wheel light leaping, they whirl it about;
Aneath their light pressure the axle hurries with fast-rolling spokes,
Turning the ponderous bulk of the hollowed millstone round.
Thus do we taste again the life of the ages primeval,
When, without labour of hands, we are sharers in Deo's gifts.
—*Antipater of Thessalonica.*

P. 284, n. †, l. 7.—

ON THE WONDERS OF HOLLAND.

I shall relate the unknown wonders of thy land, Dousa, which will seem incredible to foreigners. The wool here wearies all the looms of Minerva, and yet it is a fact that here are no wool-bearing flocks. Our towns cannot hold our carpentery, and yet our soil yields no timber to the workmen. Our granaries burst with piles of wheat, but all our land is pasture and not arable. Here abundant jars of wine are crowded in our cellars, but the pruner has no vineyards to cultivate. Here there is little or no crop of lint, and yet where is there more linen-manufacture? Here, who could believe it? we live in the midst of the waters, and yet here, Dousa, no water is drunk.—*Joseph Scaliger.*

P. 429 (App.), l. 4.—To make it apparent that there is a *maximum* both in population and in agriculture, I beg the reader's attention to the following observations. Let us, in the first place, suppose all Europe to be as fully peopled as it is capable of; it is calculated that it would contain four or five times as many inhabitants as there actually are. In that case, it would be absolutely necessary that the whole soil should be rigidly cultivated in order to support such a population. We will further take it for granted, that, by means of superior legislation and administration, all the gradations of class are justly distributed, and have, in short, their due proportion and harmony in all the parts of the various States and Governments. Europe

arrived at this point in population and culture, where is it to stop? Is it possible to arrest the further progress of the population, and how? It will be necessary to plant colonies in America and elsewhere; but this resource would not suffice; and it is to be feared that fierce and deadly wars would follow in the train of pestilence and famine. This latter scourge would soon commence its ravages; it would be the natural result of that great and universal population which we assume to exist. The yearly fruits of the earth would unquestionably be every year consumed by the respective inhabitants of each country. Now it is certain that, in the order of nature, the crops fail in every country after a certain number of years. Every country, then, in its turn would of necessity be reduced to starvation; each country, needing its own products to support its own inhabitants, could not supply its neighbours.

Let us extend our observations still further. Some naturalists maintain that our terrestrial globe has but one vegetable crust, which exhausts itself by culture, and becomes at last dry and sterile. They allege that the deserts of Arabia were formerly fertile countries, and the original residence of the human race.

Without searching into this question, every one knows that the earth is renewed by rest, that it frequently demands it in order to preserve its fecundity. Every one knows how rapid is the vegetation when a new soil is forced to recompense the first labours of the cultivator. There must then be alternations of rest and of culture; there must be a reserve of food, uncultivated lands, uninhabited countries, for the order, the harmony, and the preservation of the whole. It would appear not to enter into the designs of Providence, that the globe we inhabit should be throughout equally cultivated and peopled. This transient state of perfect opulence, if it could exist, would entail with it the greatest misfortunes. We have not attained the knowledge of the sovereign good; apparent imperfections often conspire for the preservation of the whole. We see but one part of the picture; false lights dazzle us; perfection is not the appanage of a single portion, but the result of the whole.

To multiply human beings, says Mirabeau the elder, without increasing the means of subsistence, is to devote them to the punishment of famine. This phenomenon is rare, and can only arise from defective administration and police; but, on the other hand, to increase the means of subsistence without multiplying the consumers is

a dangerous chimera, and one which can never last beyond a single year. The physical limits of the population of a country are not absolutely dependent on the products of the soil, when commerce and navigation, seconded by credit, circulation, and unrealised property, are in a healthy state,—witness Holland. It is rather the cultivation that is absolutely regulated by the internal consumption, or the precarious national exports. When population exceeds wealth, the vice is inherent in the body politic, and the whole machinery of the state is deranged. In that emergency every portion of it must be attended to, and the remedy applied everywhere at once. It becomes necessary then, as Lord Bolingbroke says, speaking of another subject, to imitate the great operations of nature, and not those of art, which are always slow, feeble, and imperfect. We ought not to proceed as a statuary does in forming a statue, now shaping the head, and now another part; but as nature operates in the formation of an animal, or any other of her products; *she begets and produces the rudiments of all the parts simultaneously*, throwing off at once the plan of each existence, and the elements of all its parts. All vegetables and animals grow in bulk, and increase in force; but they are the same from the beginning. There must be a constraining power, to bind together the orders of the State, as the keystone of an arch holds up the total structure. In a great kingdom, agriculture, commerce, manufactures, circulation, public credit, internal police, finance, the war establishment, colonies, navigation, the marine, moderate luxury, ought all to progress in a reciprocal proportion, for the preservation of the harmony of the State, the good order and the prosperity of a nation.

The extension of its frontiers does not alone constitute the power of a State; but it is a great advantage, as it admits an increased number of subjects who can find subsistence. Nor is the mere number possessed of the means of subsistence everything. There must be ease of circumstances; and this, in a large population, requires a plurality of classes, and cannot be confined to the pursuit of agriculture alone. If the population of France were at its maximum, the foreign market, or the exportation of grain, would be almost useless. It ought to be regarded as a supplement to, or as a remedy for, the want of people to consume the produce of the soil, a channel of commerce for the support of agriculture and the benefit of the population. The true secret of government, however, is not the increase of population, but

the harmony of all its parts and the equilibrium of all classes.—*Pinto.*

P. 438, l. 23.—The real circulation of money is immense in the daily and domestic outlay of business. The same crown-piece can *tumble* in twenty-four hours through fifty different hands, and will have represented, in the circulation which it has undergone, fifty different things; so that if these fifty persons met together at night, they would find that they had laid out and paid fifty crowns, notwithstanding that there was really but one, which, by its circulation, represented fifty. Suffice it to say, that there is not in the whole world one-half the money represented by the expenditure in one year in the single city of Paris, if we take into account the total outlay of money payment, from the first of January to the last of December, among all classes of the community, from the king's palace down to the beggar who spends a halfpenny per day on bread.

This circulation is rendered enormous by the multiplicity of simultaneous and repeated operations everywhere and at every moment; but there is another gross circulation which is made by means of credit and of paper, which represents money, as money represents goods. The illustration of the crown-piece shows that a particular trader, possessed of credit, can, independently of the terms accorded to him for the payment of his purchases, put his paper into circulation and get the benefit of that of others, thus multiplying his commercial resources in facilitating circulation. A bill of exchange has not unfrequently ten indorsements, and often represents the same value to ten different persons. These are important facts; though sufficiently understood, they are not to be called trivial.—*Pinto.*

P. 439, l. 4, and above, p. 378, l. 32.—During the siege of Tournay, in 1745, communication having been cut off for some time before, embarrassment was felt from want of money to pay the garrison. It occurred to them to borrow from the canteen the sum of 7000 florins. This was all the money in the canteen. At the end of the week, the 7000 florins were returned to the canteen, from which the same sum was again borrowed. This process was subsequently repeated for seven weeks up to the period of the surrender, so that the 7000 florins became in reality 49,000.—*Pinto.*

P. 416, l. 42.—

> The love of money grows, as grows the store,
> Who least possesses longs the least for more.—*Juvenal.*

VOL. IX.

P. 37, l. 7.—The true interest of Europe, taken as a whole, demands, at all times, the greatest possible development of the forces and faculties of the several nations which form parts of it. If Russia and Portugal employ English capital and workmen to stimulate their native manufactures, a circumstance so little natural implies something vicious in the system of their industry, or, indeed, an organisation utterly defective. If those defects could be remedied, not only would the nations immediately interested find it to their advantage, but, in virtue of that general connexion which binds together the productive forces of Europe, this advantage would react on all the other nations.

But should this radical improvement not take place, it is a plain and unquestionable benefit, not only to the countries which stand in need of foreign capital and labour, but to the general system of European industry, that the forces and resources of England should supply what is defective elsewhere. The evil would be infinitely greater if these fields of human activity, which are now rendered productive by English capital and labour, remained entirely uncultivated. The latter evil would be absolute, the former is but relative; it is only an evil in so far as it implies others more real; in every other respect it is a good.—*Gentz.*

P. 37, l. 36.—It is for the interest of Europe, when well understood, that all its component parts, all the countries, agricultural, manufacturing, or commercial, should attain the highest possible degree of prosperity. It is then, and in all circumstances will be, for the true interest of Europe, that each nation should participate in the general wealth of the world, and, consequently, also, in colonial possessions and in the commerce of both Indies, as much (and if possible neither more nor less) as its particular situation, industrial wants, its habits, its powers, and the most perfect development of all its productive energies demand.

From this high point of view, it will always be the wish not only of the philanthropist who interests himself in the wellbeing of all peoples, but also of every enlightened statesman who understands the

connexion of the laws that form the general economy of our system, that, at the end of the existing war, every nation adapted for maritime commerce should regain its just measure of colonial dominion, commerce, and industry. But this elevated point of view must be carefully distinguished from that equally false and narrow view which forms the ground of those complaints we hear raised on every side against the commercial superiority of the English. The former is quite beyond the scope of the authors of these complaints. If it could be grasped, if it could even be suspected by the multitude, we should long ago have ceased to hear these declamations against England.—*Gentz.*

P. 39, l. 12.—An improvement in the *internal administration* of all states, a wise and liberal legislation, more care in watching over the interests of commerce and of industry, and in searching into the sources of the true prosperity of nations,—all these propositions, these plans for a radical reform in the economic system of Europe, are sure to meet the assent of all enlightened and philanthropic persons. Blessings on the government that will embrace them in their whole extent! and thanks be to the writer who shall be sufficiently gifted with power and eloquence to rouse from their lethargy those hitherto failing, either in wit to comprehend, or in will to practise them! It is with these arms, and with these alone, that Europe should contend against England. Doubtless the result of such a contest would not answer the malicious expectations of envy, nor the senseless wishes of credulous ignorance, of an ill-conceived mercantile policy, of a self-contradictory and self-destructive cupidity that rushes after chimerical advantages. The commercial superiority of the English will not be annihilated by the elevation of all the other nations of Europe to a higher degree of perfection. But all will possess that which suits them; all, by a wise and free exercise of their activity, will put forth their natural powers, in the order, in the degree, and under the conditions which nature and their position have assigned them; all will be great, energetic, and powerful, in virtue both of their own individual greatness, and of the greatness of all the rest. Europe will raise itself without England's being therefore abased, and intelligent men of every country will have difficulty in comprehending how the time could ever have been when it was imagined, that the riches of the one necessarily involved the impoverishment of the rest.—*Gentz.*

P. 155, l. 19.—See above, vol. i. p. 530, n. B, l. 3.

P. 158, l. 1.—The interest of money ought not to be regulated by the sovereign. I suppose its present value to be barely four per cent., and that vessels from the Spanish Main, bringing great sums, are expected; if these arrive in safety, the interest will fall to three per cent. If they do not arrive, ought not I to profit by it, and get five per cent. for my money? Money is like an article of merchandise. I have a store of English cloth which is worth six livres the span. If the sovereign fixed the price of our cloth at six livres, he should be doing me wrong: for if a quantity of cloth came into the market, I could not sell mine at six livres; I should be obliged at least to reduce it, and the sovereign would not make good my loss. If that cloth do not arrive, as I run the risk of loss ought I not to enjoy the advantage which the natural price of the cloth then gives me? To reduce the interest, money must be rendered less valuable, by increasing the amount or diminishing the demand. It is two hundred years since the rate of interest was ten per cent., now it is five, and in some places three per cent.; but it is not legislation which has reduced it, but *the increase of the quantity of money since the discovery of the Indies.—Law.*

P. 158, l. 27.—The principles here developed by Mr. Law are so obvious that it is impossible to refuse one's assent to them with any justice. But here he begins to diverge from the truth, by looking at things too much in the general, without having regard to special circumstances; and his system was a result of what he here advances on the subject of interest. If circulation were very near its natural level, probably sovereigns would not need to regulate the rate of interest. But, as in states, where the circulation seems best established, there still subsist numerous causes of obstruction, the proprietors of money always constitute the smallest number, and thus exercise a genuine monopoly.—*French Editor of Law's Memoir.*

P. 159, l. 8.—It follows that the price of money ought not to be fixed any more than that of other commodities, the price of which is regulated by their abundance or scarcity; but the hardness and greed of creditors, the troubles excited by their severity in various states, the manifestly greater facility of converting money into a monopoly, by means even of high interest, than any other commodity, the suggestions, in fine, of Christian charity, have urged legislators to interfere in a transaction which naturally ought to be free.—*French Editor of Law's Memoir.*

P. 159, l. 20.—An opinion broached in France, for the first time, by Mr. Law; it is, that the State ought not to regulate the rate of interest. This opinion, *in itself correct*, has ceased to be so in practice, from various circumstances; and perhaps would hold true still, if legislators had never interfered in that kind of regulations. But since ever they took upon themselves this charge, there seems reason to fear that the benefit of a diminution never became general in any State. Experience at least proves, that the old rate contributes to all succeeding time those difficulties and obstructions which keep interest below its natural level. The rate for money invested in the public funds is at present from four to four and a half per cent., while for mercantile loans it continues to be six.—*French Editor of Law's Memoir.*

P. 178, l. 7.—See above, vol. ix. p. 159, l. 20.

P. 187, n., c. 2, l. 4.—By use and wont everywhere the ancient law was annulled, and, in bottomry and other maritime transactions, no limit was set to the price of the risk, insomuch that even more than twelve per cent. of interest might lawfully be bargained for.—*Lampredi.*

P. 194, l. 14.—I think that by the law of nature compound interest is always due, even though not promised. For he who employs my money, and for the use of it promises me yearly interest, when he does not pay that interest, has more than his own. He uses a privilege that belongs to another; something is wanting to me, whence I could derive gain if my debtor paid his interest; and thence it follows from the nature of the obligation, that the value of that, which by the deed of the debtor I lack, that is, the interest of the interest, ought to be paid.—*H. de Cocceius.*

P. 196, l. 2.—It must be observed, however, that the husbandman, furnishing, as he does, to all the most important and considerable object of their consumption (I mean their food, and the raw material of almost every work besides), has the advantage of a more decided independence. His labour, in the order of occupations shared among the different members of society, preserves the same primacy, the same pre-eminence, which the labour providing for his sustenance held among the diverse labours which he was obliged, in his solitary state, to devote to the supply of his varied wants. This primacy is not one of honour or of dignity, it is simply *a physical necessity*. The husbandman, absolutely speaking, can dispense with the services of

other workmen, but no workman can labour unless the husbandman furnish him with the means of subsistence.—*Turgot.*

P. 198, l. 27.—(Gavel-kind) an ancient custom of the Anglo-Saxons, derived from Germany, by which all the sons inherited their father's estate in equal portions (as daughters do when there are no male heirs). The brothers of a man succeeded in like manner to his property, if he died without issue; and if there were no brother, the sisters similarly.—*Spelman.*

P. 198, l. 36.—A man's children, however, are his heirs and successors, and they make no wills. If there are no children, the next in succession are brothers, paternal uncles, maternal uncles. The more relatives one has, and the more connexions by marriage, the more is old age esteemed; and there is no inducement to childlessness.—*Tacitus.*

P. 199, l. 12.—Along with the family and dwelling-house and rights of succession, are handed over the horses; the son inherits them, not, as *in the case of the other property, in virtue of primogeniture,* but of his courage and superiority in war.—*Tacitus.*

P. 358, l. 34.—The people like the ballot, which reveals the faces but hides the minds of men; and gives them the liberty to act as they please.—*Cicero.*

P. 359, l. 2.—For who is not aware that the Ballot Act destroyed all the influence of the aristocracy?—a measure which no free people ever desired, but those oppressed by the power and tyranny of princes have earnestly demanded. . . . Accordingly that practice never found a good mover or seconder. For there are four laws relating to the ballot. . . . The votes of the aristocracy ought to be known, those of the people free. By this measure an appearance of liberty is given, while the influence of the better class is preserved.—*Cicero.*

P. 362, n. †, l. 4.—

> As, when in tumults rise the ignoble crowd;
> Mad are their motions, and their tongues are loud;
> And stones and brands in rattling volleys fly,
> And all the rustic arms that fury can supply:
> If, then, some grave and pious man appear,
> They hush their noise, and lend a list'ning ear:
> He soothes with sober words their angry mood,
> And quenches their innate desire of blood.
>
> *Virgil* (Dryden).

P. 372, n. †, c. 2, l. 1.—

And made her rule dear to the intractable Englishman,
Who can neither be a slave nor live in liberty.

Voltaire.

P. 393, l. 27.—But these times were so infected and debased with adulation, that not only the chiefs of the state, who needed to shield their own dignity by obsequiousness, but all the past consuls, a great portion of the past prætors, and many of the pedarian senators, used to contend who should rise first to propose base and excessive flatteries. We are informed by tradition, that Tiberius, as often as he went out of the Senate-house, used to exclaim in Greek, *O men, prepared for slavery!* Even he, inimical as he was to public liberty, was disgusted with servility so abject.—*Tacitus.*

P. 405, n. 1, c. 1, l. 4.—See above, vol. iii. p. 399, n. A A, l. 6.

P. 415, l. 16.—See above, vol. iii. p. 398, n., c. 2, l. 2.

P. 415, n. 1.—See above, vol. iii. p. 397, n. 1, l. 2.

P. 416, n. 1, l. 1.—The ancients have been unjustly accused of having had no conception of a limited monarchy. Aristotle has laid down its principle of balances in his distinction of the three powers, and Lycurgus made it the basis of the Lacedæmonian government.—*Barthélemy.*

P. 416, l. 19.—I believe that the best form of government is a moderate combination of royalty, aristocracy, and commons.—*Cicero.*

P. 416, l. 25.—As in the music of a lyre or flute, and also of human voices, a certain combination is obtained from distinct sounds, which, when unvaried and discordant, the instructed ear cannot endure, but which, by the modulation of the most dissimilar notes, becomes symphonious and accordant; so in a state, by a well-regulated intermixture of the highest, the lowest, and the middle ranks, a unison, even as of sounds, is produced out of elements the most dissimilar. What musicians call harmony in singing, that in a commonwealth is concord, the best and surest bond of safety in every state; which, without justice, cannot possibly exist.—*Cicero.*

P. 417, l. 8.—The government of all nations and cities is either democratic, aristocratic, or vested in a single ruler. A government combining these three elements, and republican in form, is more easily praised than established; and even if it could be established, it could not be of long duration.—*Tacitus.*

P. 420, l. 16.—Solon being asked, whether he had given the best

laws to his citizens, replied, that they were the best of those which they were willing to accept. So Plato, seeing the intolerable corruption of morals among his countrymen, held aloof from any public function, remarking, that we should deal with our country as with our parents, not using force but persuasion, entreaty and not controversy. Similar was the caution of Cæsar's adviser, "Not to fall back on ancient institutions which had long ago become a mockery through the corruption of manners." Cicero, also, in writing to his friend Atticus, charges Cato the second with this error: "Cato's sentiments are admirable, but he sometimes does mischief to the commonwealth; for he talks as if he were in the republic of Plato, and not among the dregs of Romulus.—*Bacon.*

P. 435, l. 21.—By order of the people, with the sanction of the senate. The senate, says Livy, ordained, the people commanded.—*Cicero.*

P. 435, l. 24.—For at that time a magistrate-elect did not enter on his office, unless the senate had ratified the appointment.—*Cicero.*

VOL. X.

P. xxxi. l. 18.—Abundance of matter begets fulness of language; and if the subject be worthy, there will, in the nature of things, be a certain richness of style. Supposing, that is, that the speaker or writer has received a liberal education in youth, that he is an eager student, that he is favoured by nature, that he has been thoroughly exercised in every kind of discussion, and that he has selected the most accomplished writers and orators for study and imitation. He will not require, indeed, these masters to guide him in the composition and embellishment of his language; so easily does nature itself, if only disciplined, fall, without any guidance, into adornments of speech, when there is no lack of matter.—*Cicero.*

P. xlii. l. 24.—Men go to wonder at mountain heights, at the huge waves of the sea, at the lofty falls of rivers, at the course of ocean, and the circuit of the stars; but *themselves* they leave behind, nor wonder at.—*St. Augustine.*

P. 39, l. 27.—

Rely not always on the general voice;
Nor place all merit in the people's choice;
Let your own eyes be those with which you see;
Nor seek in others what yourself should be.

Persius (Drummond).

P. 46, n., c. 1, l. 11.—

PARIS, *March* 3, 1778.

The wish, Sir, to be recalled to your remembrance, when one has had the honour of your acquaintance, ought not to surprise you. Permit, then, my mother and myself to seize the opportunity afforded for this, by a new edition of the *Maxims of Rochefoucauld*, of which we take the liberty to offer you a copy. You see we cherish no malice, since the ill you have spoken of it in the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* does not prevent us from sending you that very work. Indeed, I was very near doing something more than that, for I had perhaps the temerity to undertake a translation of your *Theory;* but after I had finished the first part, I saw the Abbé Blavet's translation appear, and was forced to renounce the pleasure which I should have had in rendering into my native tongue one of the best works in yours. It would have been in that case quite necessary to attempt a justification of my grandfather. It would not, perhaps, have been difficult to excuse him, in the first place, by saying, that he had always seen mankind at court and in civil war, *two stages on which they are certainly worse than elsewhere;* and thereafter to justify, by the personal conduct of the author, the principles which in his book are undoubtedly too widely generalised. He took a part for the whole; and seeing that those who came most under his observation were actuated by *self-esteem*, he made that the general motive principle of all mankind. Besides, though his work is in some respects open to objection, it is nevertheless to be esteemed even for its matter, and very greatly for its form.

May I ask if we are soon to have a complete edition of the works of your illustrious friend Mr. Hume? We have sincerely regretted him.

Accept, I beg, the sincere expression of all the sentiments of esteem and attachment, with which I have the honour to be, Sir, your very humble and obedient servant,

THE DUKE OF ROCHEFOUCAULD.

P. 56, l. 22.—See *Works*, vol. i. p. 71, l. 15.

P. 57, l. 10.—See above, vol. i. p. 22, l. 5.

P. 70, l. 14.—

Daphnis, graft pears, thine heirs shall pluck the fruit.

—*Virgil.*

P. 86, n. E, l. 8.—I became acquainted with Smith during a visit he made to France about 1762. He spoke our language very ill; but the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, published in 1758, had given me a great idea of his sagacity and depth. And indeed I regard him at this day as one of those men who have made the most complete observations and analyses in all the questions which he has treated. M. Turgot, who was, like myself, fond of metaphysics, had a high opinion of his talent. We saw him several times; he was introduced at the house of Helvetius; we spoke of the theory of commerce, banking, public credit, and many points of the great work he was then meditating.—*Morellet.*

P. 91, l. 28.—Jean Claude Marie Vincent, of Gournay, &c., died at Paris on the 27th June last (1759), aged 47.

He was born at St. Malo, in May 1712, of Claude Vincent, one of the most considerable merchants of that city, and king's secretary. His parents destined him to a commercial life, and sent him to Cadiz in 1729, when he was barely seventeen.—*Turgot.*

P. 94, l. 1.—He was of opinion that all taxes are, ultimately viewed, paid by the landlord, who sells for so much the less the produce of his land; and that if all taxes were assessed on funds, the land-owners and the kingdom would gain all that is absorbed in the collection of the excise, all the expenditure or barren employment of broken men, whether in raising the taxes, in smuggling, or in the preventive service, without reckoning the enormous augmentation of wealth and goods resulting from the increase of commerce.—*Turgot.*

P. 94, l. 16.—He had the good fortune to find in M. Trudaine the same love of truth and that public spirit which animated himself. As he had not hitherto developed his principles, save in an occasional way, in the discussion of affairs or in conversation, M. Trudaine induced him to publish something as a specimen of his main doctrine; and it was with this view that he translated, in 1752, the treatises on commerce and on the interest of money, of Josiah Child and Thomas Culpepper.—*Turgot.*

P. 94, l. 30.—Between these two schools, availing themselves of both, but carefully avoiding identification with either, certain eclectic philosophers have arisen, at the head of whom must be placed M. Turgot, the Abbé Condillac, and the celebrated Adam Smith; and among whom are entitled to a very honourable place the translator of the latter, the Senator Germain Garnier, Lord Lansdowne in England, M. Say in Paris, M. Simond at Geneva.—*Editor of Turgot's Works.*

P. 96, l. 24.—See above, vol. ix. p. 159, l. 20.

P. 97, l. 6.—The law of perfect freedom in commerce is a corollary to the right of property.

P. 125, l. 13.—There have been many writers of history, but by universal consent two in particular far excel the rest, whose diverse merits have won almost equal praise. Thucydides is pithy, concise, and ever presses on. Herodotus is sweet, clear, and diffuse. The former surpasses in the exhibition of the more vehement emotions, the latter of the milder; the one subdues, the other charms us to admiration.—*Quintilian.*

P. 139, l. 5.—He indeed chastised the chiefs of the people and every class of the people themselves. . . . But yet when the doughty Scipio and the mild philosophical Lælius withdrew into retirement from the bustle of public life, they used to jest with him, and abandon themselves to fun, while the frugal supper of herbs was being prepared.—*Horace.*

P. 174, l. 24.—In the style of that admirable writer Livy, Pollio Asinius thinks he can trace a certain inherent *Patavinity.* If possible, therefore, let one's whole diction, and even voice, indicate a native of this city; so that the speech may be unmistakably Roman, and not merely admissible by right of naturalisation.—*Quintilian.*

P. 268, l. 23.—See above, vol. v. p. 46, l. 21.

P. 273, l. 26.—Men believe that their reason rules their language; but it is the case also that words reflect their own influence upon the reason.—*Bacon.*

P. 287, l. 14.—The power of recalling the mind from the influence of the senses, and withdrawing the thoughts from the operation of habit, denotes a great intellect.—*Cicero.*

P. 325, n. A, l. 13.—Thomas Reid, a native of Aberdeen, a colleague of my boyhood and childish leisure under Thomas Cargill, devoted himself earnestly, under Lipsius, to the course of study pur-

sued at Louvain, and taught it with great reputation in Germany, winning the regard of princes. He lived long in London, in the suite of Fulke Greville, one of the king's privy councillors and vice-treasurer of England, by whose introduction he was advanced to the royal friendship, admitted to the household, and made Latin secretary to the king. He wrote much, displaying great talent and varied learning, as, &c. Subsequently he disappeared from the palace, unknown to any one, while all were predicting his speedy advancement to higher honours; nor could any trace be found of his after occupation or residence. Many suspected that, wearied with the court life, he had withdrawn into monastic retirement, about the year 1618. It was rumoured afterwards that he had returned to court, and been restored to well-earned honours; but his merits will never obtain full recognition.—*Dempster.*

P. 326, l. 1.—There is a very elegant lament, *On the Death of Thomas Reid*, by Robert Aytoun, a man eminent both in letters and in station, in the *Deliciæ Poëtarum Scotorum*, where also are to be found his own poems, very few in number, indeed, but distinguished by grace and elegance.—*Editor of the Poet. Scot. Musæ Sacræ.*

P. 326, n. C, l. 5.—(Dr. Moor) equally happy and at home in mathematics as in Greek literature.—*Simson.*

ADDENDA.

VOL. I.

P. 557, l. 4.—As when one of the sister wood-nymphs, wandering through fresh woodlands and sequestered fields, is induced by the pure stillness and the cool shade to stretch herself on the green margin of a fountain; whilst bending face-forward, she hangs over the watery mirror, she wonders to see a nymph of a sudden come to meet her as she stoops. Then, playfully sporting with her sister, she observes that the nymph has the same limbs and countenance as herself, takes the same step, and retreats with her to the wood. She recognises herself in the wave. So, in the internal sense, the mind puts in motion the images of things, and consciously observes its own aspects.—*Gray.*

VOL. III.

P. 214, l. 30.—In surveying from a distance the planet we inhabit, what do we behold? The faults and errors of men. Here is a synod, there a divan. We shall see the Mufti, the Dervis, the Imaun, the Bonze, the Lama, the Talapoin, the Pope, the ancient Rabbis, and the European Abbés, our monks, prelates, doctors in congregation. Are you dogmatical and disputatious, my friend? Pray travel.—*Rulhiere.*

VOL. IV.

P. 85, n. 1, c. 2, l. 9.—Nor is it necessary that thou shouldst cram thyself with grammatical trifles, and weary in gloomy schools.

. . . Nor needest thou be disturbed by a barbarous phrase, or a solecism heedlessly breaking from a stammering tongue. . . . *It is a degradation of sacred mysteries to force them under the yoke of grammatical halters.—Buchanan.*

P. 130, n. 1, l. 1.—Presently, when the thick ranks are spread out wide throughout the smaller circle, and press in crowds on the goal, debarring easy access, the rolling ball is more cautiously launched, and lightly insinuates itself among them. If the player sees it creeping lazily along, and its motion suddenly languish, he presses on its track from behind with anxious attention, chides its lingering, and hangs over the running orb. That he may not lose his credit as a player, he blames the uneven ground, and a knotty protuberance in the way. Nor can a laugh be restrained when a very bad shot is made, or the lead carries the bowl too far one way, and the inwrought bias draws it from the right course. Then the thrower breaks out into insane ejaculations, and, twisting himself in all directions, inveighs against imaginary defects and abuses the bowl. It, however, despises this absurd indignation, and pursues its way, unmoved and deaf to all complaints.—*Addison.*

P. 171, l. 24.—All men are bad! So say these hateful souls, that set of false men and women, the agreeable gentry, without principles or manners, base and jealous spirits, who assert themselves by despising every one else. In vain do these frightful people, who know neither check nor scruple, attempt to make a jest of benevolence. To chase away this mist, and see clearly that man was not made for wickedness, take counsel of *collective mankind*, and hear their judgment. Observe at our theatres, when any fine trait of candour or goodness is represented, when soft humanity beams forth in all its brightness, every heart is filled with a pure delight. *There it is that you hear the genuine voice of nature.—Gresset.*

P. 224, n. 1.—

Labour for glory, nor let sordid gain
Ever inspire the worthy writer's pen.
The noblest wit, I grant, may without blame
Derive just tribute from his proper toil.
But who can bear that authors known to fame,
Despising glory, hungering for gold,
Should make their Pegasus a tradesman's hack,
An art divine, a branch of merchandise?—

Boileau.

VOL. V.

P. 224, l. 1.—Even as the river in its soft winding shuns the rough angularities of its banks, so, on the contrary, a broken margin and long openings are the finest ornaments of an extensive lake. Here the land advances into the bosom of the waters, there it opens deep recesses for the tide, and thus, invited by a mutual affection, the land and the water solicit each other in turn. These varied aspects entertain your view.—*De Lille.*

P. 244, n. 1, l. 1.—Each sense, by a happy concurrence, lends to the allied senses mutual help. The verdant margin of the waters heightens, to my sense, the beauty of their murmur; their murmur, again, beautifies their verdure. Smell aids taste, and sight serves smell; the odour of the rose heightens its splendour, and the delicious amber-flavour of the peach makes it seem more savoury to the palate of the eater. Thus love is blessed by a double theft; the hand invites the eye, the eye the hand; and the sweet mouth, where the kiss reposes, has a sweeter fragrance from the rosiness of the lips. Thus all the senses sympathise, and, doubling their pleasures, mutually awaken the desires.—*De Lille.*

P. 246, l. 18.—Venus lacks nothing, neither lilies nor roses; nor the exquisite mixture of all lovely things; nor that secret charm which captivates the eye; nor that grace which is still more charming than beauty.—*La Fontaine.*

P. 341, n. 1, c. 1, l. 3.—One must repair to that magic palace, where fine verses, dance, music, the art of charming the eye with colours, the still happier one of enticing hearts, form out of a hundred different pleasures one that is unique.—*Voltaire.*

P. 360, n., c. 1.—Our uncle is a blockhead, who believes his whole talent to lie in an imaginary stock of common sense. . . . A brain of the shallowest, who, holding it as a maxim that a parish squire is a sublime being, entertains you everlastingly with stupid talk about his bench, his cares, and his dignity. You cannot imagine how profoundly he respects himself. Swear by his chateau, of which he is himself the architect. Idiotically taken up with his own doings, possessed with the demon of property, his favour or dislike will be determined by the view you take of all his little domain. First, on arriving, &c. &c.—*Gresset.*

P. 445, l. 4.—Imagination, prolific enchantress, which does more than merely keep and recollect, retraces the past, anticipates the future, recreates all that has been, and creates all that ought to be; bids the one exist, the other come back to life; and even as the voice of the Eternal called things out of nothing, *that which was hitherto non-existent answers to her, Behold me!*—*De Lille.*

VOL. VII.

P. 85, l. 1.—Among so many kinds of animals there is not one, except man, which has any knowledge of a God; and among men themselves there is no race so rude or savage, which, even although it be ignorant of what are the proper attributes of Deity, does not, nevertheless, know that a God it should have.—*Cicero.*

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TO THE

COLLECTED WORKS OF DUGALD STEWART.

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